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Abstract
This dissertation offers rereadings of works by two of the most controversial and
influential living writers: Martin Amis and Philip Roth. These writers are often
accused of amorality, or even immorality, and this thesis deals with the controversies
these authors have incited with specific focus on their alleged misogyny. Chapter
One defines exactly why Amis and Roth are genuine problems for readers. However,
I argue that simply condemning these writers also disables a reader's ability to see just
how invested they are in issues of pressing importance to contemporary society.
Chapters Two, Three, and Four examine specific novels by these authors in the light
of theories significant both to their work as well as popular and academic culture.
Chapter Two looks at how both Amis and Roth explore their separate theories about
ideology, and especially the idea of 'goodness', in Other People: A Mystery Story and
When She Was Good. Chapter Three takes as its subject trauma, history and
narrative, illustrating how they relate to Time's Arrow and Sabbath's Theater.
Finally, Chapter Four engages with masculinity theory, demonstrating Roth's and
Amis's interest in the subject as exemplified in Portnoy's Complaint and London
Fields. This thesis seeks to illustrate that Amis's and Roth's intellectual engagement
with the issues underlying these current theories defies those critics who argue that
they are amoral, immoral, or engaged entirely with their own solipsistic philosophies.
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The Chicago Tribune's 'Tempo' section from June 1, 2006, confronts its
reader with a large picture of an unsmiling Philip Roth staring directly into the
camera. He looks troubled, despite the brilliant sunshine in which he is lounging.
Underneath this picture is an outsized headline—the largest on the page—that reads
'Philip Roth Hates Women.' Julia Keller, the Tribune's 'cultural critic,' opens this
article with the words, 'He's the best novelist in America. I hope he never writes
another word.'1 Keller's reason for writing this statement introduces the central
theme of this thesis. She writes of her position:
A paradox, yes, but one born of baffled sadness. Philip Roth [. . .] breaks my
heart nearly every time he lifts his pen. Not because he's a bad writer—he's a
provocative and prolific genius—but because he's a great writer with a large
and terrible flaw: His women have no souls.2
These damning accusations—that Roth 'hates' women and that his misogyny is
represented by his female characters' having 'no souls'—resound throughout both the
academic and journalistic criticism of Philip Roth and his fiction. And yet, as Keller
recognizes, her position is paradoxical in that she also recognizes Roth as a 'genius'
■7
whose works are 'provocative.' In other words, Keller calls Roth a misogynist while
she admits that there is something about his narrative voice that would seem to pre¬
empt or question her accusation of misogyny. Martin Amis often faces a similar set
of criticisms regarding his relationship to women, as demonstrated by Bette
Pesetsky's 1990 review of Amis's London Fields. Pesetsky writes that the novel's
female protagonist, 'is a problem' because 'she makes us yield to a sneaking
1 Julia Keller, 'Philip Roth Hate's Women' Chicago Tribune June 1, 2006, section five, page
1.
2 Keller 1.
3 In another example, underneath another picture of Roth on p. 7, Keller writes 'Because
Philip Roth's work illuminates, the fact that he gives short shrift to half the human race is crushingly
sad.'
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suspicion that a misogynist lingers here somewhere. She is not truly satisfying as
character or caricature. She seems to be another of Mr. Amis's plastic women.'4
Because of her perceived problems with Amis's characterization of a woman in one
of his novels, Pesetsky calls Amis a 'misogynist.' To call a man a misogynist is to
suggest that he denounces, as R. Howard Bloch defines misogyny, 'the essentially]
evil nature of woman.'5 To believe that women are 'essentially evil' is quite different
than creating an artistic image of 'plastic' women. Pesetsky's use of such a harsh
accusation as 'misogynist' does not seem to be supported by the relatively mild
example for why she comes to her conclusion, and her language in accusing Amis
also suggests the vulnerability of her position. Her 'sneaking suspicion' that Amis is
a misogynist is a very timid way to level such a severe allegation. As we can see
from these examples, and as I will explore in greater detail, the word misogyny is used
to represent an often undefined set of negative attitudes that men might harbour
towards women.
These examples of 'typical' criticism taken from popular journalism point to
what is the central theme ofmy thesis: that Martin Amis and Philip Roth represent,
using Pesetsky's term, a 'problem' for readers. As I will show, both writers have
found themselves interpreted through their characters and the situations the authors
create in their novels. In other words, they are accused of sympathizing with their
most violent or offensive male characters or of creating scenarios depicting Violence
against women out of their own personal desires or fantasies. That said, both Roth
and Amis have repeatedly engaged in disturbing images of self-destructive women.
One of Amis's protagonists is a woman who instigates her own murder, a 'Murderee,'
4
Bette Pesetsky, 'Lust Among the Ruins,' New York Times March 4, 1990, late ed.: section 7;
page 1, column 1.
5 R. Howard Bloch, 'Medieval Misogyny', Representations, No. 20, Special Issue: Misogyny,
Misandry, and Misanthropy. (Autumn, 1987) 2.
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and another of his female characters is a woman so determined to kill herself that she
shoots herself in the head three times. Roth's character Lucy Nelson dramatically
self-destructs, freezing to death after running away from her family out of both
madness and spite. In another of Roth's novels, the protagonist is haunted by the
suicide of his first wife, whom he disparaged and dominated, even as his treatment of
his second wife aggravates her descent into despair, alcoholism, and repeated attempts
at suicide. Furthermore, Roth and Amis appear to focus not only on images of self-
destructive women but also on the cruelty, subjugation, or humiliation of sexual
relations between men and women. Among a plethora of possible examples, Roth's
depiction of a young man sodomizing a teenaged girl under her parents' pool table
while, upstairs, her mother describes their shopping trip vies for the reader's disgust
with Roth's detailed description of Mickey Sabbath urinating on his lover, Drenka.
For Amis's part, he refers to a character's violent history of rape as merely 'a
particular difficulty with girls.'6
Violent or sexually predatory characters like Keith Talent (London Fields) or
Alexander Portnoy (Portnoy 's Complaint) are often read as fictional representations
of the real interests and fantasies of Martin Amis and Philip Roth. At the publication
of Amis's novel Success, Jay Parini wrote in a review that 'Misanthropy becomes
misogyny in Success, another novel on the theme of sexual obsession. The novel's two
narrators, Gregory Riding and Terry Service, hate women almost as much as they hate
themselves, though it remains unclear where Mr. Amis stands on all this.'7 Here,
Parini identifies two of Amis's characters as misogynists and then suggests that Amis
might very well share their prejudice. Parini's example for why he makes such an
accusation is, as will be seen, a familiar one: he believes that the way Amis presents
6 Martin Amis, London Fields (1989; London: Vintage, 1991) 168.
7
Jay Parini, 'Men Who Hate Women,' The New York Times, Sept. 6, 1987, late ed.: Section 7;
Page 8, Column 1.
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characters such as Gregory is suspicious because of the amount of detail that Amis
uses to descnbe their imaginative worlds. A similar suggestion was often made in
regards to Keith Talent, one of Amis's most violently misogynistic characters.
Despite Keith's penchant for sexual violence, both Bette Pesetsky and Christina
Konig cite Keith as the most well-developed character in London Fields, with
Pesetsky calling him, 'Mr. Amis's best creation in the book' and Konig calling him a
character of 'alarming vitality'.9 That Amis writes of openly misogynistic characters
such as John Self (Money), Keith Talent (London Fields), and Little Keith (Dead
Babies) with such unsettling accuracy and, some would argue, excessive detail
suggests to critics such as Parini that Amis's interest in these male characters reflects
Amis's own identification with them. The association of Philip Roth with his
character Alexander Portnoy illustrates the public's predilection for identifying an
author with his worst creation even more dramatically. As shall be clarified later,
Portnoy's confessions are so extreme in their nature as to be almost unbelievable. But
because his excesses are so revolting they appear to have struck readers as all the
more likely to be 'true,' not in the sense of being more plausible in terms of narrative
and characterization but in the sense that Roth must have experienced for himself all
the acts that Portnoy describes. In an interview, Roth discusses what it was like to
have Portnoy's Complaint read because people thought it was 'Roth "spilling his guts
out".'10 He complains of people's reactions:
I felt myself locked, suddenly, into this image of me as a sexual beast. I ran
into that response frequently on the streets of Manhattan. People stepped right




Christina Koning 'Death by Request,' The Guardian, Sept. 21, 1989, Guardian Unlimited,
June 6, 2007 http://books.guardian.co.uk/reviews/generalficlion.
10 Ronald Hayman, 'Philip Roth: Should Sane Women Shy Away Form Him At Parties,'
Conversations with Philip Roth, ed. George J. Seales, Literary Conversations Series (1981; Jackson,
MS: University Press of Mississippi, 1992) 117.
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women shying away from me at parties—the sane women shying away, the
less sane edging close. Men I'd known as decent, hardworking fathers
confessed all kinds of horrendous things to me over lunch.'11
That Amis and Roth are 'read' autobiographically, or that they are conflated with their
characters, draws attention to a problem common to fiction. The fact that the
reputations of certain authors obfuscate other readings of their work, however, is
magnified in the case of Martin Amis and Philip Roth, providing a singular chance to
12
explore the conjunction of celebrity and authorship.
What is unique about both Amis's and Roth's particular brand of celebrity is
that it consists of as much infamy as it does fame. They are not just 'celebrities,' they
are, in many ways, celebrity misogynists. Some critics would suggest that they are as
famous for hating women, along with other prejudices, as they are writing novels.
But what critics mean when they use the word misogynist needs to be thought
through, as the definition ofmisogynist in academic parlance and in popular culture is
vague and oftentimes illimitable. The problem with defining misogyny becomes clear
in the examples I have already given. As Pesetsky seems to define it, a misogynist is
someone who sees women as 'plastic', or as malleable, shapeless and interchangeable.
And yet Keller claims that men who hate women cannot invest them with souls, a
definition similar to Bloch's in which misogynists see women's nature as
fundamentally evil. Defining women as malleable is certainly far less nefarious than
defining them as fundamentally evil, and yet both definitions are used for misogynist.
Misogyny seems to address a continuum of negative feelings towards women, from
defining a misogynist as someone who does not really like women all that much to
someone who hates them enough to consider them inhuman, and therefore not
11
Hayman 117.
12 Joe Moran's book Star Authors: Literary Celebrity in America (London: Pluto Press, 2000)
—which features a chapter on Philip Roth—explores the relationship between celebrity and authorship
in depth.
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deserving of basic human rights. To add to the fray, feminist and legal scholar
Catharine MacKinnon writes that 'the mainspring of sex inequality is misogyny and
13the mainspring of misogyny is sexual sadism.' MacKinnon, here, makes misogyny
as much about how men treat women as how they perceive them, adding a sexual
element that focuses on the sadistically sexualized treatment of women by men. But
Andrea Dworkin—whose Pornography is one of the most famous accounts of sexual
sadism and to whom MacKinnon dedicates the book in which she defines misogyny
using sexual sadism as an element—never uses the word misogyny, instead preferring
the term 'male-supremacist ideology.'14 In Dworkin's novel the word misogyny is
conspicuous by its absence, and I would argue that Dworkin avoids the word because
misogyny has lost much of its power through vague and excessive usage. Indeed, the
Random House Webster's Dictionary simply defines misogyny as 'hatred, dislike, or
mistrust of women'.1'' Misogyny, in these examples, is obviously a broad concept,
applicable to a variety of situations from 'mere' chauvinism to sexual brutality and
even murder. So what does it really mean to call Roth or Amis a misogynist? What
critics refer to when they call Roth or Amis a misogynist is, generally, their depiction
of women as self-destructive or their depiction of male characters who view women
as sexual objects rather than independent subjects invested with their own worth and
purpose. Alleging that neither Amis nor Roth can understand or appreciate women,
critics believe that this lack translates into an inability to write women; that their
female characters lack definition and artistry symbolizes Amis's and Roth's distaste
for the subject. And yet, as I have already iterated, something about these two authors
makes critics wary of pronouncing judgment even as they do so: they call Roth 'a
13 Katherine MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law (Cambridge,
MA & London: Harvard UP, 1987) 5.
14 Andrea Dworkin, Pornography: Men Possessing Women (London: The Women's Press Ltd,
1981)13.
15
'Misogyny', Random-House Webster's Dictionary, 2nd ed, 1230.
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genius' even as they excoriate him as a woman-hater, and they undermine their
otherwise-damning accusation of Amis as a misogynist by using insipid or weak
language. What this thesis attempts to think through is this paradoxical and, often,
unfruitful critical relationship by asking what does it really mean to call Roth or Amis
a misogynist and how else can Roth and Amis be read.
By wondering about whether writers such as Roth are 'misogynists' or
'geniuses,' Keller pinpoints an important debate located within the 'typical' criticism
of the work of Amis and Roth. Keller invokes a set of familiar and yet still-resistant
questions about what kind of writer is a 'good' writer. Can a writer be a 'genius' and
a misogynist (or a racist, or an anti-Semite) at the same time? And if a writer is a
'genius,' does that mean that he cannot be a misogynist? These dilemmas are at the
heart ofmany critics' attacks on, and defences of, Amis and Roth. Those who
approve of Roth and Amis dismiss those critics who call them, amongst other things,
misogynists by citing their narrative voice. As argued by critics such as Harold
Bloom and James Diedrick, both writers use irony and humour in such a way as to
make blanket accusations ofmisogyny problematical.16 And yet this aesthetic or
stylistic argument is similarly dismissed by those who maintain that no amount of
humour, stylistic virtuosity, or postmodern irony can mask the pernicious effects of
prejudice on their novels. It is here that I want to set myself apart from the 'debate'
over Roth and Amis. It is my assertion that far too much time is spent arguing against
or defending Roth and Amis in terms of their female characters. The former side of
the debate assumes that Roth and Amis are interested in establishing or exploring
stable or essential images of women, while the latter claims that such accusations are
16
See Harold Bloom's introduction to Philip Roth, ed. Harold Bloom, Bloom's Modern
Critical Views (Philadelphia: Chelsea House Publishers, 2003) 1-6.
Also see James Diedrick, Understanding Martin Amis, 2nd ed. (Columbia, SC: University of
South Carolina Press, 2004) 28-56.
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simply inapplicable to writers of such stature and talent as Roth and Amis. These are
both assumptions with which I disagree. While I have no doubt that neither talent nor
fame can insulate a writer from his worst prejudices, I do not believe that Roth and
Amis are in any way interested in presenting to the world their idea of what it is to be
a woman. Instead, I want to focus my research on a set of themes that represent these
authors' real interests: themes that either transcend gender or focus on negative
images ofmasculinity and men. These themes are clearly discernable in both writers'
work from the beginning of their careers, and yet these themes have often been
ignored in favour of readings that focus on the alleged politics and prejudices of their
authors. Indeed, I believe that an argument about whether or not it matters if Roth
and Amis hate women is beside the point, but not because such debates are
unimportant or irrelevant. Rather, I argue that both Amis and Roth are clearly
fascinated by understanding a set of thematic issues that would certainly complicate
and even preclude critics' allegations of misogyny. One of the most obvious of these
concerns is with the masculine subject. Both writers attempt to understand and
articulate how the masculine subject is formed, be it by society, culture and history, or
by individual choice. This focus on masculinity also translates into an interest in how
masculinity imagines itself through a necessarily dichotomized feminine 'other'.
Another clear thematic interest that both Roth and Amis share is an interest in history,
trauma, and narrative. Their fiction has focused upon some of the most traumatizing
events of recent history, and they have both tried to imagine the limits and
possibilities of narrating such events. Another locus of these authors' attention is
ideology: both writers are fascinated by what it means to be 'good' and how ideology
functions in the lives of individuals.
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This thesis examines some of Amis's and Roth's most important and
controversial novels in the light of the themes articulated above. While much critical
attention has been spent either condemning or justifying these novels, as well as their
writers, I want to focus my attention on particular rereadings. Although this thesis is
certainly not meant as a 'defence' of Amis or Roth, it does attempt to engage with and
re-interpret those aspects of their work that are the most controversial. And so
Chapter One explores more fully the 'problem' that Roth and Amis represent. In
Chapter One I take advantage of the plethora of journalism written about the two
authors, as well as the work of academic critics, in order to isolate themes common to
both types of criticism. What I discover in the case of both novelists is a tendency to
read their fiction 'autobiographically,' with the critic often beginning from the cynical
position of 'knowing' who Roth or Amis 'really is.' In other words, the celebrity
caricature of both Philip Roth and Martin Amis seems to define how certain critics
read their novels. But what makes this so interesting is how some critics turn such
autobiographical readings around and actually define and advertise their own politics
through their readings of Roth and Amis. And yet another major theme of this
chapter is that Roth and Amis are, genuinely, problematic writers: that they do,
indeed, seem preoccupied with images of self-destroying women and that they focus
on unequal, humiliating and 'deviant' sexual pairings. However, rather than using
these assertions as 'facts' proving the misogyny of Amis or Roth, I introduce my
intention to think through these images and present alternative readings for some of
these author's most controversial novels.
Chapter Two takes as its thematic subject the concept of ideology, and how
'goodness' is represented in Amis's novel Other People: A Mystery Story and Roth's
novel When She Was Good. Both novels were relatively early works, and both focus
9
on self-destructive female protagonists. In When She Was Good, Roth creates a
young woman so full of rage with her family and society, which she believes to be
corrupt and barbarous, that she will do anything to defy them and to be 'good.'
However, her definition of 'goodness' is entirely reactive and self-destructive, and her
violent attempts at changing those around her result in her ultimate defeat and death.
Other People recounts the life-and-death story of Amy Hide, missing and presumed
murdered, and the amnesiac Mary Lamb, who may actually be the resurrected Amy
Hide. While Amy Hide relished hurting others, Mary Lamb tries her best to be
'good,' and yet she proves to be as destructive, to herself and to others, as her sadistic
alter-ego. While many critics saw in these novels early evidence that Roth and Amis
are intent on vilifying women, I argue that both books actually reveal these writers'
interest in how ideology functions for the individual - whether man or woman - in
society. To support this assertion, I will turn to Friedrich Nietzsche's work on
ressentiment and Gilles Deleuze's concept of the micropolitical. These philosophies
help to contextualize the radical nature of the individual's relationship to ideology as
understood by Roth and Amis.
In Chapter Three, I turn my attention to trauma, history, and narrative. I have
found Cathy Caruth's and Shoshanna Felman's seminal texts defining both trauma
and testimony invaluable, along with the definition of history and historiography
mapped out by Dominick LaCapra. The work of Ruth Leys has also proved
particularly useful with her helpful insights into the problems with common
conceptions of trauma. These works have all helped me to understand both the
possibilities and the limits of trauma theory and to apply the theory to Amis's novel
Time's Arrow and Roth's novel Sabbath's Theater. Both novels deal with World War
Two and the traumatized subject, but both novels also problematize theories of
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trauma, narrative and history by making their protagonists both the victims and the
perpetrators of trauma. Time's Arrow tells the story of a Nazi doctor guilty of
committing mass murder at Auschwitz, but this story is told backwards. Through
Amis's reversal of the narrative, the atrocities committed by the doctor at Auschwitz
become miraculous acts of regeneration, while the 'good' acts of surgeons in hospitals
become such gross mistreatments as inserting tumours into patients or unstitching
healing wounds. This temporal reversal destabilizes the conventional 'traumatic'
narrative, calling attention to the fundamentally enigmatic experience of the
Holocaust as both a historical moment and a symbolic construct. Sabbath's Theater is
similarly destabilizing in that its protagonist is both a victim of trauma as well as a
perpetrator of traumatizing acts, and the latter seems to be inextricable from the
former. But Sabbath's Theater is most interested in the narrative function of
testimony, and Sabbath is, first and foremost, a storyteller. For all ofMickey's verbal
and sexual excesses, exploring the limits and the potential of testimonial narrative is
at the heart of this novel.
Finally, in Chapter Four, I turn to the most obvious theme that links Roth and
Amis: masculinity and the masculine subject. Much attention has been paid by
feminists and feminist critics to the alleged weaknesses of Roth's and Amis's female
characters, as outlined in Chapter One. One line of feminist attack is the claim that
Roth and Amis are not interested in the female subject and that this lack of interest
17
stems from their lack of respect for women and female subjectivity. In this Chapter
I turn such criticism on its head by asking—if Roth and Amis really are not interested
in women—then what do they have to say about men? Therefore, instead of relying
on oft-used feminist critiques of their fiction, I have turned to theories of masculinity.
17 For an excellent example of this type of argument, see the concluding paragraph of Mary
Allen's chapter on Roth, from A Necessary Blankness: Women in Major American Fiction of the
Sixties (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1976) 96.
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In particular I have found the work of masculinity theorists such as Michael Kimmel
and R. W. Connell helpful for their definitions of masculinity and masculinity theory,
as well as for the spirited debate between such theorists as to the possibilities as well
as the problems inherent in common theories of masculinity. I have also found
feminists critics ofmasculinity particularly interesting, especially the work of Judith
Kegan Gardiner, for both their careful consideration of and their scepticism towards
certain important aspects of masculinity theory. By turning my attention to Amis's
and Roth's representation of the masculine subject, I reveal that they are far more
interested in the flaws and dangerous proclivities of masculinity than they are
disseminators of an allegedly misogynistic imaginary. In Amis's novel London
Fields, one of his most controversial, I argue that his presentation of a self-destroying
female stereotype is just that: that Nicola Six is everything feminist critics accuse her
of being. Nicola is, indeed, a dead and deathly caricature of femininity. Crucially,
however, the 'point' of the novel is not Nicola Six but the three men who interact with
her and insist on seeing her as real. As such, the novel is not about exploring
feminine subjectivity, but about a particularly pernicious type of masculinity that
imagines itself through dead and deathly images of femininity. Similarly, Portnoy's
Complaint is also not about the real women in Portnoy's life but about Portnoy's
destructive 'relationship' with a wholly imaginary feminine stereotype. Indeed,
Portnoy is trapped between two wholly unworkable and extreme fantasies of
masculinity promulgated in American society, and the novel explores the
consequences of his inability to live up to either expectation.
In this thesis I have chosen to grapple with some of the most controversial
novels written by Martin Amis and Philip Roth. Without exception, each of these
novels has been accused of either propagating misogynistic images of women or
12
indulging in the fantasies of violent masculine imaginaries. While the readings I offer
are certainly not the only ones available, they are meant to offer an alternative to those
formulaic critiques that insist on reading the fiction of Amis and Roth as the works of
committed misogynists. My readings also focus on what I believe is a central trope
for both writers: that of the gendered subject in general. Indeed, in my final analysis,
Roth and Amis are far more interested in understanding the compulsions and anxieties
that foment misogyny in the masculine subject than they are in denigrating femininity.
Survey of Recent Academic Criticism
In the case of Martin Amis, there are five books, all relatively current, that
comprise the published body of academic monographs. Three are introductory texts
that are part of larger series. James Diedrick's Understanding Martin Amis is in its
second edition and is the most comprehensive study of Amis available. Diedrick
served as the webmaster of the Martin Amis Web for years, and is probably the
foremost critic of Amis's fiction.18 While Diedrick's Understanding Martin Amis is
typical of its genre in that its main focus is on introducing Amis's major works
alongside of a discussion of the criticism, both academic and popular, that is
available; his own understanding of Amis stands out in two specific veins of criticism.
Firstly, Diedrick argues for an increasing conservatism in Amis's novelistic world
view that in some ways parallels but in other ways contradicts the political trajectory
of Amis's father. In this way, Diedrick challenges the popular journalistic view of
Amis and his father that continually invokes their alleged dependence on one another
without really engaging critically with this theme. Secondly, Diedrick focuses on
what he considers to be Amis's foremost impulses in his fiction: the first being a
ls Diedrick even helped Amis to compile and edit Amis's non-fiction collection of essays and
criticism, The WarAgainst Cliche: Essays and Reviews 1971-2000.
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journalistic and satirical, or a 'State of the Nation' impulse, and the second being a
Nabokovian aesthetic comprising a love of experimental narrative and word-play.
Diedrick's importance for Amis-studies cannot be underestimated, and he is
universally quoted by other academics writing on Amis.
The other two introductory texts are by Nicolas Tredell, The Fiction ofMartin
Amis, and Margaret Reynolds and Jonathan Noakes, Martin Amis: The Essential
Guide. The latter is really a work for book clubs or for individuals approaching
Amis's fiction for the first time. The nature of this book reiterates my thesis's
exploration of how Amis's fiction stands at a crossroads of academic and popular
interest. On the one hand, the topics and themes that Reynolds and Noakes introduces
are distinctly academic: one bullet-pointed list of themes includes 'narrative
structure,' 'time and memory,' 'naming,' 'the idea of the author,' 'fictionality,'and
'postmodernism'.19 On the other hand, the introduction delves deeply into popular
culture's reception of Amis, focusing on book reviews rather than more academic
criticism. And alongside the very academic themes discussed are discussions of the
'problems' Amis raises for reviewers and popular journalists, such as his depiction of
women. Similarly, Tredell's book, which is a compilation of criticism, emphasizes
the conjunction of academic and journalistic criticism in Amis studies. A typical
chapter, in this case on Dead Babies, includes 'Insightful reviews by John Mellors,
Elaine Feinstein and Peter Ackroyd; Richard Brown on the novel's trio of Americans;
Neil Powell on its literary allusions and grotesque characters; James Diedrick's
20
informed assessment of Dead Babies, as a satire.' These various introductory texts
influenced my thesis in that they continually reminded me of how much 'Martin
19
Margaret Reynolds and Jonathan Noakes, Martin Amis: The Essential Guide, Vintage
Living Texts: Contemporary Literature in Close Up (London: Vintage, 2003) 67.
20 Nicolas Tredell, Ed., The Fiction ofMartin Amis: A Reader's Guide to Essential Criticism,
Icon Readers Guide (Cambridge: Icon Books Ltd., 2000) 3.
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Amis,' the literary celebrity, is as much a product of a popular, journalistic
imagination as he the product of considered academic study of his written work.
Gavin Keulks, who took over the management of The Martin Amis Web from
Diedrick in recent years, has produced two important texts of Amis criticism. One is
an edited compilation, Martin Amis: Postmodernism and Beyond, that features most
of the major players in Amis criticism, including James Diedrick and Brian Finney,
who has published important journal articles on Amis's fiction. The nature of this
edited compilation is highly academic and covers Amis's fiction from the earliest
novels to the latest as well as Amis's own journalism. For the purposes ofmy own
research, Susan Brook's essay 'The Female Form, Sublimation, and Nicola Six' was
especially interesting, as was Philip Tew's 'Martin Amis and Late-twentieth-century
Working-class Masculinity: Money and London Fields' Both of these essays
resemble my own attempts to re-read Amis's texts by focusing on their critiques of
contemporary gendered subjects, something often ignored by reviewers who see
Amis's satirical portrayals of gender as representative of his reputed misogyny.
Another interesting facet of this collection is just how international it is; the
academics involved come not only from across Britain and North America but from
the Netherlands, Hungary, and France. This geographical spread implies Amis's
importance to contemporary literature in general, and not just to the English-speaking
world.
Keulks's other major book is incredibly important to Amis criticism in that it
is the most sustained engagement with the relationship between Kingsley and Martin
Amis. Entitled Father and Son: Kingsley Amis, Martin Amis, and the British Novel
Since 1950, Keulks directly confronts not only the impact the two Amises had on one
other but also the media obsession with a relationship that they take for granted at the
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same time that they do not really attempt to understand it. Keulks's basic premise is
that the interests of both Amises often mirror each other, but reveal interesting
tensions and displacements as much as similarities. The book is laid out by first
giving a broad, stereotypical and largely recycled introduction to the anecdotal
Amises; the media figures who made headlines for their snipes and japes at one
another's politics and writing styles. But this is where the stereotypes end, and the
rest of the book is a carefully considered study of exactly where the Amises agreed
and disagreed and, more importantly, not only why they did so but how these views
either reflected or influenced their imaginative vision of the world. In order to
achieve his objective, Keulks begins by discussing the Amises 'artistic allegiances,'
21both American and English. Keulks intention is to illustrate the divides between
Kingsley's and Martin's artistic visions, as well as to show how father and son
influenced each other's interests, both positive and negative. One of the American
writers discussed is Philip Roth, who, unlike Bellow or Nabokov, functioned more as
a competitor for Martin Amis than a mentor, as had the other two. Keulks describes
Amis's uneasy fascination with 'Roth's stylistic strengths with his structural
22
difficulties', something that Amis struggled with in his own fiction. Keulks then
looks at the intersection of particular themes in both Amises works: for example,
satire in Kingsley's Ending Up and Martin's Dead Babies or comedy in Kingsley's
Lucky Jim and Martin's The Rachel Papers. The purpose of these various discussions
is to prove that in some ways the media portrayal of the Amises as important to one
another's literary careers is absolutely undeniable, and yet to simply take for granted a
relationship made up of such complexity is to ignore or deny a profoundly
21 Gavin Keulks, Falhe & Son: Kingsley Amis, Martin Amis and the British Novel since 1950
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2003) vi.
22 Keulks 59.
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complicated, paradoxical, and fruitful line of critical enquiry for those genuinely
interested in either Amis's fiction.
Of final interest to this work is John A. Dem's Martians, Monsters And
Madonna: Fiction And Form in the World ofMartin Amis. As Dern's title suggests,
his study delves into the aesthetics of Amis's fiction. Dem argues Amis's position as
a postmodernist, citing Amis's experimental narrative forms, his unreliable narrators,
and his apocalyptic vision as evidence for his thesis. His study involves nearly every
major Amis novel, but he is particularly persuasive in his discussion of London
Fields, a chapter that I found helpful for my own work. In this chapter, Dem traces
the history of unreliable narrators, and offers a convincing argument for Nicola's
positioning as a symbol of Amis's emphasis upon style as 'more important than story,
plot, or character development'.23 But Dem argues that this emphasis on style,
however, represents a critique on Amis's part of the postmodern condition as much as
it represents Amis's own artistic motto. In other words, Dem highlights the curious
conjunction of critique and approbation that complicates so many of Amis's thematic
approaches.
The works discussed above represents the major body of Amis criticism, but
two other critics stand out in their engagement with Amis. The first is Brian Finney,
mentioned above, who has published two important articles on Amis. Finney, like
Dem, writes on Amis as a postmodernist, as well as Amis's position amongst
contemporary English writers. The other is James Wood, who straddles the divide
between popular and academic criticism with his book reviews and larger studies
published in The New Yorker, The New Republic, and The New York Review ofBooks
as well as in his book-length studies The Broken Estate and The Irresponsible Self:
23
John A. Dern, Martians, Monsters & Madonna: Fiction & Form in the World ofMartin
Amis (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., 2000) 47.
On Laughter and the Novel. Wood's works were of major importance to my work on
Amis, partly because of how they are, like Amis's work itself, a curious combination
of popular and academic. Highly readable, Wood's work is as literary as it is
scholarly, and he writes about both Amis and Roth with particular verve and insight.
His reviews, in particular those anthologised in The Broken Estate, were particularly
interesting to me in that Wood always avoids engaging with the novels he reviews as
if they were just the next stage of development for the author in question. Rather,
Wood looks upon the novels he reviews with fresh eyes, seeing them for their own
merits before trying to 'place' them in the author's oeuvre. This clarity and lack of
agenda is no small feat when dealing with the likes of Martin Amis or Philip Roth,
who are as infamous as they are famous.
The body of academic work available for Philip Roth is larger than that of
Amis, reflecting Roth's longer career as well as the prestige of the awards and
honours he has received. For the purposes of this introductory survey, I will only
discuss those books that are of particular relevance to this thesis. Two of the most
obvious books to be mentioned are Hermione Lee's short study and Harold Bloom's
anthology, both entitled Philip Roth. Although Lee's book was published in 1982,
and therefore predates the publication of some of the texts discussed in this thesis, the
importance of her work to the study of Philip Roth cannot be underestimated. Her
status as a well-known and well-respected female critic combined with the fact that
she defends Roth as 'one of the most significant and remarkable of contemporary
writers: bold, cunning, humane, ambitious, versatile and wise' make her an important
figure of support for Roth.24 Her insightful and lively book engages with Roth as a
figure of both critical delight and revulsion and an author 'received as both a
24 Hermione Lee, Philip Roth, Contemporary Writers (London: Methuan & Co. Ltd., 1982)
"popular" and as a "highbrow" writer.'25 Lee's insight into how these apparently
contradictory critical impulses function in Roth's fiction as an aspect of his
imaginative and aesthetic vision was of great importance to my own research. For
example, she talks about how Roth 'repeatedly describes his subject as being
individuals struggling to get through and beyond the boundaries that seem to be set
down for them.'26 The themes of transgression that Lee traces in Roth's fiction have
not only inspired my own criticisms, but have also clearly influenced many of Roth's
other critics, especially Ross Posnock's recent study. Roth's art of transgression is
also a theme engaged with by many of the critics in Bloom's anthology.
As in the case of Lee, the significance of Harold Bloom's support of Roth
cannot be underestimated. As one of the premier names in American academia,
Bloom's inclusion of Roth in his 'Bloom's Modern Critical Views' implies Roth's
canonical status.27 As do so many Roth-related books, Bloom's introduction presents
Roth as a figure of controversy; in this case Bloom addresses the charge that Roth is
an anti-Semitic or self-hating Jew. And, like Lee, Roth uses his introduction to
present his own defence of Roth, closing his introduction by stating 'Roth has earned
a permanent place in American literature by a comic genius that need never be
28doubted again'. In the rest of the anthology, Bloom seems to have organized his
choices around this central theme of Roth as a transgressive or disruptive force in
American letters and what this theme actually suggests about Roth's artistic
imagination. Most notably, Robert M. Greenberg's essay 'Transgression in the
Fiction of Philip Roth' engages with the question of how Roth's 'intergenerational
25 Lee 82.
26 Lee 19.
27 Bloom's anthology, published in 2003, anticipates the Library of America's publication of
Roth's entire body of work. This ultimate act of canonization has only been given to two other writers
during their own lifetime: Saul Bellow and Eudora Welty.
28 Harold Bloom, introduction, Philip Roth, ed. Harold Bloom, Bloom's Modern Critical
Views (Philadelphia: Chelsea House Publishers, 2003) 6.
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interpretation of the cultural origin of transgression in Roth's fiction illuminates the
details ofmany of his narratives' .29 Another important essay in this collection, in
terms of this thesis, was Frank Kelleter's 'Portrait of the Sexist as a Dying Man:
Death, Ideology, and the Erotic in Philip Roth's Sabbath Theater'. Kelleter's
discussion of Sabbath as 'the subversive libertine' influenced my own discussion of
Sabbath's Dionysian or Sadean impulses.30
As mentioned above, Ross Posnock's Philip Roth's Rude Truth: The Art of
Immaturity, deserves special mention in connection with a discussion of transgression
in Roth's literature. In Rude Truth, Posnock explores how 'the anti-nice, the rude, is
synonymous with a vitality won from socializing forces bent on exacting obedience,
restraint repression—basic constituents of mature adulthood.'31 Although this book
was not available in time for me to include in my own study, Posnock reiterates many
of the connections I have made in this thesis, especially the connections between Roth
and Nietzsche's philosophies. Similarly, Elaine B. Safer's Mocking the Age: The
Later Novels ofPhilip Roth, also published in 2006, investigates the role of
transgression, especially the roles of humour and mockery, in Roth's fiction. What
both of these books contribute to situating my thesis within a larger body of academic
criticism devoted to Roth is that they, too, offer rereadings of those aspects of Roth's
fiction that are sometimes read as 'just' offensive. Both of these books admit that, of
course, Roth's fiction is offensive, but they, as I do here, also ask what being
offensive might mean in terms ofRoth's understanding of the human condition.
29
Robert M. Greenberg, 'Transgression in the Fiction of Philip Roth,' Philip Roth, ed. Harold
Bloom, Bloom's Modern Critical Views (Philadelphia: Chelsea House Publishers, 2003) 81.
30
Frank Kelleter, 'Portrait of the Sexist as a Dying Man: Death, Ideology, and the Erotic in
Philip Roth's Sabbath Theater', Philip Roth, ed. Harold Bloom, Bloom's Modern Critical Views
(Philadelphia: Chelsea House Publishers, 2003) 187.
31
Ross Posnock, Philip Roth's Rude Truth: The Art of Immaturity (Princeton and Oxford;
Princeton UP, 2006).
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The final three books to be discussed are written by three people of particular
significance within Roth studies. The first, Mark Shechner, is both an academic and
book reviewer, and his collection of essays and reviews, Up Society's Ass, Copper:
Rereading Philip Roth, includes both academic essays and book reviews written over
the course of Shechner's, and Roth's, career. In this study, Shechner reprints a
selection of contemporaneous essays and reviews but follows them up with 'Second
Thoughts' sections that address either new thoughts he has had on the novels
discussed or quibbles with the arguments he made in the past. As the title of this book
suggests, Shechner also engages with the theme of transgression in Roth, and he also
offers 'rereadings' of Roth's fiction. What makes this book of special interest for
me was the struggle outlined in these reviews, and their answering "Second
Thoughts", between an academic who really appreciates Roth's aestheticism and his
narrative power and a reviewer who might love the vitality and humour of Roth's
novels but is genuinely disturbed by some of Roth's depictions of racism, sexism, and
apparent anti-Semitism. In other words, Shechner reiterates my thesis's underlying
implication that Roth's ubiquitous and loaded reputation influences even the most
academic discussions of his work, even if, in the case of Bloom, it is addressed in
order to be dismissed.
The second writer, Debra Shostak, is another prominent Roth scholar. Shostak
begins her book, Philip Roth: Countertexts, Counterlives, by discussing Roth's 1994
New York Times Book Review piece entitled "Juice or Gravy?". These choices,
offered by a Sicilian cafeteria worker, represent for Roth the joy of choosing between
oppositions. Meanwhile, what Shostak implies—and what her own work both
advertently and inadvertently represents—is that engaging with Roth's work means
32
In Shechner's case, however, his title's use of 'rereading' also refers to his rereadings of his
own work as much as rereading Roth's.
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first choosing a version of 'Philip Roth'. For just as Roth's fiction deals with the
countertexts and counterlives of Shostak's title, Roth criticism inevitably involves the
debate about who Roth really is: the self-hating, anti-Semitic misogynist bent on
reproducing pornography and giving offence, or the serious-minded and aesthetically
gifted ethicist determined to confront his own, and the world's, sins. Shostak
summarizes the dilemma for readers and critics of Roth's fiction in very effective
terms: 'does a reader have a moral imperative to reject the home truths he is revealing
about our unseemly solipsism, or is it simply easier to reject Roth for stating them?'.33
Indeed, this dilemma underpins Shostak's book. She takes those most pernicious
aspects of Roth's works—his betrayal of the contract between readers and authors that
stipulates authors must tell their readers whether they are reading fact or fiction, his
insistence on writing about sex in a way that is both disturbingly frank and
symbolically surreal, his unsympathetic portrayals of both Jews and women, and his
constant baiting of those critics who insist on his misogyny or his identity as a self-
hating Jew—and argues outward, depicting Roth as an author driven by the tensions
his fictions create.
For the purposes of this thesis, what I found most helpful was Shostak's
examination of how these tensions can be traced back to Roth's thematic obsession
with identifying, assessing, and questioning the myths and ideologies of selfhood that
underpin various identities. Her organization, by theme rather than chronology,
illustrates her theory that Roth's novels "'converse" with one another'.34 For
example, chapter one deals with male embodiment and the self, chapter two discusses
much the same issue but with the added dimension of Jewish American identity
connected to the male body and chapter three investigates the complexities of theories
33 Debra Shostak, Philip Roth-Countertexts, Counterlives (Columbia, SC: U of South Carolina
P, 2004)61.
34 Shotak vii.
of Jewish selfhood. Under these thematic categories of the male self, the Jewish-male
self, and the Jewish self, Shostak divides and discusses such diverse novels as The
Breast, American Pastoral, and Operation Shylock. Meanwhile, Shostak is careful to
remind readers that these categories are, to a certain extent, subjective choices: that
most of these novels could be discussed under any of the thematic categories and that
other themes exist that are not discussed here. For me, Shostak's engagement with
Roth as a controversial figure and her clear understanding of the themes that unite
Roth's fiction and his imaginative worlds was of signature importance to my own
work.
Finally, any survey of recent and relevant Roth criticism must include a
discussion of Derek Parker Royal's Philip Roth: New Perspectives on an American
Author. Royal is the founder and President of the Philip Roth Society as well as the
executive editor of its journal, Philip Roth Studies. He has written many articles
about Roth, and his collection New Perspectives includes essays by many of the
influential names in Roth studies. Three essays included were of special interest to
my thesis, the first being Julie Husband's 'Female Hysteria and Sisterhood in Letting
Go and When She Was Good'. Husband is one of the few academics to engage with
When She Was Good, a novel that is often dismissed by critics as an aberration in
Roth's oeuvre in that it is Roth's only entirely 'gentile' book as well as the most
Jamesian of his novels. While 1 disagree with the fundamental premise of Husband's
essay, that Roth ignores the possibility of a feminist 'sisterhood' for his female
characters, her unique reading of the text does offer many useful insights into this
much under-valued novel. The second essay to inspire my own thinking was David
Brauner's "'Getting in Your Retaliation First": Narrative Strategies in Portnoy's
Complaint'. Brauner aggressively confronts the popular reading of Portnoy's
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Complaint that conflated Roth with his protagonist, and explores how this novel
revolutionized Jewish-American fiction as well as American fiction, in general.
Finally, Ranen Omer-Sherman's '"A Little Stranger in the House": Madness and
Identity in Sabbath's Theater' concentrated on Sabbath's Theater as a Jewish reverie
on being an exile in America. While this reading is not at all my own, reading this
work clarified for me how Roth's novels offer so many multiple layers of meaning,
quilted one on top of the other. It was this essay that helped me understand my own
intentions to 'reread' Roth's novels, not because I thought that I had the 'only' or the
'true' reading but because the whole point of Roth's style and artistic vision is to
fracture ideas and themes into a multiplicity of meaning. And this is exactly what this
collection does; it offers rereadings upon rereadings, defying that journalistic urge to
summarize Roth or Roth's novels into attention-grabbing headlines that ignore the
intricacies of his fiction.
24
Chapter One
Literature isn't a moral beauty contest.
-Philip Roth, in an interview with Hermione Lee (1984)
Sexism is like racism: we all feel such impulses. Our parents feel them more
strongly than we feel them. Our children, we hope, will feel them less
strongly than we feel them. People don't change, or improve much, but they
do evolve.
-Martin Amis, The WarAgainst Cliche (1991)
Literature is a particularly effective medium for misogyny because it can be
dealt with subtly, even subconsciously, since outright statements of misogyny
are generally unacceptable.
-Mary Allen, A Necessary Blankness (1976)
The novels ofMartin Amis and Philip Roth could stand as the locus classicus
of the way that a certain section of modern culture wants to think through its gender
politics. As male novelists who often use figures of self-destroying women in their
fiction, they have been accused of having a problem with women. In the case of
Martin Amis, this 'woman problem' is best exemplified by the 1989 Booker prize
controversy surrounding London Fields and its self-murdering female protagonist,
Nicola Six.35 Not only was London Fields not short listed for the award, but The New
Statesman reported that 'Maggie Gee and Helen McNeil, the two female judges, were
fiercely anti-Amis, accusing him ofmisogyny.'36 The Times Literary Supplement
reported that Gee not only made 'a strong, formal, purely "literary" case against
London Fields,' but that she also, 'wonders whether debate over the very notion of
extra-literariness has not gone to sleep in Britain, and concedes that matters
discounted by most of the critical establishment - sexual politics, for one, and
untutored, or anti-tutorial, gut reactions, for another - have an inevitable place in
35
In London Fields, Nicola Six 'knows' that she will be murdered, and the novel charts her
relationships with the three men she has chosen as pawns in her quest for death.
36
Martin Goff, "Playing Silly Bookers," The New Statesman 23 Oct. 1998, The Martin Amis
Web, ed. James Diedrick, June 10, 2007 <http://www.martinamisweb.com/pre_2006/lfbooker.htm>.
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judgements in taste.' Gee defends herself by arguing a 'purely literary case' against
London Fields, but then immediately implies that actually some sort of 'gut reaction'
against Amis's depiction of women was also intrinsic to her judgment of his novel.
Meanwhile, Gee and McNeil were not the only critics to denounce London Fields as a
misogynistic text. Of the novel's main female character, book reviewer Bette
Pesetsky writes: 'Nicola is a problem [. ..] she makes us yield to a sneaking suspicion
that a misogynist lingers here somewhere [ . . .] She seems to be another ofMr.
Amis's plastic women.'38 Pesetsky claims that Nicola Six is representative of a
problematic type of woman often found in Amis's fiction. In turn, she implies some
sort of creative obsession on Amis's part with misogynistic images and representation
of women.
Philip Roth has also been the target of critics who have railed against his
depiction of self-destructive women. In 1976, Vivian Gornick famously published an
article in the Village Voice entitled, 'Why Do These Men Hate Women?' with
pictures resembling mug shots of Philip Roth, Saul Bellow, Norman Mailer and
■jq
Henry Miller printed underneath the headline. Five years later, in 1981, Ronald
Hayman asked a similar question in his own headline, 'Philip Roth: Should Sane
Women Shy Away From Him At Parties?'.40 As recently as June of 2006, the first
37 'Liber Number Two,' Times Literary Supplement Dec. 15-21, The Martin Amis Web, ed.
James Diedrick, June 10, 2007 <http://www.martinamisweb.com/pre_2006/lfbooker.htm>.
38
Bette Pesetsky, 'Lust Among the Ruins,' rev. of London Fields, by Martin Amis, 4 March
1990, late ed. - Final Section 7: pg 1, col 1; Book Review Desk.
39 In his May 1997 article on Salon.com, D.T. Max discusses Vivian Gornick's article 'Why
Do These Men Hate Women?' (1975) published in the Village Voice. This sensational article
castigating Saul Bellow, Philip Roth, Norman Mailer and Henry Miller was a tremendous popular
success, and Gornick recalls Susan Glassman, Bellow's ex-wife, going out of her way to shake
Gornick's hand. However, Max quotes Gornick as saying that today 'she would not bother. "At the
time they were in the cat-bird seat. They were the enemy. Now their readership is limited to the Jewish
Community Center".' This caustic dismissal of four of America's literary giants seems especially
absurd considering that American Pastoral, which won the Pulitzer Prize in 1998, was published in
1997.
411 Ronald Hayman, 'Philip Roth: Should Sane Women Shy Away Form Him At Parlies,'
Conversations with Philip Roth, ed. George J. Scales, Literary Conversations Series (1981; Jackson,
MS: University Press of Mississippi, 1992) 113.
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page of the Chicago Tribune's 'Tempo' section featured a picture of Roth, with the
words 'Philip Roth Hates Women' as the headline.41 What is significant about these
headlines is that they do not involve Roth's work, they involve Roth himself. These
writers accuse Roth, not a specific character from his fiction, of hating women. Their
evidence in supporting these claims, however, is in the actions and thoughts of
characters such as Alexander Portnoy and Mickey Sabbath. That Roth and Amis are
perceived as having a woman problem is obvious, and yet the question of whether or
not they deserve such a label and how such labels affect readings of their work
remains to be considered.
What links Roth and Amis—two authors who many would imagine have little
in common albeit misogyny—is that they share the mutual problem that they are
interpreted through the choices and actions of their characters. Far from being a new
subject of concern, issues regarding the role of the author were addressed in the 1940s
and 1950s, most famously in The Intentional Fallacy. In this well-known essay,
William K. Wimsatt Junior and Monroe C. Beardsley contest the common assumption
that 'In order to judge the poet's performance, we must know what he intended.'42
Rather than understanding literature by relying upon the stated intentions of an author,
Wimsatt and Beardsley argue that:
The poem is not the critic's own and not the author's (it is detached from the
author at birth and goes about the world beyond his power to intend about it or
control it). The poem belongs to the public. It is embodied in language, the
peculiar possession of the public, and it is about the human being, an object of
public knowledge.43
41 Julia Keller, 'Philip Roth Hate's Women*: (*ls that True? And Does it Matter?), Chicago
Tribune (Tempo, Section Five, Thurs., June 1, 2006) 1,7.
42 William K. Wimsatt Jr. and Monroe C. Beardsley, 'The Intentional Fallacy,' The Norton
Anthology of Theory and Criticism, ed. Vincent B. Leitch, et al. (New York and London: W.W. Norton
& Co., 2001) 1375.
43 Wimsatt and Beardsley 1376.
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In this conception of literature, the writer ceases to exert control over a work when it
becomes public. At publication, literature becomes open to all of the various
interpretations that the public—with all their varieties of experience—might perceive
in its pages, making it unnecessary for a reader to know what an author may have
intended.44 Equally, this means that a reader should not look to identify an author
through his or her work: 'We ought to impute the thoughts and attitudes of the poem
immediately to the dramatic speaker'.45 To attribute the 'intentions' of a character to
the author is to engage in 'author psychology,' a 'personal' form of study not to be
confused with 'poetic' studies.46 In other words, 'author psychology,' or biography,
is a form of historical study rather than literary criticism.
Despite Wimsatt's and Beardsley's admonitions against 'reading' an author
through his or her text, Amis and Roth are constantly being portrayed as sympathetic
to their most despicable male characters. To help explain why situations like this
occur, Wayne C. Booth argues that falling into the intentional fallacy is both hard to
avoid and not entirely specious. In The Rhetoric ofFiction, Booth explains that no
matter how much a writer wants to remain objective towards his subject and his
characters, 'his reader will inevitably construct a picture of the official scribe who
writes in this manner—and of course that official scribe will never be neutral toward
all values. Our reactions to his various commitments, secret or overt, will help to
determine our response to his work.'47 In other words, fallacy or not, a reader will
read the author into the text. Booth also argues that as the author writes 'he creates
not simply an ideal, impersonal, "man in general" but an implied version of "himself'
44 Wimsatt and Bcardsley compare a poem to 'a pudding or machine. One demands that it
work.' (1375).
45 Wimsatt and Beardsley 1376.
46 Wimsatt and Bcardsley 1381.
47
Wayne C. Booth, The Rhetoric ofFiction (1983: London: Penguin, 1991) 71.
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that is different from the implied authors we meet in other men's works.'48 Booth's
theory of an 'implied author' mitigates the intentional fallacy by arguing a 'middle
position' between the 'technical irrelevance' of an author claiming absolute
objectivity and the 'harmful error' of thinking that a given text is made up entirely of
a writer's 'immediate problems and desires.'49 Booth's theory about the 'implied
author' takes on special significance in regards to this thesis when one considers both
Roth's and Amis's relationship with their various critics. For Booth's theory means
not only that readers infer an 'implied author' from their readings of a text but also
that writers can play with their audience by toying with their own implied image. In
further chapters this thesis will discuss how Roth and Amis engage with their own
stereotypes by seeming to create characters that they know must anger certain critics.
In turn, this reveals how such pre-conceptions bind the reader: both by defining their
interpretations and obscuring alternative readings.
Intentional fallacy or not, there does appear to be a surfeit of textual evidence
to support those critics who accuse Roth and Amis of misogyny. Take, for example,
this passage from Amis's London Fields'.
The peculiar difficulty with girls experienced by God, Shakespeare, and Keith
was this difficulty: they raped them. Or they used to. They had all been on
the same rehab courses and buddy programmes; they had mastered some
jargon and tinkertoy psychology; and they didn't do it any longer. They could
control their aggression. But the main reason they didn't do it any longer was
that rape, injudicial terms (and in Keith's words), was no fucking joke: you
just couldn't ever come out a winner, not with this DNA nonsense. The great
days were gone. Shakespeare and God had both spent a long time in prison
for it, and Keith nearly had. Of his two court appearances on rape charges, the
first had been more or less okay ("Why, Jacqui, why?" Keith had hollered
woundedly from the dock). But the second case was very frightening. In the
end the girl dropped the charges, thank heaven, after Keith sold his motor and
gave three and a half thousand quid to her dad. Of course, Keith's rapes were
to be viewed quite distinctly from those numerous occasions when, in his




(and lesbians and godbotherers). Rape was different. Rape was much more
like all the other occasions (not so numerous, if you kept Kath out of it) when
he had candidly used main force to achieve intercourse and the woman, for
one reason or another, hadn't reported him.50
An autobiographical reading of this passage might suggest that Amis genuinely
mourns the passing of the 'great days' before DNA evidence helped to convict rapists.
Such a superficial reading would also highlight his use of 'godbotherer' and 'lesbian'
as synonymous, as well as his use of such vulgar and offensive terms as 'cockteasers'
and 'icebergs.' There is a hint of heresy with the use of a character named God being
convicted of rape, as well as the worrying conclusion that Amis seems to mock
attempts at rehabilitating sexual offenders. And the aforementioned passage is only
one of numerous eminently quotable passages from London Fields' s that seem to
support a common reading that Amis has a problem with women.
Much ofRoth's fiction shares a similar capacity to offend, as exemplified by
this episode from Sabbath's Theater.
Maestro, what would you do? To peer down at her head cradled in your lap,
your cock encircled by her foaming lips, and to watch her blowing you in
tears, to patiently lather that undissipated face with that sticky confection of
spit, semen and tears, a delicate meringue icing her freckles—could life
bestow any more wonderful last thing?51
It would be difficult to defend such a scene against the charge of misogyny,
especially in light of Andrea Dworkin's claim that the mixture of tears and sex in
52
pornography signifies that, 'force is required to conquer modesty'. The fact that
Kathy's crying inflames Sabbath's desire should give the reader pause, as should the
nature of Sabbath's fantasy. Furthermore, the use of descriptions such as Kathy's
'undissipated face' and her freckles calls attention to Kathy's youth, the age
difference between her and Sabbath, and thus the disparity in social-position between
50 Martin Amis, London Fields (1989; London: Vintage, 1991) 168.
51 Philip Roth, Sabbath's Theater (London: Vintage, 1996) 236.
52 Andrea Dworkin, Pornography: Men Possessing Women (London: The Women's Press
Limited, 1981) 148.
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the two. Kathy is a young student; Sabbath is her aged teacher, and Sabbath seems to
enjoy the inequality between the two. For these and other reasons Mickey Sabbath is
a deeply controversial figure, and critics such as Michiko Kakutani read him as the
product of a misogynistic imagination.
The passages quoted here are only an initial introduction to the problems that
Martin Amis and Philip Roth represent, and in this chapter I will examine in greater
detail those aspects of their fiction that incite the anger of critics quick to accuse them
ofmisogyny. I will also examine the words of the critics themselves, in order to
establish both their motivations and justifications for making such aggressive claims.
In other words, I hope tp establish the ideological presuppositions of these critics, so
as to understand why Amis and Roth have been so thoroughly demonized in both
popular and academic circles. For I believe that this process of demonization—really
a process of selective misrepresentation—speaks volumes about how certain critics
read, about canon formation, about what counts as 'good' or 'proper' literature, and
about the presumed ideological relationship between literature and politics.
To say that Amis and Roth are misread is not to say that their fiction is
straightforward or unproblematic. Both authors attempt, after all, to engage with
themes and ideas of great historical and ethical weight: they are both 'state of the
nation' novelists, writers who appear to strive towards the goal of writing the great
American, or British, novel. And yet a significant percentage of their readership
claims they are limited by their disdain for women and that rather than being universal
they are only capable of speaking to and for the male half of their society. In this
sense there certainly is a problem intrinsic to their fiction. However, I will argue that
to read Amis and Roth as misogynists is to endorse a type of reading that capitulates
to a popular stereotype of who these writers 'are'. It is my purpose in this thesis to
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advocate a very different style of criticism—one that responds to that which is
politically encoded in the novels of Roth and Amis—while alternatively exploring
that which is politically encoded in their critics' accusations. But first, in order to
understand what Roth and Amis are attempting to think through in their fiction, we
must engage with their fiercest critics.
The Problem of Martin Amis
Many of the ways in which Amis is read are symptomatic of what can be
called 'The Problem of Martin Amis.' Amis constitutes a problem on many different
levels, not least of which is the common perception that he is sexist. For many critics,
this seems to be an issue involving authorship, or the relationship between the public
persona of an author and how he or she is read by critics. Part of Amis's difficulty
has been that from the very beginning, readers have believed they know the 'truth'
about Martin Amis, and that part of that 'truth' involves a marked hostility towards
women. Since the publication of his first book, Martin Amis has had to contend with
'Martin Amis,' his media doppelganger. As Carlin Romano comments, '[cjelebrities
such as Amis deserve at least two reference-book entries: "author" and "media
image".'53 The 'media image' Amis is certainly charismatic but, just as often,
controversial. In revealing his own reactions to Amis, John Walsh reflects the
media's early engagement with the Amis-effect:
We read everything he wrote - a review in The_Observer, a science-fiction
fantasy in Mayfair, even a one-off poem in the 77A. He was sooooo cool. He
turned up on TV, confident, perma-smoking, talking in that curiously slouchy,
mid-Atlantic drawl. Women claimed to reach spontaneous orgasm just by
gazing at his sulky expression, his voluptuous mouth. Thank God (we said)
he's so short, or he'd be unbearable.54
53 Carlin Romano, 'Trials of a Literary Legatee: Martin Amis, Author, on Martin Amis,
Image' Knight Tidder/Tribune News Service May 17, 1995, Jan. 4, 2006, http://www.highbeam.com.
54 John Walsh "Twilight of the Idol?", Independent Aug. 15 2003: 2-3.
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From early in his career, Amis drew intense media attention. He was attractive,
articulate, and seemed, as George Szamuely summarizes, to be 'the embodiment of
the times he is living in.'55 This charm and ability to attract attention, especially
female attention, may be why some critics are so eager to malign Amis. Szamuely
does call Amis 'enviably successful' and finds suspect his ability to 'regularly
imprests] the gushing young females sent out to write profiles of him.'56 However,
despite Szamuely's depiction of Amis as a Svengali of female journalists, Amis has
not been able to avoid controversy, both in his professional and personal life.
Tabloid-style attacks reached their pinnacle in 1995, when Amis published The
Information, a novel that revels in the sordid side of both writing and publishing, at
the same time that he famously dumped his long time agent, Pat Kavanagh, for the
influential American agent, Andrew 'The Jackal' Wylie.57 The switch earned Amis
an enormous advance, but at the cost of his relationship with both Kavanagh and her
husband, Julian Barnes. Around this time he also divorced his first wife and married
his second, an American heiress. Much was also written about his costly dental
surgery that many journalists depicted, incorrectly, as merely cosmetic. The media
staged these events, including the dentistry, as Amis betraying his British roots; as
such, the attacks could not have been more personal.58 Even John Walsh lost faith:
Everything he did was suddenly wrong. He'd had it his own way too long.
He'd been too brilliant, too effing smart. He'd bitched about England and
55
George Szamuely, National Review May 28, 1990, Jan. 4, 2006 http://www.highbeam.com.
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Szamuely.
57 For a tabloid journalist's take on Martin Amis and 'The Jackal', see Geoffrey Levy, 'Is
Martin Amis Turning Into His Father?', Daily Mail 24 Hours a Day, Sept. 27, 2006, June 12, 2007,
<http://www.dailvmail.co.uk>. This article also discusses Amis's divorce, and insinuates that Amis is
as bad a son as he is husband and father. In fact, it stands out as an example of 'typical' Amis related
journalism.
58 In Experience, Amis comments upon this subject himself:
I would be coming at [Delilah] partly as a mediated being, mediated by myself - and
others: Delilah would presumably be aware that 1 had abandoned my sons to go and
live with an heiress in New York, the better to squander my advances on a Liberace
smile .. . (278).
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praised America. He was a faithless, money spinning, kids-abandoning nonce
and everyone hated themselves for salaaming before him for so long.59
A typical Amis-related headline of the time reads 'Amis, author with £20,000 teeth,
has £106 wedding'.60 Amis, the media caricature, is all teeth and wallet; cutting away
friends and family in pursuit of ever-higher advances.
Contributing to his media image of undeserved wealth is the fact that Martin
Amis is the son of a well known and equally controversial writer. The celebrity figure
I
of his father, Kingsley Amis, has had a powerful and, often, negative influence on the
media's reception of his son. Indeed, I believe that the way critics read the son has
often been prescribed by the way many believe they should respond to the father.
Take, for instance, Grace Glueck's contemporaneous review of Martin Amis's The
Rachel Papers that begins by informing the reader of Amis's parentage:
Just 20 years after Lucky Jim, Kingsley Amis's famously funny novel about
life at a minor British university, his 24 year-old-son Martin has made so bold
as to produce a novel himself; though—to say it right off—not really one to
give a novelist father the sweats. (It seems quite in the order of things that the
jacket bears a blurb from Auberon Waugh hailing Amis fits as a 'new novelist
of intelligence, with and an apparently reckless honesty ... a formidable and
exceptional talent.' Is there a club for novelists' novelist sons?)61
The gossipy, contemptuous, and bizarrely proprietary language of Glueck's 1974
reading of 'Amis fils' debut novel characterizes the sort of personal criticism that has
dogged Martin Amis throughout his career. In this reviewer's estimation, Amis's
publishing a novel at so young an age is an act of audacity, not least because of the
relatively late start of his father's own career. This suggestion coupled with the
proprietary nature of Glueck's language suggests Kingsley's identity as some sort of
British institution - something the literary community must both protect and police.
59 Walsh.
60
Quoted in Nicolas Tredell, The Fiction ofMartin Amis (Cambridge: Icon Books Ltd., 2000)
10.
61 Grace Glueck, 'The Rachel Papers: Not the Son of Lucky Jim,' The New York Times May
26, 1974, Oct. 21, 2006 http://nvtimes.com.
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As the son of a British institution, Martin Amis can expect the same treatment.
Furthermore, by identifying Amis pere as a British institution Glueck insinuates a
more nefarious reason for Martin Amis's success at publishing than straightforward
literary precociousness. The idea of a club for 'novelists' novelists sons' insinuates
that these sons of the literati owe more to their fathers' hard won successes than from
any real work on their own part. This reading is echoed by a warning from Charles
Michner, who writes, '[being] Kingsley Amis's son [is] a boon to the Amis bashers.
The idea that 'success' is something inherited and not earned abounds in [Britain,]
this green and not always pleasant land' .62 In this reading, Martin Amis has not
earned his ability to publish novels: he was born with a silver publishing contract in
his mouth.63
At times, there seems to be a tacit quota for how often this sort of derisive
gesture towards the possible influences of paternity must appear in any criticism of
Amis's work. For example, in his review of Amis's third novel, Jay Parini begins by
first telling us who Martin Amis is - 'The son of Kingsley Amis' - while admitting
'how he must hate to hear reviewers say this.'64 By his third novel, Martin Amis
probably would find it strange that the details of his parentage might still be a
revelation. This review, however, was not written upon the British release of Success
in 1978 but upon its American release in 1987. By then, Martin Amis had published
his fifth novel, Money, and become an international bestseller. And yet reviewers still
had to tell their readers, in 1987, about 'revelations' from 1974.
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Quoted in Tredell, 8.
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Sometimes the exploration of this apparently determining link between father
and son takes a more high-brow form, as exemplified by Harold Bloom's theory of
the 'anxiety of influence.'65 As James Diedrick explains, Bloom 'places the Oedipal
struggle between literary "fathers" and "sons" at the symbolic center of all relations
between writers, texts, and their predecessors.'66 Read in this manner, Martin Amis
often finds himself in the unenviable position of not only having to battle the entire
canon of white-western-male literature—all 'potentially castrating father figures'—
but also enduring the 'literal dimension' of having a ready-made Laius in his
immediate family.67 In the interest of critical expedience, such a 'symbolic conflict [.
. .] even comes complete with primal scenes of rivalry in which texts substitute for
other extensions of the male self.'68 As Diedrick suggests, Amis has been forcibly
inserted into a pre-written drama in which he and his father must time-and-again
attack each other's literary 'extensions.' Most discussions of Martin Amis seem
required to include such 'facts' as '[Kingsley Amis] finds his son's novels largely
unreadable' or that 'Amis's father publicly reported that he cannot finish his son's
novels' or Martin Amis's own often told story of how '[he] can point out the exact
place where [Kingsley] stopped and sent the book [Money] twirling through the air.'69
But notwithstanding journalists' constant reiteration of this theme of conflict between
literary father and literary son, only a few critics have attempted any sort of in-depth
65 In Fathers and Sons, Gavin Keulks dismisses Bloom's theory as a viable model for the
relationship between Kingsley and Martin Amis, writing 'In contrast to Harold Bloom's celebrated
theory of influence, therefore, the Amises' literary competitions were never hidden nor repressed; nor
did they silence either author or force him to evade his rival's achievements' (230).
66 James Diedrick, Understanding Martin Amis, 2nd ed. (Columbia, SC: University of South
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exploration of either the meaning or the effects of this conflict within the works of
70
Martin Amis.
While Amis's obsession with male power and influence is, on the one hand,
weirdly exaggerated - as can be seen in the journalistic obsession with his roots and
images of him as the son of a famous father - there is, on the other hand, a refusal to
confront these issues on a literary or thematic level. Many critics seem to displace
what is in fact a key literary and cultural theme within Amis's works into a type of
'tell all' celebrity. Martin Amis's memoir Experience can be read as his own attempt
to think through this very subject, opening as it does with a discussion of fame as a
'worthless commodity' that will 'earn you a [. . .] noticeable amount of hostile
curiosity.'71 Yet even before he wrote Experience, Amis placed within his fiction
clues as to how he envisions his own relationship to his father's work. It is a
relationship that is revealing in its understanding of Kingsley Amis's gender politics,
while also a firm rebuttal to those critics who would assume that the son shares the
father's philosophies of life. Martin Amis seems to be directly addressing his father
when he wrote the previously quoted passage about Keith Talent's 'difficulty with
girls:' 'The peculiar difficulty with girls experienced by God, Shakespeare, and Keith
was this difficulty: they raped them.'72 In 1988, Kingsley Amis published a book
called Difficulties With Girls, a sequel to Take A Girl Like You, published in I960.73
In Difficulties, the protagonist, Patrick Standish, has this problem: 'Whenever he
found himself among women in any numbers it was as if something came over him.'74
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This lack of control means that Patrick finds it difficult not to sexualize his
relationships with the women he meets, despite his marriage to the very beautiful
Jenny Bunn.
It is in the earlier novel, Take A Girl Like You, that Jenny and Patrick meet,
and in which another of Patrick's difficulties with girls comes to light. In Take A Girl
Like You, the idealistic young Jenny wants to preserve her virginity until her wedding
night. She and Patrick date, but he cannot endure sexual abstinence and continually
pressures Jenny to rethink her moral stance. Jenny manages to thwart Patrick's
attempts at seduction until, at a party at their friend Julian's, she has too much to
drink, and is put to bed by her friends. She passes out until she realizes that:
. . . Patrick was with her. He had been there for some minutes or hours when
she first realized he was, and again was in bed with her without seeming to
have got there. What he did was off by itself and nothing to do with her. All
the same, she wanted him to stop, but her movements were all the wrong ones
for that and he was kissing her too much for her to try to tell him. She thought
he would stop anyway as soon as he realized how much off on his own he
was. But he did not, and did not stop, so she put her arms around him and
tried to be with him, only there was no way of doing it and nothing to feel.
Then there was another interval, after which he told her he loved her and
would never leave her now.75
The word rape is never used in this novel, but Julian's reaction to Patrick immediately
after his encounter with Jenny informs us that Patrick's act was far from ambiguous.
Julian berates Patrick for Jenny being so drunk, saying that he did not act in
'fairness.'76 Despite Patrick's actions, however, Jenny later accepts his apology, and
Difficulties With Girls begins eight years after their marriage.77
Throughout both novels, Amis pere presents Jenny as constantly on the
defensive against men. Because of her beauty, she is never safe from unwanted
advances. Indeed, either book could serve as a wrestling manual with their depictions
75
Kingsley Amis, Take a Girl Like You (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1960) 306.
76 K. Amis, Take a Girl Like You 306-307.
77 In fact, Patrick only marries Jenny because she is pregnant, although she later miscarries.
See Difficulties with Girls p.61.
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of Jenny outmaneuvering aggressive hands and lips. And so, Patrick's difficulties
with girls are presented as all men's difficulties with girls: none of them can control
themselves around a beautiful woman. There is a constant subtext of physical and
sexual violence in Jenny's relationships with men and yet she seems to accept this
disturbing situation as normal. For his part, Kingsley Amis does not excuse this
behavior, but neither does he condemn it. His implication seems to be that
aggressively sexual behavior is natural for men, and that women should make the best
of their situation. At the end of Take A Girl Like You, the last lines have Jenny
expressing regret over her lost innocence, while Patrick, whose own behavior has
been monstrous even by his standards, simply answers that 'with a girl like you ... It
was inevitable.'78 The problem of gender relations in these books is fairly obvious: in
both Take a Girl Like You and Difficulties with Girls, the role of men as sexually
aggressive towards women is taken for granted.
By incorporating into his own fiction the exact same language his father
uses—indeed the very title of one of his father's novels-—Martin Amis does seem to
want his reader to associate father and son. And yet this characterization is not a
declaration of solidarity: after all, he uses his father's title as a designation for rape.
Rather than extolling Patrick Standish as the 'normal' man that Kingsley Amis seems
to intend his character to be, Martin Amis connects him and his actions with Keith
Talent: a sexually abusive and predatory misogynist who regularly commits the act of
rape. Indeed, Keith Talent seems to be a direct challenge to his father's conception of
gender relations. But why would Martin Amis issue such a challenge, considering his
perceived notions about women? Here we come to the second level at which Martin
Amis constitutes a critical problem, and the problem at the heart of this thesis: Amis's
78 K. Amis, Take a Girl Like You 320.
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perceived woman problem. Critics love to cite all the various ways in which Martin
and Kingsley Amis differ, but chauvinism is one topic upon which some critics insist
father and son agree wholeheartedly.
In order for this perception to be viable, critics have continually to invoke the
intentional fallacy.79 Critics who believe they 'know' who Martin Amis is might
therefore believe that they 'know' what Martin Amis intends his books to mean. In
other words, in order to keep a fixed or judgmental view of Amis's work in view, they
forge a link between author and character in which the character reveals the author's
thoughts and intentions. This link enables the sort of bald statement that Bette
Pesetsky's accusation of misogyny represents: Amis creates misogynists such as
Keith because Amis must be a misogynist. Pesetksy's statement, however, is actually
a peculiar combination of condemnation and equivocation. To call someone a
misogynist is to suggest that he exculpates such violence as spousal abuse and rape: a
very damning statement. And yet the nervousness of Pesetsky's language - with its
'sneaking suspicion' and 'lingers here somewhere' - suggests anxiety about this
narrative perspective. If Pesetsky really believes Amis to be a misogynist, she would
just say so. Instead, there is something in Amis's style - in his irony, or his point of
view, or his use of perspective - that complicates this picture. And so critics damn
him with the title ofmisogynist while simultaneously admitting their discomfort with
this stance: Gee by arguing her 'purely "literary" case' and Pesetsky through her use
of equivocal language. Such language in Amis's detractors points out just how
elusive and enigmatic Amis's narrative style is. It is my intention in this thesis to
explore the nature of this enigmatic narrative style, for it is my belief that this
79 See William K. Wimsatt Jr. and Monroe C. Beardsley's 'The Intentional Fallacy.'
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elusiveness is not due to misogyny or 'bad' thinking, but to an imaginative vision of
the world that is unique to both Amis and Roth.
Another reason that critics have been predisposed to seeing Martin Amis as a
misogynist may simply be their aforementioned conflation of the son with the father.
For often Amis is not only depicted as inheriting his father's fame but also accused of
having inherited his father's well-documented prejudices. By the end of his life, the
once liberal Kingsley Amis, The Angry Young Man, had become infamously
conservative. In Experience, Martin Amis writes, 'Edward Upward said that he felt
the aging process to work in him when he experienced "little failures of tolerance."
Well, Kingsley was never much of a tolerance cultivator; and his failures were big
failures.'80 Martin Amis freely explores such 'failures of tolerance' in Experience.
For example, he includes the following exchange that occurred shortly after Kingsley
Amis's famously chauvinistic novel Stanley and the Women was published in 1984:
-I've [K.A.] finally worked out why I don't like Americans.
I [M.A] waited
o 1
-Because everyone there is either a Jew or a hick.
Experience provides Martin Amis's reactions to Kingsley's various prejudices,
especially his reaction to Kingsley's misogyny. After telling the reader about how
Kingsley 'started to liken women to the USSR (department of propaganda)' and
'started referring to the opposite sex as "females",' Martin Amis discloses his critical
perception of how this sort of sexist attitude inhibited his father's work: 'I always
thought it was suicide: artistic suicide. He didn't kill the world. He just killed half of
it.'82 Here we have the curious situation of an author capable of elucidating why
misogyny cannot form a basis for a viable definition of art but who is often labeled a
misogynist himself.
80 M. Amis, Experience 91.
81
M. Amis, Experience 93.
82 M. Amis, Experience 310.
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One explanation for this paradox may be that critics who choose to review
Martin Amis's works do so because they have already made their own political
decision about what 'Martin Amis' must represent. In other words, certain critics
sense an opportunity to clarify their own politics through engaging with Amis's
fiction. Adams Mars-Jones unintentionally admits to this sort of position when he
writes in a review of The Information that '[t]his reviewer, being homosexual, has a
sentimental respect for the Other Persuasion f. . ,].'83 Here Mars-Jones admits to what
David Simpson and Andrew Sullivan have called reading 'azza' subject position.
Sullivan explains his having given 'azzas' that name after a book tour, during which
members of the audience would ask questions inevitably began with 'As a': as in,
85
'azza Latino transsexual,' or 'azza working-class Scottish socialist.' In Sullivan's
definition, 'Azzas believe that all reason gives way at the stoplight of personal
experience. They hold that argument is never anything more than the rationalization
of personal experience, and that the most marginal of personal experiences is always
the most authentic.'86 Simpson calls 'azza' simply 'a way of establishing one's
credentials as authoritatively and efficiently as possible.'87 The further implication of
this theory is that the reading of a particular text is not only informed by the reader's
personal politics, but actually advertises their politics. Using Mars-Jones's words as
an example, he begins with the dubious assumption that Martin Amis cannot possibly
have any respect, sentimental or otherwise, for women. Therefore, 'azza' homosexual
male, Mars-Jones must automatically reject what he perceives as Amis's inherent -
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and possibly inherited - misogyny. In this way, Mars-Jones defines himself through
his reading of Amis while simultaneously advertising his own ideological allegiance
through his position on what he perceives to be Martin Amis's world view. At best
reading 'azza' allows for the exploration of how disenfranchised, minority
perspectives can challenge those of the canonized majority, as in the case of Kate
Millet's groundbreaking Sexual Politics. At worst such readings become a sort of
critical onanism in which critics automatically 'know' what they are going to argue,
they argue through stereotypes, and they take pleasure in the process.
Martin Amis talks about a similar style of reading to reading 'azza' in his
forward to The War Against Cliche:
The reviewer calmly tolerates the arrival of the new novel or slim volume,
defensively settles into it, and then sees which way it rubs him up. The right
way or the wrong way. The results of this contact will form the data of the
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review, without any reference to the thing behind.
The idea that a reader waits to see how a novel 'rubs him up' is complicated by
Amis's further assertion that these reactions are determined more by who the reader is
than what they are reading. Readers approach fiction with pre-established judgements
or feelings that, as Amis explains, 'are seldom unadulterated; they are admixtures of
herd opinions and social anxieties, vanities, touchinesses, and everything else that
makes up a self.'89 Amis may, inadvertently or not, have helped to explain why there
seems to be such critical investment in trying to maintain ideologically narrow
readings of his own novels. In their reading of his fiction, critics are saying as much,
if not more, about their own feelings and literary protocols as about the books they are
discussing.
88 Martin Amis, The War Against Cliche: Essays and Reviews 1971-2000 (2001; London:
Vintage, 2002) xHi.
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The ideological presuppositions of critics frequently emerge in their readings
of Amis's fiction. Critics often propose readings of Amis's novels that are based on
their own presuppositions of who 'Martin Amis' is and what he represents.
Sometimes Amis is depicted as representing inheritance—not of talent, but of
publishing contracts as well as his father's sexism—and he is often represented as
amoral, or even immoral. Specifically, he has been associated with misogyny, and it
appears as if certain critics seek to establish their own relationship to issues of gender
through their reading of Amis's fiction. Using Simpson's and Sullivan's term, they
read 'azza' person who wants to establish their politics as contrary to those ofMartin
Amis. The problem with such a reading is that it is based on a series of assumptions
made on the part of the critic and often based on a popular media caricature of Amis.
As such, some critics ignore readings that might contradict their feelings about Amis
in favour of well-established readings that always look for, and must inevitably find,
evidence of Amis's alleged 'woman problem.' In other words, critics expect certain
things from Amis's fiction that prove their perception of Amis's world view, and they
read his novels accordingly. As such, Martin Amis's purported 'problem' with
women can actually be better understood as some critics' problems with their own
presuppositions about Martin Amis himself.
Martin Amis's fraught relationship with both the media and his readership has
been well documented in both popular journalism and academic criticism. And yet,
Amis's battles with the press and with those critics who insist on reading him in a
certain way seem dwarfed by the controversies that surround Philip Roth's work.
This is not to say that Roth's battles are more significant or representative than
Amis's: both authors share a similarly problematic relationship with their popular
media representation as well as their perceived political beliefs. But Roth's
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relationship with his critics concentrates those ideas and controversies that are at the
heart of this thesis in a way that demands close inspection. The most instructive of
these long term battles has been Roth's relationship with the literary journal
Commentary, and especially with the Commentary writers Irving Howe and Norman
Podhoretz.
The Problem of Philip Roth
Philip Roth is one of America's most successful, as well as one of its most
vilified, authors. On the one hand, many of his books are bestsellers, enjoying great
critical acclaim. He has won every major American literary prize, including the
Pulitzer, and there has been speculation about his possible position on the Nobel Prize
short list.90 On the other hand, he has repeatedly been charged with misogyny, anti-
Semitism, and of being a self-hating Jew. Crucially, debates about Roth and his
controversial novels are not limited to academia. While there has been an increase in
academic publications concerning Roth's work, throughout his career he has found
himself discussed not only in literary journals, but in synagogues, magazines,
newspapers, and even gossip columns.91 In other words, he has been very much the
literary celebrity, discussed across the cultural and social spectrum.
Both Roth's celebrity and his position as a divisive and controversial writer
place him at the centre of a cultural and critical debate involving perceptions about the
roles of authors and readers, about the politics of writing, and about the public
perception of what can, and cannot, be written. But despite the wide range of Roth
criticism, certain clear lines of critical opinion can be identified. We might begin by
noting three well established ways of reading his work. The first way of reading
90 Derek Parker Royal, 'Introduction; or "Now Vee May Perhaps to Begin. Yes?",' Philip




Philip Roth begins with the perception that Roth is a deeply misunderstood writer.
This reading argues that those who condemn Roth of misogyny or anti-Semitism fail
to read him properly and to register his profound moral engagement with questions of
identity, the self, ideology, and history. Such readers often dismiss the arguments of
the second and third group; sometimes under the pretence that Roth's skill as a
novelist must preclude accusations of 'bad' politics. The second way of reading Roth
includes those lay readers, journalists, and academics who favour autobiographical
and highly politicized readings of Roth's fiction. These readers argue that there are
certain things that, as a man and as a Jew, he simply cannot say. This group often
accuses him of being misogynistic, racist, anti-Semitic, and generally offensive.
Finally, there are those critics—such as Irving Howe and Norman Podhoretz—who
make very sophisticated cases against Roth that, I would argue, actually disguise
arguments as subjective and ideological as those of the second group. The disparities
between these three ways of reading Roth reveal questions of readership and
authorship, and all three depend on particular critical investments involving
perceptions not only of Roth as a man as well as a writer but of a particular critic's
perception of him or herself. In other words, many readings and misreadings of
Roth's works are based on particular critical investments that both establish a certain
image of Roth in the public imagination and also endeavour to create a certain moral
image of criticism itself.
From the beginning of his career, a considerable number of readers—
including well known writers and critics—have recognized Roth as a major talent.
His first collection, Goodbye, Columbus and Five Short Stories—parts of which were
first published in the Paris Review, the New Yorker and Commentary—received
positive reviews from established writers such as Saul Bellow, and famous critics
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such as Irving Howe and Alfred Kazin.92 Within a year of publishing Goodbye,
Columbus, Roth was awarded the National Book Award, the Jewish Book Council's
Daroff Award, the Paris Review's Aga Khan Award, a Guggenheim, and a National
Institute of Arts and Letters award.93 To this date, he has won not only the
aforementioned Pulitzer Prize but also two National Book Critics Circle Awards,
another National Book Award, two PEN/Faulkner Awards, as well as numerous other
medals and honours, including a National Medal of Arts.94 He has also continued to
receive attention in the form of book reviews and academic criticism from some of the
most famous and well-respected figures in the literary community.
Two such figures are Hermione Lee and Harold Bloom. Hermione Lee
depicts Roth as a writer concerned with issues of morality, ethics, identity and the
self. Partly, according to Lee, these concerns are related to the particular set of events
lived through by Roth's generation, in which the relative innocence, patriotism, and
promise of the 1940's was challenged by the nightmares of Vietnam and Korea, the
farce and hypocrisy ofWatergate, the transgressive exhilaration of the sexual
revolution, and the profound changes wrought by the civil and women's rights
movements. Lee believes that one of Roth's strengths has been his conceptualization
of what he has called this 'demythologizing era:'95
Roth's fiction made 'unexpurgated' use of post-Korean America's most
painful concerns. Psychoanalysis, alienation, erotic fixations, pornography,
urban violence, strains on the family, divorce, anxiety about eastern Europe,
alarm at the implications of Zionism for twentieth-century Jewish history,
92 Howard Junker, 'Will This Finally Be Philip Roth's Year,' Conversations with Philip Roth,
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dismay at the ineffectuality of liberalism, and national political guilt and
disillusion, were appropriated by Roth [. . .] as raw material.96
Roth grapples with these themes throughout his career, and Harold Bloom believes
that this preoccupation indicates Roth's profound engagement with 'moral prophecy,'
with the fact that 'he continues to be outraged by the outrageous—in societies, others
and himself.'97 At the same time, Bloom believes that what keeps this ethical outrage
interesting to an audience, rather than intimidating or condescending, is its
no
conveyance 'by the highest humour now being written.' This combination of an
intense engagement with prescient themes, high moral seriousness, and audacious
humour leads Bloom to conclude that, 'Roth has earned a permanent place in
American literature by a comic genius that need never be doubted again, wherever it
chooses to take him next.'99 Lee shares this approval, claiming that 'Roth's stylistic
and emotional range, and his commitment to the real world he lives in, makes him [. .
.] one of the most significant and remarkable of contemporary writers: bold, cunning,
humane, ambitious, versatile and wise.'100 That Roth has received the critical
attention of such well-known academics as Bloom and Lee helps to establish his
significance to contemporary American literature.
While Bloom and Lee agree that Roth is an adroit stylist and humorist, both
also believe that these skills are inevitably used to serve Roth's ethical and moral
preoccupations. In their view, it is not his often obscene and transgressive humour,
nor is it his style or aesthetics that dominates his writing. Rather, as John N.
McDaniel asserts, 'we can best assess Roth's artistry by viewing him, rather broadly,
96 Hermione Lee, Philip Roth, Contemporary Writers (London: Methuan & Co. Ltd., 1982)
10.
97 Harold Bloom, introduction, Philip Roth, ed. Harold Bloom, Bloom's Modern Critical






as a writer whose artistic intentions are "moral," whose method is realistic, and whose
subject is the self in society.'101 Roth's humour, even at its most obscene, and his
style, even at its most frenetic, can both be attributed to what McDaniel calls, 'Roth's
assault on the American experience -his exploration of moral fantasy, his concern for
moral consciousness, his willingness to confront the grander social and political
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phenomena of our time [. . According to critics such as Bloom, Lee, and
McDaniel, Roth is an explicitly moral writer who engages with a specifically
American experience: with both the events and ideologies of American life. In this
first dominant perspective on reading Roth, critics understand him to be both a
brilliant stylist and a comic genius. They also believe him to be profoundly engaged
with questions of morality and ethics, despite his controversial approach to many of
the issues raised in his fiction. This first group of critics does not imagine Roth to be
either amoral or immoral but fascinated by how morality functions in the daily lives
of ordinary Americans. As such, they give short shrift to those critics and readers
who feel that any exploration of ethics or morals on Roth's part is overwhelmed by
the vulgar and offensive nature of his fiction.
Whilst many readers and critics have followed Roth's career with delight and
approbation, very often he has found himself at the centre of heated controversy. A
small but vociferous group of critics have taken umbrage with various aspects of his
fiction throughout his career. The types of charges levelled against him range from
the spiteful to the profoundly damning. A typical example of the former is Stanley
Edgar Hyman's 1964 essay, 'A Novelist of Great Promise.' Although Hyman does
praise Roth, he also warns of the damage being done by 'gushy reviewing,' believing
that 'the minor result of the shower of praise and coin that Roth received was to make
11)1 John N. McDaniel, 'Distinctive Features of Roth's Artistic Vision' Philip Roth, ed. Harold
Bloom, Bloom's Modern Critical Views (1973; Philadelphia: Chelsea House Publishers, 2003) 43-44.
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him arrogant'103 This appraisal of Roth as arrogant is a telling one. The idea that
Philip Roth is somehow determined to transgress 'normal' boundaries of religion,
community, sexuality and family, or that he is determined to offend, seems to inform
those readings, or misreadings, of Roth's second group of critics. These readers often
attack Roth under one of two auspices: they see Roth as a misogynist or Roth as an
anti-Semitic, self-hating Jew.104 In one sense, this reading can be seen as an inversion
of reading 'azza' that was discussed in my preceding section. Here we see critics
demand Roth writes 'azza,' asking whether, 'azza' Jew and 'azza' man there are
things he simply should not say.
It is not only journalists who question Roth's feelings about women in
newspapers and magazines; many academic critics who focus on Roth's fiction make
equally negative assertions. Patricia Meyer Spacks believes that Roth's work in the
1970's exhibits, 'little awareness of women's status as full-fledged human beings,
with possible purposes unrelated to men,' and Mary Allen, writing in 1976, believes
that Roth 'projects his enormous rage and disappointment with womankind ... as a
man who rails at the world because he has never found in it a woman who is both
strong and good.'105 Both of these statements are equally damning. The first claims
that Roth does not recognize women's very humanity. The second asserts that Roth
finds women weak and evil and is, therefore, filled with rage and disappointment at
the entire female sex. These critics find in Roth's fictional work what they consider
to be proof of Roth's misogyny.
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But why do critics find such fault with Roth's portrayals of women? Both
Allen and Spacks discern an issue with his characterization of women, believing that
he cannot, or will not, depict a fully rounded or morally decent female character. In
other words, they invoke the intentional fallacy by asserting that the images of women
presented in Roth's fiction somehow represent the feelings of the author for actual
women. If one does take for granted this connection between image and creator, then
a reader can easily find support for the accusation ofmisogyny in male characters
such as Alexander Portnoy, from Portnoy's Complaint, who gives his girlfriends such
contemptuous monikers as 'the Monkey,' 'the Pumpkin,' and 'the Pilgrim.' Roth
himself admits that the literary shenanigans of Portnoy helped to create the derogatory
public image that journalists such as Gornick and Hayman refer to when they call him
a woman-hater or ask whether women dare confront him at parties. In an interview
with Joyce Carol Oates, Roth says that his public reputation is, 'a concoction spawned
by Portnoy's Complaint and compounded largely out of the fantasies that book gave
rise to because of its "confessional" strategy, and also because of its financial
success.'106 Roth implies that there is a body of readers who, perhaps partly out of
jealousy over his successes, insist that he is Portnoy, displacing all of Portnoy's
dysfunctions onto the shoulders of Philip Roth. This second strain of criticism reads
Roth's fiction autobiographically, judging Roth the author in light of the perceived
values of his subject.
Another aspect of certain novels, especially Portnoy's Complaint and the later
novel Sabbath's Theater, which leads some readers to label Roth a misogynist is
Roth's use of obscene, even pornographic, language. In their reviews of the novel,
Sanford Pinsker and Daniel Schifrin both imply that Sabbath's Theater is
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pornographic. Although his review is mostly positive, Pinsker wonders, 'how do the
graphic descriptions of women seduced into frenzies of sexual heat by Sabbath's
smooth talk differ substantially from the steamy fare one might encounter in Hustler
or Penthouse!'101 Schifrin warns that Sabbath's, 'sexual immodesty has hardly been
seen outside the letters column in Penthouse magazine.'108 To call a novel
pornographic is to suggest it may not be art, the assumption being that art and
pornography are mutually exclusive. Much of the feminist discourse surrounding
pornography, however, would claim that it is not only mutually exclusive to art but
always exploitive of women. As Andrea Dworkin writes, 'We will know when we
are free when the pornography no longer exists. As long as it does exist, we must
understand that we are the women in it: used by the same power, subject to the same
valuation, as the vile whores who beg for more.'109 According to Dworkin,
pornography subjugates all women by insinuating to men that any female body can be
used - and wants to be used - in the same way as the body of the woman in the
pornographic film or picture. Any man who produces, disseminates, or enjoys
pornography exploits women, and they do so out of fear and hatred of women. In this
analysis, if Roth were pandering a literary form of pornography, then he must be the
woman-hater of Gornick's imagination.
Critics such as Keller or Spacks who see in Roth a misogynist often do so for
one of the three reasons above. Some read Roth's fiction as autobiographical,
believing that the most pernicious or outrageous beliefs and actions carried out by his
fictional characters are really his beliefs and his actions. Other critics perceive his
female characters to be less realized than their male counterparts. Finally, Roth's
107 Sanford Pinsker, 'Still (Sex) Crazy After All These Years: Philip Roth's Newest,' Jewish
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work often contains obscene language and pornographic situations. As Sanford
Pinsker laments, '[Roth's] writing was dirty, a word that was troubling enough in
English and even more so when uttered in Yiddish: schmutzik.,ln) Such schmutzik
coupled with a feminist discourse that states all pornography must be based on male
domination of the female body damns Roth as a misogynist. However, that Roth does
recreate apparently pornographic images, while fully aware that he is often called a
misogynist, suggests that Roth wants to encourage those readers who might be
predisposed to accuse him of misogyny. Roth appears to delight in taunting his
critics, in purposefully exacerbating those aspects of his work that they find most
offensive.
Despite the sincerity of those who charge him with misogyny, Roth himself
has not taken the attacks too personally. When asked by Alan Finkelkraut how My
Life as a Man was received by America's 'women's lib,' Roth answers that the novel
was 'the most damaging evidence brought against me.'111 The reason being,
according to his own estimation:
Because in 1974 the world had just recently discovered that women were good
and only good, persecuted and only persecuted, exploited and only exploited,
and I had depicted a woman who was not good, who persecuted others, and
who exploited others—and that spoiled everything ... to depict such a woman
was contrary to the new ethics and to the revolution that espoused them. It
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was antirevolutionary. It was on the wrong side of the cause. It was taboo.
Roth's definition of feminism, and the reason he gives why some feminists took
umbrage with his writing, is actually more interesting than a mere dismissal of the
women's rights movement. Certainly this statement could be read as a condescending
refusal to take the issues surroundings feminism seriously, and as such it could
support the idea that Roth is a misogynist. Yet 1 would argue that, far from being a
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denigration of women's rights or proving some vengeful and vicious hatred for
women, these statements by Roth reveal his irritation with any ideological stance that
demands the right to circumscribe, censure, or silence an individual. In fact, Roth's
attack on censoring ideologies can actually be interpreted as consonant with the very
sort of ethical stance upon which the feminist movement is based. Both feminists and
Philip Roth demand an individual's right to define him or herself, rather than be
defined by social pressures.113 Indeed, this thesis will argue that Philip Roth and
feminism have some things in common: they both argue vehemently for the
individual's right to attempt self-definition; they both explore how the varieties of
cultural, historical, and political experience impinge upon the formation of a self; and
they are both very interested in the role of sex and gender in defining the self. All of
these are themes that dominate Roth's writing, and his interest in such issues stands in
stark opposition to those who accuse him of a misogynist ideology.
Besides feminists who disliked Roth's characterization of women, Roth's
fiction also offended a certain segment of the Jewish community. Unlike the
accusations of feminists, the charges that angry Jewish readers levelled against him
were perceptibly harder for Roth, being Jewish, to dismiss. Indeed, exploring the
impact such criticisms had on his writing became its own theme in his fiction.
Attacks by Jewish readers began early on, with the publication of the individual
stories that would later be published together as Goodbye, Columbus. In The Facts,
Roth writes that most of these stories, 'though they may have attracted a little more
than ordinary reader interest, had caused no furor among Jews, appearing as they did
in the Paris Review, a young literary quarterly then with only a tiny circulation, and in
113 This is not, however, to suggest that Roth believes such self-definition is easy or even
possible.
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Commentary, the monthly [.. .] published by the American Jewish Committee.'114
This benign reaction changed, however, with his publication of the short story
'Defender of the Faith,' a story about a Jewish private, Sheldon Grossbart, in basic
training duringWorld War Two and his superior officer, Sergeant Nathan Marx, who
is also Jewish. The story is told from the first person perspective of Sergeant Marx,
an honourable man and dutiful soldier just returned from Germany and now teaching
basic training stateside.115 Marx is approached by Grossbart who automatically
assumes an attitude of familiarity with his superior officer because of their shared
heritage. To Marx's disgust, Grossbart continually asks for special favours, including
a pass to leave the base to spend a Jewish holiday with his aunt, only to return to base
bringing Marx a gift of eggrolls from a Chinese restaurant and claiming to have
misread the invitation and gotten the dates mixed up. Finally, Marx learns that
Grossbart, who continually hints that he would appreciate Marx's help in keeping him
out of the Pacific where his unit is bound after basic training, has managed to find a
Corporal named Shulman to dupe into sending him, alone of his unit, to Fort
Monmouth, New Jersey. Marx is so appalled by Grossbart's use of his religious and
cultural heritage as a form of emotional blackmail that he makes sure Grossbart is
reassigned back to the Pacific with the rest of his unit.
The depiction of a conniving, cringing Jewish character, Grossbart, offended
Jewish readers, despite the fact that the hero of the story, the honourable and brave
soldier Marx, is also Jewish. But Roth claims that it was not really the story itself that
offended Jewish readers but where it was published. He argues that, 'Defender of the
Faith' would have 'been certified as permissible Jewish discourse by appearing in
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Commentary:nb However, by publishing the story in the New Yorker with its gentile
readership, he opened himself to the accusation of having 'divulged Jewish secrets
and vulgarly falsified Jewish lives.'117 Public reaction was furious. According to
Irving Howe, angry rabbis 'made a virtual career out of attacking his work.'118 In
Reading Myselfand Others, Roth quotes from a rabbi's letter written directly to him:
'You have earned the gratitude [. . .] of all who sustain their anti-Semitism on such
conceptions of Jews as ultimately led to the murder of six million in our time.'119
Another eminent rabbi, writing in protest to the Anti-Defamation League of the B'nai
Brith, demanded to know 'What is being done to silence this man? Medieval Jews
would have known what to do with him. . ,'120 Lay readers also found in Roth's work
justification for anti-Semitism, and Roth claims to have received 'a number [of
letters] written by Jews accusing me of being anti-Semitic and "self-hating".'121 One
such reader wrote that, 'you have done as much harm as all the organized anti-Semitic
organizations have done to make people believe that all Jews are cheats, liars,
connivers.'122 Ironically, the exposure given to what would otherwise have been just
another short story published by a relatively unknown writer was amplified by those
very rabbis and Jewish organizations who most wanted the story to disappear. And
so, when Goodbye, Columbus and Five Short Stories was finally published, it
received much more attention than most first books. The public debate over the
116 Roth, The Facts 116.
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stories that would later comprise the novel acted as free publicity, helping Goodbye,
Columbus to win its variety of accolades and increasing its potential readership.
What differentiates these charges of anti-Semitism or self-hatred from the
charges of misogyny against Roth is that Roth admits to having taken these critics
very seriously indeed. In his interview with Finkielkraut, Roth says of his Jewish
critics, 'it isn't difficult to understand their concern. In fact, it's the ease with which
one understands it that presents a problem of conflicting loyalties.'123 He explains:
[. ..] Jews who register strong objections to what they see as damaging
fictional portrayals of Jews are not necessarily philistine or paranoid. If their
nerve endings are frayed it is not without justification. They don't want books
that will give comfort to anti-Semites or confirm anti-Semitic stereotypes.
They don't want books that will wound the feelings of Jews already
victimized, if not by anti-Semitic persecution in one form or another, by the
distaste for Jews still endemic in pockets of our society. [. . .] In the aftermath
of the horrors that have befallen millions of Jews in this century, it isn't
difficult to understand their concern.124
Roth admits not only to understanding the concerns of his fellow Jews but also
concedes to their having good reason to fear the kind of fiction that they accuse him
of writing. The fact that he engages with controversial subjects anyway only
complicates the question of why Roth insists upon exploring the subject matter that he
does.
This question has certainly not been lost on Roth, who has fictionalized this
very debate in such books as The Ghost Writer and The Anatomy Lesson as well as
non-fiction forums such as The Facts, 'Writing About Jews,' and 'Imagining Jews.'
As Roth puts the matter in an interview with Hermione Lee, '[tjhe difficulties of
telling a Jewish story—How should it be told? In what tone? To whom should it be
told? To what end? Should it be told at all?—was finally to become The Ghost
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Writer's theme '125 These questions are exactly what those Jewish critics of
'Defender of the Faith' had asked Roth. In response, Roth appropriates their
questions, making the questions—rather than the answers—the subject of a novel.
And therefore The Ghost Writer becomes a story about a Jewish writer imagining all
the problems contingent to telling Jewish stories, a lateral approach to the very subject
with which his critics demand he engage with.
In interviews and essays Roth often discusses the strangely fruitful
relationship between his fiction and its worst critics. Roth credits his critics' hostile
reactions with shaping the course of his writing, saying, 'I have no idea how my
career would have gone if this stuff hadn't kicked it off.'126 Roth even attributes such
criticism with having been the catalyst for his creation of Alexander's Portnoy, his
most controversial character to date. According to Roth, Portnoy was actually
inspired by 'the censorious small-mindedness and shame-ridden xenophobia that I ran
into from the official Jews who wanted me to shut up.'127 Indeed, Roth claims that
Portnoy's Complaint was written partly out of frustration with a Jewish audience who
refused to see in him anything other than the writer of his very first short stories.
'They wouldn't let up, no matter what I wrote. So I thought finally, "Well, you want
it, I'll give it to you." And out came Portnoy, apertures spurting.'128 Needless to say,
Roth's critics did not accept their role in the creation of the novel, and the controversy
created by Portnoy's Complaint would dwarf that of Goodbye, Columbus, with the
associate editor of Commentary denouncing Roth's 'fanaticism in the hatred of all
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things Jewish' and former supporters, such as Irving Howe, turning on Roth with
vicious public condemnations.129
Philip Roth was attacked by not only Jewish readers for his creation of
Alexander Portnoy but also by feminist readers who found Portnoy's callous use of
women to be proof of Roth's own feelings towards the female sex. That both Jewish
and feminist readers would be angry seems obvious considering such outbursts from
Portnoy as, 'YOU FUCKING JEWISH MOTHERS ARE JUST TOO FUCKING
MUCH TO BEAR!'130 Portnoy testifies to what he 'knows' is wrong with him: he
thinks his illness can be blamed on overbearing Jewish mothers, constipated Jewish
fathers, and a world filled with shikses who have the audacity to 'all have cunts!
Right under their dresses! Cunts—for fucking!'131 Many readers misread Portnoy as
thinly veiled autobiography, and Roth became, in his own words, 'locked, suddenly,
into this image of a sexual beast.'132 To his critics, he became a self-imposed anti-
Semitic stereotype—'the "Jewfreak", refusing, complaining, neurotic, seasick,
outraged and outrageous'—and the feminist nightmare of the unrepentant
misogynist.133 However, such critics are guilty not only of misreading Roth's fiction
but also of demanding a type of self-censorship from their authors. In other words,
they demand that Roth, as a man and as a Jew, not say certain things. Roth addresses
this idea of self-censorship through his dismissal of it: 'I am not interested in writing
about what people should do for the good of the human race and pretending that's
what they do do, but writing about what they do indeed do, lacking the programmatic
efficiency of the infallible theorists.'134 In many ways creating Portnoy is a direct
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attack against such 'infallible theorists,' as Portnoy represents those individuals and
ideas that exist despite public disapproval and attempted censure.
This second group of critics, those critics who find in Roth a misogynist or an
anti-Semitic Jew, base their readings on what are actually mis-readings of his work.
They insist on reading Roth autobiographically and seek to define the parameters of
what is acceptable for him to write. That Roth write 'for the good of the human race'
is exactly what these critics ask him to do. Yet by publicly declaring themselves
'against' Philip Roth—by denouncing him in synagogue, by writing a letter to the
New Yorker, or by attacking him in an academic journal—critics were also taking the
opportunity to advertise their own political beliefs. In other words, if Roth is at the
centre of an important cultural and critical debate involving the purpose of art and the
role of the reader in contemporary society, then, through him, critics have the
opportunity to declare their own position in this debate. As Mark Shechner writes:
In the conflict between Roth and the numerous voices of Jewish disapproval, a
conflict that goes back to 1959 and the publication of Goodbye, Columbus, the
critics are out of touch. And I don't mean out of touch with the new age, but
with the spirit of fiction itself, with the normal uses of the imagination in
literature. For their quarrel with Roth is not properly over literature or any
aspects thereof but over touchy matters of culture: over who gets to speak for
the Jews and what messages are considered safe to deliver.13
This passage can also be applied to some feminist critics who use Roth to debate how
women can and cannot be discussed in literature and who has the right to make those
decisions. There is an implication here that critics or readers are somehow
responsible for policing literature: for defining what is written and how subjects are
presented. If a writer does not comply, the punishment, as Roth's case illustrates, is
to be publicly denounced and threatened. And the rabbi's threat that Roth continually
135 Mark Shechner, 'Up Society's Ass, Copper: Rereading Philip Roth,' (Madison, WI: The
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refers to in interviews—that 'Medieval Jews would know what to do with him'—
seems far more disturbing in light of thefatwa against Salman Rushdie.
The third group of critics to be discussed are similar to the second in that they,
too, find much to criticize in Roth's work and public persona. What makes them
different, however, is their self-conscious affiliation with culture and art. These
critics—here exemplified by Irving Howe and Norman Podohoretz—claim to base
their arguments against Roth on their experience as academics, as men of culture, or
men of letters. They are sophisticated critics who make it abundantly clear that they
should not be confused with those politicized readers that make up the second
group—those feminists, rabbis, or Jewish organizations—that base their judgements
on gut reactions or tribal loyalties. I would argue, however, that the opinions of Howe
and Podhoretz are as absolutely subjective as the second group. Indeed, it is in the
disjunction between how critics like Howe and Podhoretz perceive themselves and
what their arguments actually reveal that helps to establish Roth's position in the
centre of a cultural and critical debate about the role of literature in contemporary
society. What makes Irving Howe's and Norman Podhoretz's critique of Roth so
important is the question of why they attribute to Roth the philosophies that they do
and how they define themselves against these philosophies. In fact, their
understanding of Philip Roth represents an attempt not only to think through but also
to advertise their own specific moral vision regarding the purposes behind both
reading and writing.
Both Irving Howe and Norman Podhoretz were supporters of Roth's earliest
fiction. Upon the publication of Goodbye, Columbus, Howe wrote in the New
Republic that, 'What many writers spend a lifetime searching for—a unique voice, a
secure rhythm, a distinctive subject—seem to have come to Philip Roth totally and
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immediately '136 Podhoretz also found Roth's earliest short stories appealing and
even claims to have been the first to recognize Roth's potential: 'Unless my memory
is playing tricks on me—and if so, I have no doubt that someone, though not, if I
know anything about him, Roth himself, will correct me—it was I who "discovered"
him as a writer of fiction.'137 However, by the time that Portnoy's Complaint was
published, both Howe and Podhoretz found it necessary not only to reappraise their
position on Roth's writings but to reconsider their endorsement of Roth as a man.
This led Howe to publish 'Philip Roth, Reconsidered,' a vicious attack on Roth's
writings as well as Howe's perception of Roth's ethics. For his part, Podhoretz wrote
a short piece called 'Laureate of the New Class' as a sort of introduction to 'Philip
Roth Reconsidered,' which he begins by stating, 'Except for a detail or two I agree
with everything Irving Howe says about Philip Roth.'138 What is interesting about
these changes of opinion is that they seem rooted in a larger philosophical sea change
affecting both critics later in life. Indeed, Philip Roth seems to have found himself in
the unenviable position of representing the earlier political philosophies of two
literary and social critics who had undergone dramatic political conversions. As a
symbol of their former philosophical naivete, Roth—the man, and not just the
writer—became the ritual sacrifice to be publicly condemned so that Howe and
Podhoretz could expiate their former ideological sins.
Both Howe and Podhoretz began life as left-wing liberals. According to Alan
Wald, the younger Howe was a committed Trotskyist, 'full of fiery rhetoric and eager
formilitant action not so different from some of the most extreme (but nonterrorist)
136 As quoted by Stanley Edgar Hymen, 'A Novelist of Great Promise,' Philip Roth, Harold
Bloom, ed., Bloom's Modern Critical Views (Philadelphia: Chelsea House Publishers, 2003) 7.
137 Podhoretz, 'The Adventures of Philip Roth.' Commentary (Oct. 1998) 25.
138 Norman Podhoretz, 'Laureate of the New Class.' Commentary, Vol. 54 no. 6 (Dec. 1972):
4.
62
elements of the New Left of the 1960's.'139 But all of this changed when Howe
turned against the New Left of the 1960s and early 1970s, 'caricaturing its aims and
activities, and even flirted briefly with the incipient neoconservatives and their
campaign against The New York Review ofBooks.,uo A similar process of political
conversion took place in Norman Podhoretz. The New York Times calls him 'an
outspoken champion of the political left who went on to become one of its leading
scourges.'141 Like Howe, Podhoretz was horrified by the radical and sometimes
violent tendencies of the New Left. He has written that, 'I've turned against almost
everything I was saying between 1958 and 1968, and in a sense I regret having
contributed to what seems to me today a dangerous and destructive cultural, political
wave—a kind of plague'.142 Both Howe and Podhoretz moved from positions on the
left to the right—the very far right in the case of Podhoretz—and both cite their
reason for doing so as the occasional terrorist activities of the New Left. Podhoretz
hints at why this political transition made them so disagreeable towards Roth in his
discussion of the New Left 'plague': 'To the extent that I helped spread that plague, I
regret it. My defense ofmyself is that I then devoted all my energies and all my
resources and whatever talents I had, not only to undoing that damage, but trying to
build something healthier.'143 It is here, in Podhoretz's expressed wish to redress his
past ideological oversights, that he reveals the real motivation behind both his and
Howe's attacks on Roth.
What is striking about Howe and Podhoretz's condemnations of Roth is how
personal they are: both in the sense that they attack Roth, personally, and not just his
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fiction, but that they are also about Howe and Podhoretz's own personal involvement
with Roth and his fiction. Both begin by talking about their early support for, and
encouragement of, Roth; and both talk about their falling out with Roth in terms of
their recognition that Roth represents a new cultural milieu that they cannot abide.
Howe launches two forms of attack on Philip Roth. The first is a purely 'literary'
attack, which upon closer examination reveals what is really a very personal attack
characterizing Roth as arrogant, immature, and culturally void. The second is a
'defence' of Roth against charges of anti-Semitism that actually establishes Roth as
an anti-Semitic author. Both attacks against Roth also involve Howe establishing
himself as Roth's ethical, cultural, and critical foil. Where Howe depicts Roth as
arrogant, he implies his own humility in the face of great art; where he depicts Roth as
ethically challenged, Howe implies his authority on ethics in literature; where Roth is
culturally void, Howe is an arbiter of high culture. Similarly, Podhoretz also sets his
own position in society against that of Roth, believing that Roth represents a 'New
Class' of readers. He writes:
Philip Roth owes his centrality to the fact that he so perfectly embodies the
ethos of a group which began coming to consciousness of itself as a distinctive
social class around the time Roth first appeared on the scene and which has
become numerous enough and powerful enough in recent years to move from
the margins of our culture into the very mainstream of our political life. The
New Class, in short, now constitutes a mass audience in its own right and Roth
is the New-Class writer par excellence. No wonder he is such a success.144
The language of this passage reveals Podhoretz's contempt for this New Class, the
name of which raises the spectre of aristocracy, inherited cultural supremacy, and
class warfare. Indeed, as Mark Shechner argues, Podhoretz reveals a great deal of
discomfort that stems from a conservative sense of class consciousness. Shechner
writes, 'The New Class. So, this is war. This is Kulturkampf. You can smell the
144
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cordite right through the page and hear the click of heels on pavement. Fathers on
patrol!'.145 Both Howe and Podhoretz base their arguments on cultural—even class—
divisions and attempt to establish Roth on one side of the divide with themselves on
the other.
Howe sets this tone of cultural division early in 'Philip Roth, Reconsidered,'
when he warns that '[a]t least for a moment or two, until the next fashion appears, we
are in the presence not only of an interesting writer, but also a cultural "case".'146 The
disdainful tone Howe uses when he describes his belief that Roth is merely another
'cultural case'—a fashion soon to be eclipsed by the next celebrity writer—also
reveals Howe's perception of himself as someone who is not interested in, or
appreciative of, popular culture. Howe is of the other culture, an enduring 'High'
culture that only recognizes 'serious' art. Later in his essay, Howe reiterates his
opinion of Roth's relationship to America, Judaism, and popular culture. As Howe
has already belittled Roth for being a cultural 'case,' and a mere literary trend, it
comes as no surprise when Howe introduces his theory that Roth comes of a 'thin
personal culture.'147 First Howe alleges that Roth 'is one of the first American-Jewish
writers who finds that it (the tradition of Jewish self-criticism and satire] yields him
no sustenance.' Next, in an imaginative leap that seems to accuse Roth of abandoning
his entire Jewish culture and heritage along with any associative literary traditions,
Howe adds this 'deficiency [. . .] need not be a fatal one for a Jewish writer, provided
he can find sustenance elsewhere, in other cultures, other traditions.'148 Howe implies
that Roth has abandoned his Jewish culture with its Jewish literary traditions. In
Howe's estimation, the obvious substitute of American culture and its literary
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traditions has, however, eluded Roth. Howe writes that, 'his relation to the
mainstream of American culture, in its great sweep of democratic idealism and
romanticism, is decidedly meagre.'149 All Roth has, instead, are the 'frayed remnants
of cultural modernism, once revolutionary in significance but now reduced to little
more than the commonplace "shock" ofmiddlebrow culture.'150 The larger
implication of this assertion is that—while Roth does not understand Jewish literary
culture or tradition; while Roth does not understand the 'great sweep' of American
'democratic idealism and romanticism'; while Roth is cursed with a 'thin personal
culture'—Irving Howe can understand and appreciate all of these things. While Roth
panders to 'middlebrow culture,' Howe concerns himself with higher matters—his
own personal culture is anything but thin, his culture decidedly high brow.
Like Howe, Podhoretz also draws a division between the New Class and a
more sophisticated and reserved culture. In 'The Adventure of Philip Roth,'
Podhoretz writes of Roth that:
he was simply incapable of achieving mastery over the outrage, hatred, grief,
and love that drove him to write. By nature he was too judgmental and too
passionately tendentious to transcend such motives and feelings. What he
wanted to do as a writer, what he needed to do as a writer, was to take stock of
the world in which he lived and give it the business, as only someone with so
wicked a pen and so unforgiving a mind as his could do.151
This perception of Roth as weak in the face of his emotions, as spoiling to exact
revenge on his enemies and heap abuse upon those he deems to be his inferiors seems
ironic given the vituperative nature of Howe's and Podhoretz's own essays on Roth.
Indeed, what should strike a reader of these essays is the extent to which those
motivations that Podhoretz claims to be Roth's apparently match Howe's and
Podhoretz's own motivations for attacking Philip Roth. 'To take stock of the world'
149
Howe, 'Philip Roth Reconsidered' 73.
150
Howe, 'Philip Roth Reconsidered' 73.
151
Podhoretz, 'The Adventures of Philip Roth' 30.
66
and 'give it the business,' is exactly what Podhoretz proceeds to do with Roth and the
type of reader and thinker that Podhoretz believes Roth to represent. Podhoretz
revisits his comments from 'Laureate of the New Class':
Roth was their 'laureate' in the sense that everything he wrote served to
reinforce their standard ideas and attitudes, to offer documentary evidence for
their taken-for-granted view that America was a country dominated by
vulgarians, materialists, bores, and criminal political leaders. In doing so,
Roth was inviting his readers to join with him in snobbishly and self-
righteously celebrating their joint superiority to everyone else around them. [. .
.] Without going so far as the New Left or the counterculture, he nevertheless,
and in his own unique style, experienced and gave voice to a hostility as great
as theirs to middle-class America and what later came to be called "family
values."152
Here Podhoretz takes stock of his world: a world he sees as permeated by the
influence of the New Class, the counterculture, and the New Left. This influence
hates middle-class America and 'family values.' They are snobs; they are self-
righteous; they celebrate their superiority, and Roth is their poet laureate. Podhoretz
then gives Roth 'the business.' He says that upon rereading Portnoy's Complaint he
found the book 'very tiny,' and only allowed himself to read Roth's other books once
and no more. He was 'repelled' by one novel, 'disgusted' by another, and 'bored' by
others, including Sabbath's Theater,153
Howe's own attacks on Roth also reveal a strong desire to wound. He berates
Roth for lacking a 'passion for moral scrutiny,' and for being 'a writer who has denied
himself, programmatically, the vision ofmajor possibilities.'154 Howe implies that
Roth, with his limited spiritual and cultural resources, can only contemplate the most
superficial aspects of reality and that he lacks the desire to look at the world from any
sort of moral standpoint. Howe restates this idea more dramatically later, when he
states that a 'vital culture'—as opposed to Roth's own 'thin personal culture'—'can
152
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yield a writer those details of manners, customs, and morals which give the illusion of
reality back to his work.'155 While Howe appears to be commenting on a writer's
ability to create realistic characters and situations, his implication is actually that
having a 'vital culture' is what gives a writer not only the details of manners, customs
and morals but his or her own manners, customs and morals. In other words, Roth's
lack of culture is responsible for his lack of manners, disrespect for customs, and his
immorality. That Howe can judge Roth so harshly on matters ofmorality implies his
own perceived status as a moral arbiter: as a literary critic who looks for what he
perceives to be 'moral issues' in the fiction—and the authors—that he reads.
Howe and Podhoretz reaffirm their accusations of insensitivity and depravity
by accusing Roth of being an anti-Semitic Jew. Howe launches a 'defence' of Roth
against charges of anti-Semitism that actually establishes Roth as anti-Semitic. Near
the end of his essay, Howe says that 'Portnoy's Complaint is not, as enraged critics
have charged, an anti-Semitic book.'156 What makes this defence of Roth sound
strange to a reader is that the preceding pages of the essay seem to make a strong case
that Roth certainly acts and thinks like an anti-Semite. Howe begins by attempting to
establish a biographical link between the character of Alexander Portnoy and that of
the 'real' Philip Roth. Howe first makes this connection before he tells us that he
does not find Portnoy's Complaint to be an anti-Semitic novel. He writes:
The psychic afflictions of his character Roth would surely want to pass up, but
who can doubt that Portnoy's cry from the heart—enough of Jewish guilt,
enough of the burdens of history, enough of inhibition and repression, it is
time to 'let go' and soar to the horizons of pleasure—speaks in some sense for
Roth?157
In this passage Howe directly associates Portnoy with Roth by stating that Portnoy's
complaint must actually be Roth's complaint: that Portnoy speaks for Roth. Howe
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again implies that all of these furious denunciations of Jews and their Jewish feelings
are really Roth's when Howe writes that Portnoy's wish that the super-ego 'were a
Jewish invention,' 'helps explain, I think, what Roth's true feelings about, or relation
to, Jewishness are [ital. mine].'158 Howe again associates Portnoy with Roth,
implying that Portnoy's complaints reveal Roth's true feelings about Jewishness.
When, in the next few sentences, Howe says that Portnoy's Complaint is not an anti-
Semitic book, the reader is left to wonder why Howe would make such an assertion.
Indeed, immediately after his assertion that the book is not anti-Semitic, Howe adds
that 'it contains plenty of contempt for Jewish life,' blatantly contradicting his
defence of Roth.159 He then adds that, 'Roth does not write out of traditional Jewish
self-hatred [ital. mine],' a statement that leads the reader to wonder if Roth instead
writes out of some sort of non-traditional Jewish self-hatred.160 Rather than
defending Roth against charges of Jewish self-hatred, Howe actually encourages this
most insidious of condemnations.
Finally, if there is any doubt of Howe's real intentions as to his appraisal of
Roth, as a man and as a Jew, the next section of his essay accuses Roth of supplying
fodder for the anti-Semitic hordes. Howe says that, 'After the Second World War, as
a consequence of certain unpleasantnesses that occurred during the war, a wave of
philo-Semitism swept through our culture.'161 However, Howe believes that, for
many, this affection for Jews was entirely feigned. What a relief to anti-Semites,
then, that Philip Roth wrote Portnoy's Complaint.
[. . .] for it signalled an end to philo-Semitism in American culture, one no
longer had to listen to all that talk about Jewish morality, Jewish endurance,
Jewish wisdom, Jewish families. Here was Philip Roth himself, a write who
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even seemed to know Yiddish, confirming what had always been suspected
about those immigrant Jews but had recently not been tactful to say.1 2
It is clearly Howe's belief that Roth is guilty of supplying anti-Semites with proof that
their hatred of Jews is justified. It is no great leap to state that Howe implies that
Philip Roth, a Jewish writer and Jewish son, actually justifies that decimation of
European Jewry - that 'certain unpleasantness' - that is known as the Holocaust.
This implication of Holocaust justification—an ultimate act of anti-Semitism—is why
Howe feels the need to condemn Roth so publicly and so harshly. Not only because
of his own disgust at what he perceives to be Roth's politics but because, as someone
who had once publicly supported Roth, Howe needs to re-establish his own political
stance through his relation to Roth. In other words, 'Philip Roth, Reconsidered'
attempts to confirm Irving Howe as—ethically and politically—the opposite of Philip
Roth.
Podhoretz embarks on a similar process of proving Roth's anti-Semitism in
'The Adventure of Philip Roth,' but he takes his accusations against Roth as a self-
hating Jew a step further by linking his recognition of Roth's anti-Semitism with his
own political conversion to neo-conservatism. Podhoretz makes much about why
Roth's fiction initially appealed to him. He says he believed Roth to be 'a real find,'
and 'extraordinarily accomplished': 'demonstrating] that no one, not even [Saul]
Bellow himself, had so perfectly pitched an ear for the speech of the first two
generations of Jews who had come to America from Eastern Europe, or so keen an
eye for the details of the life they lived, or so alert a perception of the quirks and
contours of their psychological makeup.'163 As much as Roth's keen eyes and
perfectly pitched ears make him a good story teller, however, they also helped to
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complicate the origins of these same stories. Critics wondered were they fact or
fiction? What made this question so important to readers was the nature of the stories
themselves. Roth's stories were sharp, critical, and distanced, very different from the
sort of fiction that Saul Bellow complained was for and by those 'who feel that the
business of a Jewish writer in America is to write public-relations releases, to
publicize everything that is nice in the Jewish community and suppress the rest,
loyally.'164 Podhoretz's reaction to this criticism in relation to Roth forms the crux of
his own adventure with Philip Roth, in which Podhoretz reveals more about his own
political leanings then he does about the fiction in question.
After agreeing with Bellow's criticism of the 'philistinism of Jewish readers
who regarded it as the duty of Jewish writers to portray their people only, or at least
largely, in the most sympathetic and favourable terms,' Podhoretz reiterates, 'But, as I
say, I have always had trouble with Roth'.165 One aspect of this trouble stems from
Roth's insistence on asserting that serious art was not to be judged by the ideological
criteria of some of his Jewish readers. Podhoretz claims that such an assertion was
redundant because 'in the 50's, the piety towards serious literature [. . .] was so great
that making such an argument seemed entirely unnecessary.'166 Therefore Podhoretz
depicts Roth as trampling over his already-disadvantaged critics, a sign of gratuitous
aggression on Roth's part, and equates Roth's published responses to his Jewish
critics with 'mugging cripples.'167 He writes, 'I do not mean to insinuate that these
Jews were "cripples," but only that their arguments were so weak and out of touch
with contemporary critical dogma that exposing and ridiculing them, as Roth was so
easily able to do, bore a certain resemblance to the mugging by the strong of the weak
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and defenceless '168 Podhoretz makes a number of assumptions in these statements.
By calling Roth's Jewish detractors 'weak,' 'defenseless,' and 'cripples,' he intimates
that their insults could have no impact on Roth. And yet Roth's own life-long
dialogue with these critics demonstrates that they not only enraged him but challenged
and inspired him as well. In turn, Podhoretz assumes that Roth's only purpose in
engaging with these critics was that Roth sensed how easy such targets really were,
asserting a lack of sophistication on the part of these Jewish readers. The irony here
is that the contempt Podhoretz credits Roth with actually seems to be Podhoretz's
own. After all, Roth's own numerous responses to these reader's complaints
represent an engagement with his Jewish detractors not as the 'cripples' of
Podhoretz's estimation but as adversaries to be taken seriously.
Despite comparing offended Jewish readers to 'cripples,' Podhoretz admits
that, 'I had an uneasy (if largely hidden, as much from myself as others) sympathy for
the Jewish nervousness over Roth's work; and over the years this feeling of sympathy
grew deeper.'169 Podhoretz claims that his inability to acknowledge his sympathy for
'Jewish nervousness' over Roth's work was enforced by the 1950's American cult of
'serious literature.' This understanding of 'serious literature' was the ideological
opposite of the way the older generation of Jews read and understood literature. In
Podhoretz's view, 'reinforcing and exacerbating their Jewish defensiveness and
sensitivity was an old-fashioned moralistic conception of literature (a conception, by
the way, that had been good enough for some very great literary critics like Dr.
Johnson and Matthew Arnold, and to which Roth might have paid a bit more respect
on that account alone).' In other words, Roth's Jewish critics were not really
unsophisticated readers; they were reading from an older but entirely viable and
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legitimate critical perspective that says literature should perform some sort of moral
function. Here Podhoretz sets two different ways of reading against one another, and
these two ways of reading are representative of the cultures by which they are
engaged. On the one hand, Roth represents 'a cult of serious literature' that bases its
judgments on aesthetic criteria alone. This 'cult' is exactly what its name implies—it
is new, popular, and dangerous. On the other hand, there is a much older and more
traditional way of reading that is represented not only by Roth's Jewish critics but
also by canonized authorities such as Dr. Johnson. This is a moral tradition that
sidelines aesthetics. Podhoretz represents himself as having been unwillingly
indoctrinated into the former, popular 'cult' of fiction, until he eventually accepts his
doubts and comes to embrace the latter, 'moralistic' way of reading fiction.
Podhoretz attempts to prove not only that Roth's Jewish critics read him in an
entirely legitimate way but also implies that America's idea of 'serious literature'
included far more nefarious demands that inevitably made Jewish authors such as
Roth—and even Bellow—into unwitting anti-Semites. Roth's incredible popularity,
according to Podhoretz, 'was based on more than his remarkable talent.'170 Roth was
also lucky in that he came along at a point in history when American readers were
willing, even eager, to embrace Jewish subjects. But while Jewish writers such as
Saul Bellow had blazed a trail for the next generation, Podhoretz claims that there
were 'implicit conditions attached to this receptivity.'171 One was an authentically
intimate portrayal of a Jewish subject still considered exotic by mainstream America,
'but the author also had to be sufficiently distanced from this experience to write
about it with a critical if not a jaundiced eye.'172 In other words, mainstream America
did not want to read a story written by a Jew that was uncritical about Jewish subjects.
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Podhoretz implies that non-Jewish American readers wanted Jewish subjects
'revealed' to be the stereotypes that (inherently anti-Semitic) gentiles wanted them to
be. According to Podhoretz, 'This test Roth passed with flying colors from the word
go.'173 In Podhoretz's estimation, Roth's creation of characters such as the Patimkins
and the Portnoys may have owed their existence to their author being part of a chapter
in history in which Jews could write about Jewish subjects and still be published and
read, but he ignored the fact that he was pandering images that must be anti-Semitic in
order to be published and read by gentiles. And so, no wonder many of Roth's Jewish
readership were nervous: 'To them it seemed that with the Gentile anti-Semites finally
forced to bite their tongues, a smart Jewish boy with a big dirty mouth had come
along to take their place.'174 Podhoretz claims that the demands of 'serious literature'
meant that Roth had to write critically—even unsympathetically—about a people who
had so recently witnessed the horrors of systematic genocide and to recycle the anti-
Jewish stereotypes that had been used by the perpetrators of that very crime.
Howe and Podhoretz accuse Roth of being the type ofman, reader, writer, and
even Jew that they are vehemently not. To them, Roth represents all the ills of the
new century, the New Class, and the new brands of literature being disseminated by a
mindless and immoral popular culture dominated by the New Left. He represents
self-hating Jews, anti-Semitism, anti-Americanism, radical groups that support
terrorists, and readers and writers who believe aesthetics to be more important than
morality. In response, Howe and Podhoretz set their own ideologies, culture, and
beliefs about literature against what they claim Roth believes. The irony of this
situation is the fact that Roth never actually espoused any of the philosophies that they
attribute to him. As Mark Shechner writes:
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Since atmospherics, vast tremblings in the Zeitgeist, were at issue, it did not
matter that Roth himself was by no stretch of the imagination either a New
Leftist or a counterculture groupie, as Mailer tried to be. He was always, as he
remains, a dissenting and distraught son of the secular, bookish, Europeanized,
diasporic Jewish culture that created him and that Howe spoke for.175
Shechner argues that Howe's accusations against Roth as a 'cultural case' and
Podhoretz's equating of Roth with the New Class, the New Left and the
counterculture were really based on their own fear of the changing Zeitgeist, displaced
onto the shoulders of Philip Roth. In his discussion ofAmerican Pastoral, Podhoretz
explicitly uses his relationship to Roth to announce his own political leanings: he is a
Neoconservative and, as such, he defines himself against his own definition of Roth
as a liberal.176 Howe does something less overtly political, but similar. That
Podhoretz found in Howe's dissection of Roth impetus for his own essay, 'Laureate of
the New Class,' is no accident. Howe's distaste for the culture of which he believes
Roth is a 'case' is evident, and this distaste stems from the values he believes this
culture espouses.
In reading the essays ofHowe and Podhoretz, one realizes that there is an
ideological force to these readings. The question then becomes: what do Howe and
Podheretz derive from their positions? I argue that what their style of criticism tries
to accomplish is to use Philip Roth as a way to establish their own authenticity.
Indeed, their essays reveal a type of literary criticism that is underpinned by its
relentless moralizing. At the heart of their arguments is the idea that what is wrong
with Roth's fiction is that it is notmorally redemptive. They imply that Roth is an
immoralist: that there is something morally degenerate about his fiction. This interest
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in morality is proven by the singular instance when Howe does praise Roth, for his
short story 'Defender of the Faith.' In his discussion of this story, Howe often repeats
the word 'moral' in his praise. He calls the story, 'serious in its larger moral
implications.'177 He says 'the power of this story derives from presenting a moral
entanglement.'178 He writes that 'the story does not allow any blunt distribution of
moral sympathies' but also believes that Roth has not written anything else
'approaching it in compositional rigor and moral seriousness.'179 Howe repeatedly
claims that Roth's fiction—and fiction in general—must include 'justice and largesse'
in its 'imaginative treatment' of its subject; that fiction should strive to be 'objective';
that fiction should be 'precise' and 'scrupulous' in its 'use of social evidence.'180 And
yet what really seems to please Howe, the word he repeatedly uses in the rare case in
which he praises Roth's fiction, is 'moral.' When Howe finds within Roth's fiction
what he believes to be 'moral' is when Howe finds a Roth story worthy of admiration.
Critics such as Howe and Podhoretz attempt to benefit from writing essays
like 'Philip Roth, Reconsidered' and 'The Adventure of Philip Roth,' despite their
claims that they are objective in their criticism and that they believe the purpose of
literature is to capture reality objectively. In fact, what their essays betray is their
contempt for writing that does not uphold the morals, the politics, and the ideologies
that they hold dear. Howe finds Portnoy's Complaint objectionable because he sees it
as Roth's validation of the 1960s counterculture Howe despises whilst Podhoretz
believes IMarriedA Communist espouses values opposite to his own self-proclaimed
position as a neoconservative. Both critics demonstrate their politics—and through
their politics, their values—through their reading of Roth. While Howe and
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Podhoretz pretend their arguments are objective, their arguments are actually fiercely
partisan and ideological: they believe that literature should be an expression of a view
that they have defined and approved. In other words, although they attempt to
convince the reader of their broad-mindedness, they are really demonstrating
extraordinary narrow-mindedness and this is reflected in their interpretations of
Roth's work. For Howe and Podhoretz ignore the rich thematic tapestry on offer in
Roth's novels in favour ofmerely condemning him as being his most caricatured
media-image.
Re-reading Philip Roth and Martin Amis
Rather than limiting myself to readings ofMartin Amis's and Philip Roth's
fiction that takes into account only those images of self destructive women, images of
violent masculinity, or images of violence against women that admittedly feature
prominently in their fiction, I will ask what else these images might mean. For I
believe it is necessary to go beyond a standard 'images of women' reading that labels
these authors as having imaginations dominated by their problem with women. Such
a reading assumes that Amis and Roth are interested in creating 'realistic' or
'symbolic' representations of women and that as such these images represent their
authors' philosophies of and feelings towards women. It is this assumption I
question, arguing that the fiction of Amis and Roth is not 'about' women at all. In
turn, this thesis will offer alternative readings that explore in what else these writers
are interested, paying particular attention to how such important themes as trauma,
masculinity, and ideology are explored through certain novels. In this vein, my next
chapter will explore how issues of micropolitics, ideology, and affect are encoded in
some of Roth's and Amis's most maligned and controversial works.
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Chapter Two
My work does not offer answers.
-Philip Roth, from an interview with Martha McGregor (1960)
And suddenly she realized: books were about the living world, the world of
power, boredom and desire, the burning world. These books were just more
candid about it than the others; but they all fawned and fed on the buyable
present. What had she felt before? She felt that books were about the ideal
world, where nothing was ideal but everything had ideality and the chance of
moral spaciousness. And it wasn't so. She ran her eyes along the shelves with
mordant pride. Books weren't special. Books were just like everything else.
-Martin Amis, Other People: A Mystery Story (1981)
[M]an will wish Nothingness rather than not wish at all.
-Friedrich Nietzsche, from The Geneology ofMorals (1887)
Chapter one of this thesis concludes with the assertion that issues of
micropolitics, ideology, and affect are helpful contexts for discussing the works of
Amis and Roth. It is my intention to illustrate how Roth and Amis redefine, or refine,
theories about ideology in order to explore how ideology functions for the individual.
These are authors whose fame, or infamy, seems to rest on their creation of
outrageously self-obsessed masculine subjects. And yet, as this chapter will explore,
their fiction actually reveals a deep commitment to the question of how individuals
live with and through ideology, as well as what it means to be 'good'. This claim will
be developed in the context of Friedrich Nietzsche's theory of ressentiment, as well as
Gilles Deleuze's concept of the micropolitical. By exploring the role of affect and the
will to power in ressentiment and the micropolitical, new avenues for understanding
texts such as Roth's When She Was Good and Amis's Other People: A Mystery Story
will begin to emerge. But first the connection between ideology and the individual
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must be clarified, in order to understand the very specific ways that Roth and Amis
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imagine people 'do ideology.''
Ideology and the Individual
This chapter proposes that Martin Amis's Other People: A Mystery Story and
Philip Roth's When She Was Good are linked in that both works present ideology as a
form of affect. To understand this proposition better, I have found helpful the work of
sociologists Gary Alan Fine and Kent Sandstrom, who write that they want to study
'how individuals and groups do ideology.'182 Working from a post-Marxist
understanding of ideology as something in which the subject naturalizes the political
and collaborates in his or own construction as ideological subject, Fine and Sandstrom
see a 'need to connect ideology more directly to action and meaning, or to examine
how people use and present ideologies as they pursue their everyday interests.'183 The
kernel of the idea that grew into this chapter comes from Fine's and Sansdtrom's
suggestion that, at some unconscious level, people attempt to use ideology to further
their own interests. In order to clarify this idea, more has to be said about the
conjunction of ideology and power. Nietzsche's theory of ressentiment, combined
with Deleuze's understanding of the micropolitical, offers insight into this
understanding of ideology that is crucial to the fiction of Martin Amis and Philip
Roth.
Nietzsche and Ressentiment
An understanding of Nietzsche's theory of ressentiment helps to contextualize
how ideology is conceived of by both Martin Amis and Philip Roth. Although
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Nietzsche's definition of ressentiment places its genesis in ancient times, Saul
Newman warns that 'Ressentiment is diagnosed by Nietzsche as our modem
condition.'184 Ressentiment is especially important because of its connection with
morality.185 Nietzsche claims that what modern man conceives of as 'morality' is
really the effect of ressentiment, a theory that radically redefines 'morality,'
challenging all preconceived notions about morality's relationship with the individual
and society. As Bernard Reginster writes, '[Nietzsche] unequivocally maintains that
the three central phenomena that constitute, in his view, modern morality—the
distinction between good and evil, the feeling ofmoral guilt, and the ascetic ideal—all
have their origin in ressentiment.,186 What makes Nietzsche's theories regarding
these aspects ofmorality so revolutionary is that Nietzsche identifies ressentiment,
and therefore morality itself, as 'an assertion of will to power.'187 In associating
morality with the will to power, 'Nietzsche challenges some of our most deeply held
beliefs about what is valuable.'188
According to Nietzsche, the origins of ressentiment lie in the weaker
individual's revolt against the aristocratic values of the master class. This revolt
reveals 'the origin of the antithesis of good and bad' and the genealogy of our moral
ideas.189 This weaker individual is not Nietzsche's 'slave,' rather he is one of 'two
subgroups' that 'compete for political superiority, namely the "knights" and the
184 Saul Newman, 'Anarchism and the Politics of Ressentiment,' Theory and Event, 4:3 (2000)
Project Muse, University of Edinburgh Library, Nov. 21, 2006, http://muse.ihu.edu/.
185 Bernard Reginster, 'Nietzsche on Ressentiment and Valuation', Philosophy and
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"priests".'190 Although both groups have been raised as rulers, the priests feel
impotent in comparison with the physical glory and the effortless dominance of the
knights.191 It is this feeling of impotence that makes the priest so dangerous.
Nietzsche writes, 'Yet the priests are, as is notorious, the worst enemies—why?
Because they are the weakest. Their weakness causes their hate to expand into a
192
monstrous and sinister shape, a shape which is most crafty and most poisonous.'
Despite feeling impotent, however, the priest never loses his desire for power, as
Nietzsche warns, 'These weaklings!—they also, forsooth, wish to be strong some
time; there is no doubt about it, some time their kingdom also must come—"the
kingdom of God" is their name for it, as has been mentioned:—they are so meek in
everything!'.193 And so the priest remains aware that power is not within his grasp,
and yet he cannot renounce his desire for that which he cannot have. This situation
leads the priest to perform what Reginster calls 'ressentiment revaluation.'194 The
priest sublimates his desire for power so entirely that he 'fails to recognize that his
devaluation of power is still motivated by his repressed but enduring desire for it.'195
The priest's sublimation of his true desires creates a condition of perpetual
self-deception and misery. In Nietzsche's own words:
"They are miserable, there is no doubt about it, all these whisperers and
counterfeiters in the corners, although they try to get warm by crouching close
to each other, but they tell me that their misery is a favour and distinction
given to them by God, just as one beats the dogs one likes best; that perhaps
190 Reginster 285. Later in this essay, Reginster clarifies why he discusses ressentiment in
terms of the priest, when Nietzsche himself uses both 'priest' and 'slave' to designate ressentiment.
Reginster argues that ressentiment is a slave revolt in that it favors the slave by negating noble values,
but that this revolt is led by the priests. (289)
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aspect of Nietsche's example. The weakness of the priests creates their feeling of impotence only
because they hold it responsible for the loss of their political supremacy. [.. .J But there is no reason to
think that, in different circumstances, the feeling of impotence would not be created by intellectual,






this misery is also a preparation, a probation, a training; that perhaps it is still
more something which will one day be compensated and paid back with a
tremendous interest in gold, nay in happiness. This they call
'Blessedness.'"196
As Reginster explains, the priest finds himself caught in a position of perpetual
unhappiness through this act of self-deception: 'he refuses either to give up his desire
for [power] or to accept his inability to acquire [power].'197 And so he expresses his
belief in ideals or values that are antithetical to his real values and desires.198 This
creates an apparently 'new' set of values that, on closer inspection, actually reveal
themselves to be a negation of the sublimated values that the priest really admires.
These 'new' values are of special interest to this thesis.
Nietzsche's theory on the genealogy of ressentiment is edifying, but what is
most important is how morality and ideology function within his theory of
ressentiment. As Nietzsche explains in The Genealogy ofMorals:
The revolt of the slaves in morals begins in the very principle of resentment
becoming creative and giving birth to values—a resentment experienced by
creatures who, deprived as they are of the proper outlet of action, are forced to
find their compensation in an imaginary revenge. While every aristocratic
morality springs from a triumphant affirmation of its own demands, the slave
morality says "no" from the very outset to what is "outside itself," "different
from itself," and "not itself': and this "no" is its creative deed.199
This quotation reveals two crucial aspects of Nietzsche's theory of ressentiment: that
it is reactive, and that ressentiment becomes creative and gives birth to values.
Thomas J. Brobjer argues that in Nietzsche's estimation, 'Moral principles, even
relativistic moral principles, assume or presuppose moral opposites, presuppose good








opposites.'200 Ressentiment offers a glimpse into why moral principles dichotomize
the world and what the individual 'gets' from this dualistic vision of morality.
According to the theory of ressentiment, negative emotions such as rage, fear,
jealousy, and insecurity actually create values. In this philosophy, morals and ethics
are revealed to have their basis in subjective and personal feelings and judgments
rather than objective and universal perceptions of experience. It is the priest's feeling
of impotence and the anger and frustration this causes that causes him to revaluate the
world, sublimating his real passion for its opposite. And so he reacts against the
values of the knight—values such as pride, strength and resolve—by claiming to
espouse opposite values such as humility, equality and forgiveness. These reactions
against a particular perception or viewpoint are then re-interpreted as the impersonal
origin of values: 'Ressentiment describes the movement in which this reactive and
resentful denial of higher life begins to create its own moral system and vision of the
world.'201 A reaction against a particular mode of life becomes the origin and basis of
individual and collective ideologies. Paradoxically this primary act of negation
becomes the 'positive' principle at the very heart of a particular vision of life.
Eventually this reactive stance establishes itself as the 'universal' interpretation of the
moral groundings of life.
Nietzsche argues that reactive values conceal a will to power. Ressentiment
inscribes moral judgment at the very heart of life and underscores the ascendancy of
purely reactive values:
[. . .] the conspiracy of the sufferers against the sound and the victorious; here
is the sight of the victorious hated. And what lying so as not to acknowledge
this hate as hate! What a show of big words and attitudes, what an art of
"righteous" calumniation! [. . .1 What do they really want? At any rate to
200 Thomas J. Brobjer, 'Nietzsche's Affirmative Morality: An Ethics of Virtue', Journal of
Nietzsche Studies, Issue 26 (2003) 64.
201 Lee Spinks, Friedrich Nietzsche, Routledge Critical Thinkers (London and New York:
Routledge, 2003) 97.
represent righteousness, love, wisdom, superiority, that is the ambition of
these "lowest ones," these sick ones! And how clever does such an ambition
make them! You cannot, in fact, but admire the counterfeiter dexterity with
which the stamp of virtue, even the ring, the golden ring of virtue, is here
imitated. They have taken a lease of virtue absolutely for themselves, have
these weakest and wretched invalids, there is no doubt of it; "We alone are the
good, the righteous," so do they speak, "we alone are the homines bonae
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voluntatis."
By advertising their values as 'truth'—as righteous, good and just—proponents of
ressentiment not only bring their own imaginative world into focus but also elevate
themselves and their values above their enemies. In other words, a system of values
that enshrines a violent recoil from life claims instead to find its roots in universal
values such as love, goodness and selflessness. So, the priest seeks power through
being 'good,' even while he claims that the quest for power is immoral.
Crucially, this claim to superior morality also allows the "man or woman of
ressentiment" to malign their enemies as corrupt, evil and dishonest. Nietzsche
writes:
The ascetic ideal has an aim—this goal is, putting it generally, that all the
other interests of human life should, measured by it standard, appear petty and
narrow; it explains epochs, nations, men, in reference to this one end; it
forbids any other interpretation, any other end; it repudiates, denies, affirms,
confirms, only in the sense of its own interpretation [. . ,].203
The implication here is that this 'lease of virtue' can become a lease of violence. As
William Mackintire Salter warns, 'It is the people with "absolute truth" who burn
lews and heretics and good books, and root out entire higher cultures, as in Peru and
Mexico—fanatical love of power leading them on.'204 The ultimate irony of this
situation, however, is that just as the man or woman of ressentiment may bring
unhappiness unto others, he or she is doomed to be unhappy as well. Reginster warns





ressentiment" is thus left pathetically hanging between the impossibility to enjoy the
satisfaction of desires he does not really have, and the impossibility to enjoy the
satisfaction of desires he has but cannot embrace.'205 So if the priest does succeed in
convincing people that they are all equal, he cannot actually rejoice in his triumph.
For what he really wants is to exert power over his flock. As Reginster writes, 'In the
last analysis, ressentiment revaluation is predicated upon the unacknowledged hope
that turning away from the frustrated desires, and pursuing the very opposite values,
somehow will at last bring about the satisfaction of those desires'.206 However,
Nietzsche warns, the desire for revenge at the heart of the man or ressentiment knows
no bounds and must ultimately end in a perpetual state of unhappiness for both 'the
man of ressentiment' and his object of revenge:
They are all men of resentment, are these physiological distortions and worm-
riddled objects, a whole quivering kingdom of burrowing revenge,
indefatigable and insatiable in its outbursts against the happy, and equally so
in disguises for revenge, in pretexts for revenge: when will they really reach
their final, fondest, most sublime triumph in revenge? At that time, doubtless,
when they succeed in pushing their own misery, in fact, all misery, into the
consciousness of the happy; so that the latter begin one day to be ashamed of
their happiness, and perchance say to themselves when they meet, "It is a
shame to be happy; there is too much misery/" . . . [sic]207
As Salter cautions, ressentiment revaluation inevitably brings misery both to the men
and women of ressentiment and also to those who fall on the wrong side of their
dichotomized world view.
Deleuze and the Micropolitical
The philosophical theories of Gilles Deleuze owe a tremendous debt to the
philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche. Deleuze's own body of work illustrates his





Philosophy (1962) and Nietzsche (1965)—and he edited volumes for the Gallimard
publication of Nietzsche's works.208 According to Petra Perry, many of Deleuze's
theories 'were explicitly linked to and fortified by reference to Nietzsche', and
Deleuze has been credited 'with a privileged role as a primary instigator of a new
reading of Nietzsche'.209 Although Deleuze does not entirely agree with Nietzsche's
negative depiction of the will to power, many of Deleuze's ideas about how ideology
functions in the life of the individual illustrate a clear connection to aspects of
Nietzsche's theory of ressentiment.2]0 Deleuze is especially interested in Nietzsche's
conception of the world 'in terms of chaotic and free-roaming fluxes.'211 These
notions of change and flux are important to Deleuze's conception of ideology in that
they inform how he defines concepts. Deleuze's definition of concept is set against
his definition of opinion, and these two ideas are critical to an understanding of how
he imagines individuals conceive of their personal ideologies. Finally, the role of
affect and the micropolitical are essential to understanding Deleuze's theories of
opinion, concept, and ideology.
At the heart of Deleuze's philosophy is his redefinition of the word problem.
Rather than something negative, Deleuze saw developing problems as the power of all
life: 'Life poses problems - not just to thinking beings, but to all life. Organisms,
cells, machines and sound waves are all responses to the complications or
"problematising" force of life.'212 On a material level, for example, the 'problem' of
birds needing to swim was answered by webbed feet; or the 'problem' of dust is
answered by the invention of the vacuum. But this definition of problem also has
2°8 petra Perry, 'Deleuze's Nietzsche', boundary 2, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring, 1993) 178.
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philosophical connotations. Deleuze's understanding of problems ties in with his
understanding of 'concept': 'All concepts are connected to problems without which
they would have no meaning and which can themselves only be isolated or
understood as their solution emerges.'213 Citing Nietzsche's influence, Claire
Colebrook argues that in Deleuze's philosophy, 'Philosophical concepts are not
amenable to dictionary style definitions, for their power lies in being open and
expansive. For this reason we have to understand them through the new connections
that they make.'214 Rather than being standardized definitions that seek to define how
people live and why, philosophical concepts should help people to understand the
problems that they encounter in everyday life. This is not a reductive mode of
thought: it should not seek to categorize, define, or deaden life and thoughts about
life. Rather, 'There is no concept with only one component. Even the first concept,
the one with which a philosophy "begins," has several components, because it is not
obvious that philosophy must have a beginning, and if it does determine one, it must
cobine it with a point of view or a ground.'215 As Colebrook writes, 'A concept, for
Deleuze, is just this power to move beyond what we know and experience to think
how experience might be extended.'216
For Deleuze, a concept is an active, engaged, thinking approach to life. Set
against this definition of concept, is Deleuze's definition of opinion. In contrast,
'opinion is the rule of the correspondence of one to the other; it is a function or a
proposition whose arguments are perceptions and affections, and in this sense it is a
function of the lived.'217 Crucially, opinion is also tied in with affect:
213 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, trans. H. Tomlinson and G.
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For example, we grasp a perceptual quality common to cats or dogs and a
certain feeling that makes us like or hate one or the other: for a group of
objects we can extract many diverse qualities and form many groups of quite
different, attractive, or repulsive, subjects (the "society" of those who like cats
or detest them), so that opinions are essentially the object of a struggle or an
exchange.218
As Colebrook points out, Deleuze's views on opinion have implications for the way
we think about our world with its homogenizing capitalist prejudices.219 But this
reactive, affect-based definition of opinion, or doxa, bears implications for how we
'do ideology.' Deleuze uses the example of cheese:
Doxa is a type of propositioin that arises in the following way: in a given
perceptive-affective lived situation (for example, some cheese brought to the
dinner table), someone extracts a pure quality from it (for example, a foul
smell); but, at the same time as he abstracts the quality, he identifies himself
with a generic subject experiencing a common affection (the society of those
who detest cheese—competing as such with those who love it, usually on the
basis of another quality). 20
In reducing, or ignoring, other peoples' different ways of being in the world—in
denying the complexities of existence—I am making my own desires and pleasures
both 'normal' and 'good.' If I enjoy cheese, than, in Deleuze's example, 'it is the
enemies of cheese who stink.'221 In other words, what I find desirable, or what I think
is pleasurable, becomes not my own subjective experience of the world but what I
consider to be the objective qualifiers for universal values.
Where purely personal, subjective responses become enshrined as 'values' is
where Deleuze believes opinion goes wrong: 'Opinion not only assumes a present
and shared world; it also assumes a common sense whereby thinking takes the same
"upright" form distributed among rational perceivers.'222 In other words, my opinion
assumes that I am a normal, average person, and therefore what I feel is right or
218 Deleuze & Guattari 144.
219 Colebrook 16.
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wrong must be what everybody feels is right and wrong. Deleuze explains that, 'It
gives to the recognition of truth an extension and criteria that are naturally those of an
"orthodoxy": a true opinion will be the one that coincides with that of the group to
which one belongs by expressing it.'223 The further implication is that if we all feel
something is right or wrong, it must be right or wrong: 'opinion triumphs when the
quality chosen ceases to be the condition of a group's constitution but is now only the
image or "badge" of the constituted group that itself determines the perceptive and
affective model, the quality and affection, that each must acquire.'224 But opinion is
not only reductive; it also allows me to condemn that which I do not understand or
enjoy. This means that what we. feel becomes what we think the world means, and
this has overtly political repercussions. Indeed, according to Deleuze, '[opinion]
abstracts an abstract quality from perception and a general power from affection: in
this sense all opinion is already political.'225 Deleuze warns, 'That is why so many
discussions can be expressed in this way: "as a man, I consider all women to be
unfaithful"; "as a woman, I think men are liars.'"226 For Deleuze, our prejudices, or
the things that we believe to be evil, immoral or perverse, are really just our fears or
our disgusts disguised as concepts. To reiterate his examples, rather than a woman
acknowledge that she has made bad choices in regards to her boyfriends, she labels all
men 'liars'. Or, rather than a man admit that he dated the wrong woman, he labels all
women 'unfaithful'. To combat the reductive and generalizing responses to the world
that are inherent in opinion and 'common sense', Deleuze, according to Colebrook,
argues that 'we need to look at how we compose our perceptions of the world, the
force of those perceptions (affect) and how we create decisions, judgements and
223 Deleuze & Guattari 146.
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concepts '227 Deleuze's concept of ideology and micropolitics helps to effectuate
such an understanding.
Deleuze defines ideology in the narrow sense, understanding it as something
that 'explains how individuals act against their interests.'228 In opposition to
ideology, Deleuze offers his own version of a transcendental method of critique.
However, Deleuze's transcendental method is very similar to how I argue Amis and
Roth understand ideology. The connection here is the onus that Deleuze places on
showing 'how persons and interests are produced from the chaotic flows of desire.'229
Claire Colebrook does an admirable job of summarizing Deleuze's complicated views
on micropolitics, which 'shows how the extended and individual categories of
persons, classes or interests are "coded" from affects.'230 Colebrook gives the
example of bourgeois marriage that 'far from being the effect of our desire appears as
a law that ought to govern our desire.'231 In other words, because I want access to a
sexual partner I get married, even though I depict marriage as something that governs
desire by making it legal and moral. The transcendental method that examines our
values and morals micropolitically illustrates how 'desire is not repressed by politics
so much as it is coded.'232 In this sense, understanding how desire operates can be a
liberating experience in that Deleuze believes that 'Desire itself is power, a power to
become and produce images.'233 Deleuze imagines that we can 'become other'
through our ability to produce images, and thus free ourselves from our own limiting
subjectivity. He writes, 'becoming is an extreme contiguity within a coupling of two










captures both of them in a single reflection.' As Colebrook warns, however,
'Desire also has the power to produce images that enslave it: images of a moral "man"
obeying his social duty.'235 This image of a moral man obeying his duty recalls
Nietzsche's man of ressentiment: a subject bound by an adherence to 'values' he or
she secretly despises in order to cultivate social standing in the community.
What makes this discussion about ideology important to this thesis is the way
in which both Martin Amis and Philip Roth depict how people come to make the
political and ideological choices that they do. Rather than being amoral or immoral
authors, as critics often contend, both Amis and Roth are interested in how ethics and
values actually come into being. Amis and Roth differ from each other in their
narrative approach, and they are both interested in different aspects of the same set of
questions. And yet this thesis will argue that they are also both fundamentally moral
writers in that Martin Amis and Philip Roth seek to understand what living a 'moral'
life—or at least attempting to live one—actually means. To this end, two fictions—
one by each author—will be examined. Both texts are about being 'good', and both
ask questions about the ideological foundation of 'goodness' itself. Martin Amis is
particularly interested in micropolitics, or the affective responses that encode our
politics. In Other People: A Mystery Story, Amis creates a world in which Deleuze's
warning that desire can enslave is the only reality for the average man, and the
proliferation and power of popular culture seems to undercut any attempt at Deleuze's
transcendental critique. Roth, on the other hand, revels in ressentiment. His early
work When She Was Good is a novel that imagines what we do to ourselves in our
desire to be 'good' and what being 'good' really means.
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A Micropolitical Approach to Amis's Other People
Chapter one of Other People: A Mystery Story begins with the first sensations
of an unnamed woman who is full of relief that '[t]ime—it's starting again.'236 There
is a stranger with her, who asks her how she is, tells her he is leaving her, and finally
admonishes her to 'be good.' She opens her eyes to find herself alone and lying in
what appears to be a hospital. But the woman herself has no idea that she is in a
hospital, as she is suffering from some sort of total amnesia.237 She fails to remember
not only anything about herself but also the world she lives in. In the toilet, the
function of which she 'cannot connect with herself,' she attempts to understand her
situation.238 Trying to remember things leads nowhere: 'Her mind went on for ever
but contained nothing, like a dead sky.'239 The only thing that she recognizes is her
own fear, and she is overwhelmed by the sensation of 'such unanimity of threat, such
imminence of harm.'240 When she finally musters the courage to leave the hospital
and enter the world, her sensation of being under threat proves accurate. She wanders
around the city of London as ignorant and innocent as a newborn, except she is a fully
grown and very attractive young woman.
Alone, scantily dressed, and still unable to remember or recognize anything,
she stumbles around London until she encounters a groups of tramps, one of whom is
singing the nursery rhyme, 'Mary Had a Little Lamb.'241 Inspired by the song, she
takes the name Mary Lamb. But the reader is soon introduced to the idea that this
sweet and innocent amnesiac might very well be Amy Hide, a morally unscrupulous






complex than simply a story about memory loss. The novel intimates that Amy was
murdered; this is the story of her afterlife and her chance at redemption. Prince, the
policeman who watches over Amy, seems to be none other than the narrator, her
murderer, and perhaps even the Prince of Darkness himself. At the end of the novel,
Mary/Amy willingly returns to Prince to be murdered again, in order to replay her
hand at life.
The novel, in a way that recalls Amis's earlier novel Success, charts Mary
Lamb's rise up the social ladder as well as her progression from innocent victim to
corrupt victimizer as she recognizes her power to 'make feel bad (sic)' and reclaims
242
her identity as Amy Hide. When innocent, Mary is the object of other people's
desire. As such she is a victim; but she also causes a fair amount of chaos and misery.
Mary is raped, viciously, soon after emerging from the hospital, after being pimped
out by a young woman who claims to be a friend. But Mary's innocence and inability
to understand the complex emotional world simmering around her also means that she
can be cruel. As Blake Morrison writes, 'Breakage is a dominant motif in the novel
and whereverMary goes she leaves a trail of destruction behind her: broken backs,
243broken jaws, broken noses, broken necks, broken spirits, broken hearts.' Despite
her desire to be good, Mary cannot understand the emotions she incites or encourages,
and she can never really understand the pain she brings to others. After she tells
Alan—the nervous, insecure and frantically balding young man who worships her—
that she wants to end their sexual relationship, he hangs himself. She recognizes that
she has had a part to play in his death, and in her statement to the police she writes,
'I'm sorry, I didn't mean to. I'll try not to do it again.'244 But she cannot imagine
242 Amis 116.




what her role in Alan's suicide could actually be and still wonders if he did really kill
himself because of his hair loss, as his suicide note claims.245 Mary's relationship to
her world is, in many ways, sub-human or animal-like; she reacts only to comforts, or
distractions, or distastes. For example, she enjoys sitting on her friend Russ's lap
because he holds her securely, whereas sitting on Alan's lap is uncomfortable because
of his meager frame.246 She remains wholly unaware, however, of the intricacies of
human emotion, or how painful feelings such as desire and jealousy can be. And so
she sits on Russ's lap in front ofAlan, registering her own unease with the situation,
but ignoring it because she misreads the tension and thinks that 'the boys seemed to
enjoy it.'247
James Diedrick believes that Mary is curiously affectless: that she neither
understands, nor is affected by, emotion. This can be juxtaposed against what the
reader knows about Amy Hide, who is depicted as a young woman who takes
pleasure in hurting her family, her friends, and herself. Amy's sado-masochistic
tendencies reveal her own disengagement with the world around her and her own best
interests: she does not care for others or for herself. Diedrick's understanding of
Mary/Amy's affective estrangement is interesting in that it not only explains why
such estrangement happens but also illustrates the effects of such an estrangement in
terms of world view:
On one level, Mary/Amy's estrangement is a metaphor for that of Amis's
generation. A kind of emotional and moral 'downward mobility' affects even
the most privileged members of the twenty-something generation here. Like
Mary/Amy, they seem to have lost touch with the past; their responses are
likewise stunted. The narrator even compiles a new, secularized list of the
seven deadly sins to apply to this generation: 'venality, paranoia, insecurity,
excess, carnality, contempt, boredom.'248
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The original seven deadly sins—avarice, envy, pride, gluttony, lust, anger, and
sloth—are really the desires or emotions that motivate sin.249 But Amis's list of the
seven deadly sins, as revised for the 20th century, consists of the responses—both
physical and ideological—that the original seven deadly sins create.250 Out of envy
the subject becomes paranoid of the enemies he or she creates in others; because one
is angry, he looks to others to fuel your contempt; and because one is lazy she depicts
the world as essentially boring. According to Amis, something about the 20th century
has redefined the seven deadly sins not as the vices that are the root cause of certain
self-destructive behaviors but as the affective responses that create people's
ideological world views. One thing that this shift in moral perspective does is upset
the notion of responsibility implied by the original seven deadly sins. Pride, gluttony,
and lust are all things that the individual must learn to control and, ideally, expunge so
that he or she can live a 'good' life. But how can 'contempt' or 'paranoia' be
controlled if the emotions underpinning such reactions, such as envy and anger, are
not understood? But while I agree with Diedrick that Mary and Amy are
representative of an 'emotional and moral "downward mobility",' I would argue that
this is not because they are affect/ess.
Rather, I would argue that Mary and the original Amy Hide are all affective
response. Granted, both are estranged from understanding the more complex or
nuanced aspects of emotional responses, but they absolutely understand affect. Mary
and Amy live in a world of opinion and doxa: they live in a world of simplified
affective responses that jump directly to the level of concept, but this does not mean




in Mary's relationship with Jamie, a wealthy young man who supports a variety of ex-
girlfriends with his inheritance. Initially, Mary, Jamie, and his exes all live together
peacefully enough, partly because Jamie has declared himself 'out of it.'251 He wants
nothing more to do with sex or relationships. He tells Mary, 'I'm not in that line any
more. I'm not in futures any more. I'm not up to you heavy dames. I'm just wide
open. You'll chomp me up and poop me out before I know it.'252 Jamie blames his
lack of sexual interest on two things. He fears the vulnerability that is entailed by
emotional intimacy, but he also depicts sex and love as a fundamentally creative act—
a 'futures' act—that he is incapable of taking part in anymore. This sterile and
deadened view of the world supports Diedrick's claim that Mary/Amy's world is one
of 'emotional and moral "downward mobility".'253 But unfortunately for Jamie, Mary
has finally, and for the first time in the novel, come to want something:
Mary sat naked on the edge of the bed. She was crying again. No more of
this, she thought. She couldn't go on being alone. It wasn't just Jamie—she
knew what was wrong with Jamie. But only he could stop the rawness and the
rending, the needing, the tearing eagerness. And everyone needed someone to
make them feel halfway whole.254
Out of a combination of loneliness and desire, Mary, for the first time in the novel,
decides that she needs something: Jamie. Her newfound need implies that Mary is
changing; either she is changing back into Amy Hide or becoming something else
entirely.
Mary's newfound desire is a turning point in the novel. Jamie remains
oblivious to her advances, entrenched in his position as 'out of it.' The only time he
really pays attention to her is when she is upset, or crying, a trick she learns from






Carlos knew: it always got you what you wanted.'255 She calls her newfound
ability—crying to get attention—the 'power to make feel bad.'256 The irony of this
situation is that because making Jamie feel bad brings Mary attention and, therefore,
makes Mary feel good, Mary does not equate 'the power to make feel bad' with being
bad. In fact, she is quite proud of her accomplishment:
Mary made Jamie feel bad by feeling bad herself. She concentrated on this
feeling and it struck her with its purity. After a few days it seemed obvious,
just, even admirable. God, Mary feels bad. Do you see how bad she's
feeling? Mary condensed the world and its present into a settled haze above
her head. She glowed with it, her new power. It was true, it was true; how
257could something be as intense as this and be false?
What stands out in this passage is how Mary's response to her desire for Jamie
evolves and how emotional blackmail becomes for her an 'admirable' act of 'purity.'
Because she feels good when she receives Jamie's attention—when he enquires why
she looks so miserable or anxiously watches her glower—feeling bad becomes
something good. And because 'the power to make feel bad' breaks down Jamie's
resistance so that he makes love to her, her manipulative act proves itself to be 'good'
in the sense it gives her what she wants. When Prince phones her again, she claims—
for the first time in the novel—to be happyP* That Prince, who knows Mary better
than she knows herself, promptly responds to this by saying, 'You sound terrible,' is
telling.259 Although Mary has achieved her goal of bedding Jamie, the irony is that
she has to be unhappy for him to pay attention to her. And Mary, in the 'gothic
parody of romantic intimacy' that is her relationship with Jamie, continues to torture







close '260 This nightmarish 'relationship' continues until Jamie finally snaps—and
goes into a psychiatric hospital—and Mary's cruelty and madness rejoin the two
opposites of her personality into one, and she re-becomes Amy Hide. Or does she?
At the end of Part Two, Mary Lamb and Amy Hide definitely reunite: 'She
had found her again. She was herself at last.'261 But the chapter immediately
following these words opens with the supposedly anarchical Amy Hide burning
rubbish in her garden and making small talk with her elderly neighbors, for whom she
often runs errands and visits for tea and cakes. We learn that this Amy Hide now
lives with Prince but sleeps in a separate bedroom. She enjoys housekeeping, she
makes omelettes for supper, she reads, and she listens to the radio with Prince. This
description certainly does not match up to the description of the pre-Mary Lamb Amy
Hide: the woman who 'did terrible things' to herself, to her family, and to anyone else
who loved her.262 That the new Amy is, indeed, a different Amy is hinted at by both
Prince and Amy herself. When she tells Prince that she used to date someone on the
television, he responds by saying 'Boy, I bet old Amy made short work of him.'263
Note that he just says 'old Amy,' not the old Amy. 'Old Amy' is talked about, here,
as a separate subject rather than a former incarnation of the Amy currently sitting at
Prince's side. She reiterates this difference when she recalls that 'He [Michael Shane]
told me that after Amy he thought he was going queer' rather than 'After me he
thought he was going queer.'264 This new Amy Hide does not seem to identify, in any
way, with the Amy Hide the reader was introduced to in the first two sections of the
book. In fact, Mary Lamb—who despite wanting to be good brought disaster to those
who cared for her—actually seems like a better person after 'becoming' her nemesis:
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the reportedly terrifying and corrupt Amy Hide. At the very end of the novel, when
Amy returns to her murderer in order to complete the cycle initiated at the beginning
of the novel, he asks 'Is it really you?'265 The answer seems to be no: this Amy Hide
does not appear to be anything like the dangerously self-destmctive siren described
earlier in the novel. And yet she succumbs to her fate and is either murdered or
resuscitated—the wording is ambiguous—to reawaken as a young girl, still protected
by her mother and father, and as yet unknown to the man who would become her
demon-lover.266
The ending of the novel is as ambiguous as the beginning. What are we to
make ofMary's life, such as it is? In his review of the novel, Evan Hunter implies
that Amis's intention in Other People was to create 'an obscure book,' and warns that
'Mr. Amis would seem far too young to have acquired such a dismal view of the
world.'267 These criticisms—that the book is 'obscure' and 'dismal'—are echoed by
others. As Diedrick writes, 'Her [Mary/Amy's] progressively disillusioning
encounters with the world and with other people seem designed to justify the
narrator's nihilistic commentary, which itself seems to derive from some unspecified
sense of diminishment and loss.'268 It would be easy to read the novel as nihilistic:
Mary's is a world devoid of joy or connection in which acts of kindness are repaid
with acts of violence. But Diedrick points to another aspect of the novel that is
instrumental in my reading of Other People as a text that engages with ideology,
affect and ethics. He writes:
Or perhaps [Amis] is posing one last challenge to the reader, this one calling
for a rejection of the dualism that initially seems to organize the novel.
Throughout Other People, Amis has challenged the epistemological
265 Amis 222.
266 Amis 222-224.




dichotomies that structure conventional wisdom, including such distinctions as
male/female, good/evil, even life/death.269
Other People does indeed organize itself by dichotomies, the most obvious being
Mary Lamb and Amy Hide. In turn, these two characters should represent opposite
sides of a binary system. Mary is 'good,': she is innocent, even-tempered, asexual,
gentle and kind. Amy is 'bad,': she is depicted as having been cruel, corrupt,
voraciously sexual, and defiant. But I would argue that the ultimate challenge that
Amis makes to epistemological dichotomies is at the end of the novel, when Mary and
Amy finally merge.
The first two parts of the novel insist that Mary is 'good,' and that Amy was
'bad,' and the point of the novel seems to be Mary's resistance to Amy: Mary must
not fall back into her old behavior and return to being Amy Hide. And so she tries to
do as Prince tells her; she genuinely tries to be good. But it is much more than an
ironic device that in trying to be good, Mary inevitably brings suffering. There is
something about the way Mary imagines 'goodness,' or what she thinks being 'good'
is, that fails her. In trying to be 'bad,' in behaving selfishly and by courting danger,
Amy Hide had hurt her loved ones and herself. And yet in trying to be good, Mary
Lamb also hurts herself and those around her. This could be construed as nihilism: as
Amis seeing no space for goodness in the world. Or it can be conceived of as Amis's
commentary on what it means to be 'good.' For Mary reveals herself to be the mirror
image of Amy Hide in that both of them confuse being good with feeling good, and
neither of them can realize the impact they have on others because neither of them can
imagine otherness. It is only when both extreme characters merge, that a new Amy
Hide comes into being. This Amy Hide, as opposed to either Mary or her earlier
incarnation, not only feels but imagines.
269 Diedrick 71.
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After catching Prince unawares playing at being an orchestra conductor, Amy
and Prince share a moment of quiet togetherness in which Amy realizes that 'he is in
awe ofme too.'270 Later, alone in bed, Amy:
[. . .] could see the moon, perched alone on the very tip of the night. The
silvered tinge against the navy-blue sky contained tiny particles of rose among
its inaudible storms of light. If tenderness had a colour, then that was the
colour of tenderness. With her cheek on the pillow, Amy's thoughts began to
loosen. She felt a gentle impatience for each successive moment, not the
tearing eagerness but the half-anxious certainty of a mother at the school
gates, waiting for her child to emerge from the crowd. She felt that Prince was
watching her. She felt what it was like to be young. She felt that the moon
and her own prayers and thoughts were living things that shared her room and
carefully presided over the contours of her sleep. She wasn't sure whether this
was love. She thought that everyone's heart must hurt slightly when they
began to feel right about themselves.271
The last line of this passage, in which Amy thinks about 'everyone', is the first
instance in the novel in which Mary or Amy actually attempt to apply their own lived
experience to those of others, thus attempting to imagine what it might be like to be
another person. Indeed, a lack of imagination on the part of Mary has hitherto been
one of her most prominent features. For example, earlier in the novel Mary tries to
learn to masturbate, but fails because she cannot imagine pleasure. Her only sexual
experience up to that point has been terrible, and Mary rationalizes her inability to
achieve orgasm by dismissing it as 'a memory game.'272 But as her pamphlets such as
Female Erotic Fantasies imply, her inability to masturbate has as much to do with her
lack of imagination as her bad memories. Mary cannot fantasize or imagine; she can
only process her own lived experience. Presumably the earlier incarnation of Amy
Hide must have been much the same. Her cruelty to those who loved her, especially
her parents and sister, speak of a lack of empathy that borders on the pathological.





begins to think about 'everyone' and attempts to understand her own experiences in
terms of a universal experience.
Imagining Amy Hide as a challenge to epistemological dichotomies offers an
entirely new and different understanding of the novel to that which says it is nihilistic.
Mary and Amy are not really opposites; indeed, they are very much the same in the
sense that neither of them attempt to access the imaginative lives of others. Both
women can pursue only their own pleasure, while remaining incapable of
understanding the consequences to themselves and others. Similarly, both order their
world by how it makes them feel. Mary wants to be good, but what is 'good' is what
gets her what she wants; even if it requires making herself and others feel bad.
Likewise Amy, in her original incarnation, felt good making herself and others feel
bad. There is really no difference, despite Mary's claims to the contrary, between
Mary and Amy. Mary might lack the ability to understand or conceptualize her own
desires and emotions, but in her relationship with Jamie she proves herself to be as
desirous of power as Amy, and her torturing Jamie clearly recalls Amy tormenting
Michael Shane.273
Because Mary/Amy cannot imagine otherness, she can no more understand
herself than she can other people. Mary and Amy are trapped in their own opinions,
or doxa: they live in what Colebrook calls 'a direct link between affect and concept,
between what we see and what we say, or between the sensible and the intelligible.'274
In a crucial scene, Mary wonders whether or not all women are divided because she
feels divided.275 She cannot move beyond her experience of the world as that of a
woman who feels like two people. So she cannot question whether or not all people





because she is a woman, and she feels divided, all women are, quite literally, two
women.276 It is only when Mary and Amy—as the two opposites of a mirror image—
combine that Amy Hide can emerge as a whole person: a person who can imagine
other people. In this reading, the title of the novel is actually a subtle challenge to
Jean Paul Sartre's assertion that 'hell is—other people!'.277 Mary and Amy made
their own and other people's lives hell because they could not understand otherness
and because they asserted themselves over other people. In this sense 'other people'
are hell because we have made them 'other,' and in doing so we have forced upon
them the negative axis of the binary divide. 'Other people' are 'hell' when, like Amy,
we need others to be weak in order to be strong, or, like Mary, we need others to feel
bad so that we feel good.
As the new Amy Hide, Amy begins to see other people not just as a
dichotomized 'other' to battle with; instead, she begins to conceptualize how other
people live and feel. This affects my reading of the end of the novel. Other People
ends ambiguously, with Amy Hide returning to her murderer and being 'reborn' as the
girl she was before she turned bad. But the epilogue returns to the demon-lover
narrator that haunts Amy's life and the novel. He is watching the sixteen year old
Amy leave her house and is planning their first encounter. He claims that 'I won't do
anything to her unless she asks for it', but he admits that 'I'm not in control any more,
not this time.'278 In a nihilistic reading of the novel, this admission can be read as the
reader's clue that this is but the beginning of another cycle of death and rebirth for
Mary/Amy. But Amis himself has said that he 'wanted to suggest on top of
everything else that she would in fact get it right this time.'279 In the reading in which
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Amy Hide has learned how to conceptualize in an open, Deleuzean sense—rather than
living in a world of doxa or opinion—this alternative and happier reading makes
sense. Because she can imagine otherness, the new Amy will not feel compelled to
react against everything as the earlier Amy was. Indeed, if she can imagine
difference as a Deleuzean problem that opens up new ways of understanding
existence, she can be open to other people and the helpful challenges they represent.
Understanding Other People from a Deleuzean sense offers an entirely
different set of readings of the novel and its characters. Deleuze's concepts of
difference and becoming makes Mary/Amy into a caricature of stagnant opinion
rather than a nihilistic vision of a world in which goodness has no place. It is only
when Amy Hide learns to see difference not as something to homogenize or destroy
but as a Deleuzean problem to explore and with which to engage that she can truly be
reborn. As such, this rebirth signifies hope, and a chance at a life in which she will
avoid the traps of opinion and purely affective responses to life that made her so
unpleasant and self-destructive.
Philip Roth's Woman of Ressentiment in When She Was Good
When She Was Good was published in 1967, two years before Portnoy 's
Complaint and five years before Irving Howe's and Norman Podhoretz's attacks on
Roth in Commentary. When She Was Good, then, precedes Howe's critical
intervention, which actually restates in quite simplistic terms elements of the
relationship between morality and life that has been the subject of Roth's fiction
almost from its inception. This fascinating novel, however, has been granted very
little critical notice, and what little attention it has received has often been dismissive.
Many critics see the novel as Roth's literary vengeance against his ex-wife Margaret
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and have allowed this autobiographical interpretation to cloud their criticism.280 In
my reading When She Was Good represents Roth's first sustained attempt to imagine
the pre-ideological development of moral ideas. To establish this reading, I want to
explore how Nietzsche's theory of ressentiment can be employed to unlock some of
the novel's key themes.
When She Was Good is the story of Lucy Nelson, a young woman bom and
raised in Liberty Center, a small Midwestern town. The novel begins, however, with
her grandfather's story. All of his life Willard Nelson desired, 'Not to be rich, not to
be famous, not to be mighty, not even to be happy, but to be civilized—that was the
dream of his life.'281 This dream of civility is a reaction against the brutal poverty of
his family. Willard's most important childhood experience was 'the time a full-
blooded Chippewa squaw came to the cabin with a root for his sister to chew when
Ginny [the sister] was incandescent with scarlet fever.'282 This experience of
childhood illness exposes Willard to the cruelty of the universe: he 'never forgot the
brutality of that occurrence, which for him lay in the fact that nothing was to be done,
for all that what was happening was happening to a one-year-old child.'283 Ginny's
fever also reinforces Willard's experience of human brutality. After refusing to help
his sister, his father tells his son 'let her be' as Willard tries to feed the Squaw's
medicine to his baby sister.284 For Willard, these experiences combine to give him,
'at seven, his first terrifying inkling that there were in the universe forces even more
immune to his charm, even more remote from his desires, even more estranged from
human need and feeling, than his own father.'285 In his youthful imagination, the idea
280 For examples, see Shostak, p. 115.
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of civility—living the sort of 'civilized' life that he sees as the opposite of his
family's existence—acts as a buffer between the individual and the omnipresent threat
of brutality and suffering.
Willard's sister does not die of her disease, but the fever leaves her mentally
retarded. Willard has finally escaped, 'to the town of Liberty Center,' the last stop on
his 'journey out into the civilized world,' but when his mother dies and his father puts
Ginny into care, Willard retrieves her and takes her to his home.286 For Willard,
Liberty Center represents the opposite of his experience with his family, Ginny, and
her illness:
If ever there was a place where life could be less bleak and harsh and cruel
than the life he had known as a boy, if ever there was a place where a man did
not have to live like a brute, where he did not have to be reminded at every
turn that something in the world either did not like mankind, or did not even
know of its existence, it was here, Liberty Center! Oh, sweet name! At least
for him, for he was indeed free at last of that terrible tyranny of cruel men and
cruel nature.287
Willard cares for his sister, his wife and his daughter in what he believes to be this
safe haven of civilization. And yet the reader soon learns that Liberty Center, despite
its promises, has failed to protect all ofWillard's family. For early in the novel
Willard is found sitting 'one afternoon in November,' 'before the graves of his sister
Ginny and his granddaughter Lucy'.288 This is where the story switches its focus
from Willard to Lucy and where the tragedy of When She Was Good begins to unfold.
Our introduction to Lucy is framed by her relationship with her brain-damaged
Aunt Ginny. It is after Ginny's rescue from the institution that Willard's daughter
Myra, her husband Whitey, and their daughter Lucy come to live in Willard's house.
Willard dwells fondly upon his memories of his 'tiny, spirited, golden-haired'
granddaughter 'learning to care for herself' and trying 'to pass what she knew on to
286 Roth, When She Was Good 5.
287 Roth, When She Was Good 6.
288 Roth, When She Was Good 7.
106
her Aunt Ginny '289 Ginny follows Lucy everywhere, and Willard finds this 'a
strangely beautiful scene, but a melancholy one, too, for it was proof not only of their
love for each other, but of the fact that in Ginny's brain so many things were melted
together that in real life are separate and distinct.'290 Ginny's inability to understand
herself as separate from Lucy becomes a serious problem after Lucy begins school.
Ginny stands 'outside the classroom all day long, singing out in her flat foghorn of a
voice, "Loo-cy . . . Loo-cy . . .".'291 Ginny's inability to recognize the distinct
subjectivity of others introduces a central theme of the novel. Ginny becomes such a
hindrance to Lucy's schooling thatWillard is forced to put Ginny back into an
institution where she soon dies. 'And why? Because she could not understand the
292
most basic fact of human life, the fact that I am me and you are you.' As the novel
progresses, Ginny's inability to respect difference—to allow other individuals the
freedom to be themselves without forcing her own will and desires upon them—
begins to influence Lucy's attitude with ultimately tragic consequences.
Despite her apparently happy childhood, Lucy's adolescence is dominated by
her hatred for her father and her contempt for her family. Whitey, her father, is an
out-of-work alcoholic, unable to support his wife and child. Her long-suffering
mother, Myra, cannot renounce her love for her husband, despite his flaws.
Meanwhile, Lucy believes her grandfather's generosity towards his son-in-law allows
her father to maintain his fecklessness and immaturity, and she sees in Willard's
desire for 'civility' only emotional weakness and an inability to confront reality 'like
a man.' When Lucy is fifteen, her father comes home drunk and sees Myra soaking
her feet. Whitey interprets this as an insult to his pride, as Myra has to work hard
289 Roth, When She Was Good 10.
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because of his own inability to hold down a job, and verbally assaults his wife, tearing
the window shade off the wall and upending her footbath onto the rug. Lucy, alone
with her cowering mother and raging father, calls the police and her father goes to
jail. Her grandfather, concerned about his daughter's having caused such an upset to
his 'civilized' world, asks her why she called the police, rather than calling him.
Their conversation emphasizes the growing disparity between their views of the
world:
"I wanted him to stop\"
"But calling the jail, Lucy—"
"I called for somebody to make him stop!"





"Well," she said, backing away, "you don't..
[.. .]
"We are civilized people in this house and there are some things we do not do,
and that is number one. We are not riffraff, and you remember that. We are
able to settle our own arguments, and conduct our own affairs, and we don't
require the police to do it for us. I happen to be the assistant post-master of
this town, young lady, in case you've forgotten. I happen to be a member in
good standing of this community—and so are you."
"And what about my father? Is he in good standing too, whatever that
means ?"293
ForWillard, the appearance of respectability and civilized behaviour is what is
important, but Lucy questions her grandfather's emphasis on appearance. She does
not want her grandfather to appear civilized; she wants him to assert his authority
over her father, to have the power to 'make him stop.' In other words, she wants her
family to be good, not merely to maintain "good standing."
Calling the police becomes, for Lucy, the defining act of her childhood. In her
own imagination, and in the imagination of many of the town, she has become the girl
who had her own father arrested. After this confrontation with her father's vice and
293 Roth, When She Was Good 22-23.
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with her grandfather's forgiving philosophy, Lucy becomes increasingly obsessed
with her own virtue. She sees herself as morally superior to both her family and the
small town she comes from. This sense of superiority is vague but indomitable. As
she thinks of her friend, Ellie Sowerby, 'she was Elbe's superior in every way
imaginable, except for looks, which she didn't care that much about; and money,
which meant nothing; and clothes; and boys.'294 Her conception of herself as morally
superior seems to rest on those aspects of her life that are not composed of
stereotypically womanly virtues. She claims not to admire beauty, cultivation, or the
ability to attract the opposite sex, and the implication is that her vague notions of
superiority are based on some inner quality of virtue. This implication is supported
by her early flirtation with Catholicism, especially with the Saint Teresa of Lisieux, a
figure of suffering and uncompromising virtue. But this Saint is also a silent sufferer,
and to act in her image would require Lucy 'to appear serene, and always courteous,
and to let no word of complaint escape her, to exercise charity in secret, and to make
self-denial the rule of life.'295 This way of being in the world is actually similar to
that of Lucy's forgiving and selfless mother, Myra, and forbearance also underlies the
code of conduct that her grandfather espouses. And so, Lucy's fealty to a Saint
Teresa style of suffering ends on the night that her father overturns her mother's foot
bath onto the rug. At that point the forceful declaration of her own superior virtue—
and the inferiority of everyone else in her life—becomes Lucy's exclusive mantra.
In fact, Lucy's new conception of goodness is based on virtues that are
absolutely in opposition to those of Saint Teresa, as Julie Husband explains:
Though her entire family is opposed to Lucy's confrontational form of power,
she is increasingly convinced of not just the effectiveness but the virtue of her
behaviour. She will not lie or compromise to protect others. Lucy understands
294 Roth, When She Was Good 73.
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her ability to see the worst in people as a virtue. Unlike her grandfather and
mother, she will not look the other way or make excuses for destructive
actions. However, Lucy's cynicism makes it impossible to have charity
toward others.296
Lucy sees her father as nothing but a drunk, her grandfather and mother as morally
feckless, and the rest of her small town as complacent in its opinion of itself. This
perspective is not only uncharitable but also treacherous. Lucy's monomania means
that she often makes mistakes about other people, and, more dangerously, about
herself. For example, the father of her friend Ellie is a war hero, a successful
businessman and the richest man in Liberty Center, but he is also vulgar and sexually
predatory. Lucy finds him a mystery, which she blames on Mr. Sowerby's
paradoxical character. However, the real reason she finds Mr. Sowerby—or Uncle
Julian—difficult to judge is that while she finds him vulgar and offensive, he also
flatters her, and he does so in ways that she cannot acknowledge. Lucy believes
herself to be a young woman who does not care about money, social status or looks.
And yet in her interactions with Uncle Julian, who calls her 'Blondie' and 'cutie pie,'
flirts with her publicly, and invites her to parties at his expensive home, she reveals a
weakness for his flattery that contradicts her ideas about herself. Her enjoyment in
Julian's attention reveals that she does want to be considered attractive, that she does
want social approval, and that she would like to be seen as socially superior despite
her contrary declarations. Self-deception is evident in Lucy's assertions that she does
not care what others think of her or her status within the community when she so
obviously does. And so, Lucy's dishonesty with herself calls the accuracy of her
perspective into question.
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The Sowerby family becomes even more important to Lucy's story after she
begins dating and finally marries their young nephew, Roy Bassert. Her relationship
with Roy is another example of how inaccurate and biased Lucy's perspectives really
are, despite her belief in her own superior moral judgment. As Husband suggests,
Lucy's attraction for Roy is based partially on her incorrect belief that he is the
opposite of her father:
Roy has served in the military; her father had a medical waiver. Roy is
looking for a girl with a 'brain in her head,' not one with 'thin little wrists and
ankles' [like her mother], Roy is addicted to Hydrox cookies instead of
whiskey. Yet he is as self-deceiving as her father—and as Lucy.297
Lucy and Roy begin to date, and, despite her ambivalence about him and her distrust
of his intentions, they begin a sexual relationship. Predictably, she becomes pregnant,
and she and Roy are married. Her marriage to Roy renders the fundamental flaws
within Lucy's worldview more pronounced. Within the intimacy of marriage, her
inability to compromise, her steely determination to tell 'the truth,' and her refusal to
see her own flaws become increasingly destructive. Still enraged at her father, and
determined not to 'repeat her mother's life,' she attempts to force Roy to become the
strong patriarch that she believes her father and grandfather should be.
Lucy's attempts to mould Roy take the form of constant reproach. She mocks
his ambitions to start his own photography studio but continually criticizes him for
not bringing home enough money. When he tells their young son stories of his time
in the army, she resents his harmless exaggerations, made for the benefit of the child's
amusement, as outright lies. After a terrible argument and a brief separation, during
which time Roy's Uncle Julian supplies him with a lawyer and advises a legal
separation, Lucy forbids him to have any contact with this side of his family. Even
Roy's Hydrox cookies become a symbol to her of his immaturity and helplessness.
297 Husband 36.
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Her constant assaults on Roy become so pronounced that their young son Edward is
depicted as fleeing continuously from the dinner table, the scene of her most cruelly
barbed insults. A typical response from Lucy to Roy's employment woes consists of
her throwing down her napkin and yelling, 'Must you whine! Must you complain!
Must you be a baby in front of your own child!'298 As Husband suggests, Lucy's
irrational demands on Roy leave him with no options:
If Roy obeys her, he is weak. If he doesn't, he has fallen under the influence
of others, especially his confrontational Uncle Julian, and is again weak. If he
defends himself, he is attacking her and is therefore a brute. If he doesn't
defend himself, he is guilty of being unmanly. Lor Lucy, being a man is being
a brute, so Roy has no positive identity to embrace.299
Lucy wants Roy to be the responsible father figure thatWhitey failed to be, and yet
any attempt at decision-making on Roy's part, such as moving them in with his
parents for a summer to save money, lead inevitably to fierce marital disputes in
which Lucy depicts Roy as attempting to manipulate or oppress her.
Lucy will do anything to win an argument, including using her own child as
emotional leverage or informing Roy of his uncle's infidelities. And yet, she depicts
Roy's concessions to her not as conciliatory gestures to keep his wife happy and sane
but as signs of his inherent weakness:
She saw him pretending now nearly all the time, so as to avoid the clashes that
had taken place almost weekly after the first six months of the marriage.
Every time he opened his mouth she could hear that he did not mean a single
word, but was trying only to disarm her by saying what he thought she wanted
him to say. He would do anything now to avoid a battle, anything but really
change. [. . .] She could not stand the pretense; so she tried with all her might
to believe that it was not pretense, that he actually believed what he was
saying, and found she could not stand that either.300
In Lucy's view of the world, Roy's attempts to please her are proof of his dishonesty
and his weakness. She is disgusted by the compromises he makes for her happiness,
Roth, When She Was Good 212.
299 Husband 39.
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finding them evidence of his lack of masculine strength. And yet she perceives any
man who crosses her as a brutal tyrant. Up until her marriage to Roy, Lucy has been
portrayed as much as a victim as an aggressor. But by this point in the novel her
sense ofmoral superiority has exiled her from readerly sympathy. When the novel's
final tragic confrontations occur, the reader knows that Lucy is beyond redemption.
In a crucial development, Lucy discovers that her father is in a Florida prison
for stealing from an employer. She also discovers that her mother has been in contact
with her father for the years he has been missing. Myra has even broken off an
engagement with a successful local business man who promised to be the, 'stem,
serious, strong and prudent' father Lucy had always wanted.301 Lucy is so enraged by
this news that she conflates her feelings for her father and mother with her feelings for
Roy. When Roy comes to pick her up from her family home, her thoughts reveal her
confusion, 'Mom was what he [Roy] called Lucy's mother. Mom! That weak, stupid
blind ... It was the police who had put him there. It was he himself who put him
there!'302 In Lucy's mind, her feelings for her husband become confused with her
feelings for her father, and she punishes Roy in Whitey's stead. On the drive home,
she begins screaming. Roy tries to comfort her, but she continues screaming, to the
evident distress of Edward. Upon their arrival home, Roy does his best both to
comfort Lucy and to remind her that their young son is present. But Lucy has lost all
control and lashes out at her husband with all the years of anger and resentment built
up against her father:
"You worm! Don't you have any guts at all? Can't you stand on your
own two feet, ever? You sponge! You leech! You weak, hopeless, spineless,
coward! You'll never change—you don't even want to change! You don't
even know what I mean by change! You stand there with your dumb mouth
open! Because you have no backbone! None!" She grabbed the other
301 Roth, When She Was Good 225.
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cushion from behind her and heaved it toward his head. "Since the day we
met!"
He batted down the cushion with his hands. "Look, now, look - Eddie
is right be-"
She charged off the sofa. "And no courage!" She cried. "And no
determination! And no will of your own! If I didn't tell you what to do, if I
were to turn my back - if I didn't every single day of this rotten life . . . Oh,
you're not a man, and you never will be, and you don't even care\" She was
trying to hammer at his chest; first he pushed her hands down, then he
protected himself with his forearms and elbows; then he just moved back, a
step at a time.
"Lucy, come on, now, please. We're not alone—"
But she pursued him. "You're nothing! Less than nothing! Worse
than nothing!"
He grabbed her two fists. "Lucy. Get control. Stop, please."
"Get your hands off of me, Roy! Release me, Roy! Don't you dare try
to use your strength against me! Don't you dare attempt violence!"303
The reader knows that it is not Roy, but her father, whom Lucy believes to be a
'leech,' a 'sponge,' and whom she curses for his inability to change. For Lucy,
however, her relationships with men have been defined by her mistrust of and
aversion to her father. Lucy's definition of masculinity, therefore, is entirely
unrealistic and unworkable: to be a "man" in Lucy's eyes would require Roy to be
more forceful; but to be more forceful would be to be construed by Lucy as a
violently constraining gesture. As such, Lucy exhibits a clear preoccupation with
power: she reacts with fury whenever anyone tries to exert power over her, and yet
she claims to want to have power taken away from her by her husband becoming the
strong patriarch she claims to admire. This contradictory obsession with her
husband's power—or lack thereof—implies her own desire for strength, respect, and
control.
Just how far Lucy's rage has infected her perception of reality becomes
obvious in her further confrontation with Roy's Uncle Julian. After her violent
outburst overWhitey's letters, Roy waits until Lucy is asleep and then escapes with
303 Roth, When She Was Good 262.
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Edward back to the Sowerby's and the protection of Uncle Julian—the one character
in the novel who is able to stand up to Lucy's onslaughts. When Lucy arrives at the
Sowerby home, she tries to appeal to Uncle Julian by talking to him of Roy's 'duty,'
her own 'rights' as a mother, and her own responsibility to see that her son 'is not
misused by all the beasts in this filthy world'.304 Julian responds by calling Lucy 'a
real saint,' a designation she accepts, until he amends his comment with, 'that's all
you are, you know. A little ball-breaker of a bitch. That's the saint you are, kiddo—
Saint Ball Breaker.'305 Confronted with Julian's wrath, Lucy loses all composure,
tells Julian's family about his affairs with his employees, verbally attacks her former
friend Ellie, and finally charges up the stairs, only to hit Roy hard enough to draw
blood. All of this again takes place in front of her horrified young son, who shrieks in
terror at the sight of his mother. Meanwhile, this final confrontation is given a
shadowy and hallucinatory quality by Lucy's ambiguous vision of her father.
When she presses the doorbell at the Sowerby house and again right before
she strikes Roy and collapses, she sees, 'her father sitting in a cell in the Florida State
Prison. He is sitting on a three-legged stool wearing a striped uniform. There is a
number on his chest. His mouth is open and on his teeth, in lipstick, is written
INNOCENT.'306 This vision is open to several interpretations. One way of
understanding this image would be to suggest that some part of Lucy's brain
recognizes her irrationality concerning her father and is warning her that if, indeed,
her father is innocent of her worst accusations, then her entire way of seeing and
being in the world needs drastic revision. Another provocative reading, however,
could assert that this image of her father is Lucy's interpretation of her situation with
the Sowerby's. Being written in lipstick on his teeth, the credibility of 'innocent'
3H4 Roth, When She Was Good 276, 274, 276
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seems suspect. Just as Hester Prynne's scarlet letter "A" is meant to represent her
adultery, Whitey's 'innocent' could represent Lucy's long held belief that her father's
real problem is his inability to accept responsibility for his actions, and on his
insistence on continually pleading his innocence. And so 'innocent' is written on his
teeth in lipstick to symbolize his most destructive delusion, especially in relation to
the women he has wronged in his life. In turn, Lucy may apply this vision to the
Sowerby's, who she imagines will also be incapable, like her father, of admitting
either their own mistakes or Lucy's 'genuine' innocence and 'obvious' virtue.
Whatever the purpose of this vision, the reader knows that Lucy has doomed
herself by attacking Roy so violently in front of his family and their son. This entire
scene begs the question of whether Lucy was doomed from the beginning of the novel
or whether her fate was open. Hermione Lee has called the novel, 'doggedly
naturalistic,' and Husband believes that Lucy fits June Howard's definition of a
'naturalist brute,' a figure described as a 'menacing and vulnerable Other incapable of
acting as a self-conscious, purposeful agent.'307 In The Facts, Roth himself defines
Lucy's predicament in decidedly naturalistic terms:
Lucy's hideous death at the end ofWhen She Was Good was neither wishful
thinking nor authorial retribution. I simply didn't see how the disintegration
of someone so relentlessly exercised over the most fundamental human
claims, so enemy-ridden, and unforgivingly defiant, could lead, in that little
town, to anything other than the madhouse or the grave.
Rather than the madhouse, Lucy's final rampage ends with her grave placed, as the
reader knows from the first few pages of the novel, next to that of her Aunt Ginny's.
After her violent outburst at the Sowerby's, Lucy's grandfather brings her home and
tries to convince her that she needs medical care. Enraged that her family believes her
to be having a mental breakdown, Lucy flees into the freezing winter. She dies of
3(17 Lee 63; June Howard, as quoted by Husband, 39.
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exposure in the cold weather, seeing enemies everywhere, and clutching a recent letter
from her father to her mother. In the letterWhitey begs Myra's forgiveness and
declares his love and faithfulness—while also hinting that he needs a sponsor and a
job to be released from prison. In other words, Lucy dies defeated. In fact, the novel
begins with Lucy already defeated, a clear novelistic decision on Roth's part. The
novel begins after Lucy's death, with Willard picking Whitey up from the train
station, after he has sponsored his son-in-law and found him a job. Myra will take
him back; Whitey will again live in the house Lucy grew up in and believed she had
exorcised her father from forever; and Lucy will lie silently in her grave next to her
Aunt Ginny, the other person in the novel who suffered because 'she could not
understand the most basic fact of human life, the fact that I am me and you are you.'
Lucy's inability to let people make their own decisions and their own mistakes, to
forgive people their human frailties, and to acknowledge her own shortcomings is
what makes her so destructive and also so brittle in her own weakness.
It is noticeable that very little critical attention has been paid to When She Was
Good in the context of Roth's work as a whole. Indeed, many critics believe the
novel to be inferior to his later work, and Husband cites this as the reason the novel
'garnered comparatively little attention'.309 Howe believes that both When She Was
Good and the earlier novel Letting Go, 'add slight luster to his [Roth's] reputation,'
and Lee has called it 'the most uncharacteristic and uninspired of his books'.310 Other
critics found in Lucy Nelson and When She Was Good proof of Roth's "woman
problem".311 Much has been written, including by Roth himself, about his
spectacularly unsuccessful marriage to Margaret Martinson Williams and the
309 Husband 25.
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inspiration found in this marriage for When She Was Good. Roth presents this
connection between the facts of his relationship and his narrative fiction as his way of
purging his life of Margaret's influence:
Eventually the book became for me a time machine through which to look
backward and discover the origins of that deranged hypermorality to whose
demands I had proved so hopelessly accessible in my early twenties. I was
trying to come to some understanding of this destructive force, but separate
from my own ordeal, to exorcise her power over me by taking it back to its
local origins and tracing in detail the formative history of injury and
disappointment right on down to its grisly consequences [. . .]. 12
Although Roth acknowledges his ex-wife's role in motivating his writing of When She
Was Good, the novel is not, he claims, intended as an act of personal vindication. He
wanted, instead, to separate his own 'ordeal' from his fiction in order to explore the
larger issue—the idea of 'hypermorality' as a 'destructive force'— that he believed
underpinned his wife's behaviour.
Needless to say, many readers doubt Roth's claim of impersonality and see in
the character of Lucy Nelson a very personal act of emotional revenge. Julie Husband
believes that both Margaret and Lucy, 'are depicted as women singularly lacking in
313
self-awareness and overwhelmed by anger, resentment, and desperation.' Even
Theodore Solotaroff, normally a staunch supporter of Roth, admits that, 'as much as I
liked When She Was Good, it was further evidence that he was locked into this
preoccupation with female power which was carrying his fiction into strange and
relatively arid terrain.'314 The perception that Roth's rage with his ex-wife, who died
in a car crash in 1968, infuses his depiction of Lucy and other female characters has
had a baleful effect upon readings of the novel. While Roth readily admits that the
facts of his life inspired the events in his fiction, his version of events makes this
process one of transmutation rather than transcription. According to Roth, he may use




events from his life, but they are not simply reproduced in their original form. They
are fictionalized, and this process allows him to explore themes and ideas, and to
explore the nature of perceived reality, in a way that a straightforward memoir would
disallow. There are many critics and reviewers, however, who question this
distinction between biography and fiction, believing instead in the popular media
perception of Roth as self-obsessed and, as Podhoretz accuses, eager 'to take stock of
the world [. . .] and give it the business.315 While it cannot be denied that
autobiography figures heavily in Roth's work, and it may be true that his use of
autobiography may or may not reveal aspects of his personality that he would like to
remain hidden, to seek in his work only autobiography or proof of his less wholesome
predilections denies more profitable avenues of interpretation. In the case of When
She Was Good, a reader who insists on seeing only "proof' of Roth's hatred of
women or sees in Lucy only a shade of Margaret Williams will miss what is in fact
the first appearance of a set of important and prescient ethical questions that Roth's
work will continue to explore throughout his career.
Although Julie Husband's account of Roth contains many interesting
observations, it also illustrates the limitations of reading Roth's fiction as if it were
autobiography. In Husband's reading of the novel, When She Was Good represents 'a
sustained, if ambivalent, engagement with the emerging women's rights movement of
the 1960's, the "second wave feminism" that began with Simone de Beauvoir's The
Second Sex (1949) and Betty Friedan's The Feminine Mystique (1963).'316 This
reading has its virtues, but it cannot entirely explain Roth's interest in writing When
She Was Good. In fact, Husband's assessment of When She Was Good, as opposed to
Podhoretz,'The Adventures of Philip Roth,' 30.
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that of Letting Go, places far too strong an emphasis on Roth's autobiography, in
particular his marriage to Margaret Williams.
Central to Husband's argument is the claim that When She Was Good and
Letting Go 'offer an intriguing view of Roth's struggle with second-wave feminism,'
and that they 'develop forceful critiques of patriarchy that should delight feminist
readers.'317 These novels fail to placate, however, because 'even as his heroines
overturn abusive, manipulative, or weak fathers and husbands they emerge so
damaged, so filled with angst, self-disgust, rage, and bitterness that they are even
more crippled than the patriarchs they have defeated.'318 Husband specifically cites
When She Was Good as being the worse of the two, claiming that "in the later novel
the narrator leads the reader to feel relief in the humiliating and improbable demise of
Roth's rebellious heroine. If patriarchy is bad, matriarchy would be far worse, the
11Q .
novel suggests." In Husband's reading, Roth's novels do depict female characters
frustrated at the subservient and uninspiring roles offered to them under a patriarchal
system. But neither does his fiction offer any alternatives to this frustration and in
their bitterness at their situation Roth's female characters become as destructive as the
system they oppose.
The major problem with Husband's analysis of When She Was Good is that
she reads Lucy autobiographically, finding in her "a striking likeness to Roth's first
?? 320wife". Husband focuses on her perception that Roth conflates Margaret and Lucy:
"If Martha [from Letting Go] rises above her harrowing origins, neither Margaret nor
Lucy Nelson, a character created after Roth's bitter separation from Margaret, do.






anger, resentment, and desperation"321 Husband also believes that Lucy s fate is
anything but inevitable' and implies that her destruction is really a product of Roth s
rage at his ex-wife. Eventually, Husband comes to the conclusion that When She Was
Good "reinforces an antifeminist message."322 She bases this conclusion upon her
assessment of Lucy's extreme nature: "Certainly, paranoid characters like Lucy can
exist, but introducing Lucy at the moment that second-wave feminism emerged pitted
Roth against early feminists."323 She also blames the novel's "anti-feminism" on
Roth's inability to imagine a positive outcome for women who spurn the roles defined
for them by patriarchy: "Roth's female characters seem trapped and accept
undesirable compromises, in part, because Roth does not imagine the possibilities for
female alliances they themselves would likely have imagined."324 In Husband's
reading, Lucy's extreme behaviour and her inability to see women as allies rather than
enemies are not, as Roth suggests, legitimate characteristics of a certain "type" that he
wants to explore through his fiction. Rather they are proof ofRoth's anti-feminism
and the personal rage with one woman, his ex-wife, that has coloured his conception
of all women.
In many ways, this essay is an excellent example of the third type of typical
Roth criticism that I discussed earlier. Husband claims to be re-examining two novels
that have been unfairly dismissed by critics. Her readings of the novels rely,
however, on the "facts" of Roth's biography to reveal the psychology of Lucy's
author. In other words, she reads When She Was Good as if it were the sort of
confessional Portnoy's Complaint was rumoured to be. Interestingly, Husband quotes






connection to When She Was Good without including any of this material in her
discussion. Instead, she uses only a description that Roth gives of Margaret. She
points out the similarity of this description to Lucy's character in order to support her
claim that Lucy is Margaret. This move, for a reader unfamiliar with The Facts,
suggests that Roth himself was unaware of any association between the two women
whilst he actually explores the connection between the novel and his marriage in
considerable depth.
Besides reading When She Was Good as a psychological study of Roth,
Husband's relationship to second-wave feminism also seems to be at stake in her
essay. She states that Roth's creation of a character like Lucy in this charged social
atmosphere 'pitted' him 'against early feminists,' with the implication that this was
Roth's explicit intention. Husband also seems to assume that because Roth hated his
wife, he must have hated feminism as well. Whilst Roth has often expressed derision
for aspects of the feminist movement, Husband's insistence on linking the novel's
argument and presentation of character to his former domestic unhappiness implies
that Roth hates feminism because he does not like women. Meanwhile, this reading
ignores what Roth has actually written and said about feminism. As quoted earlier,
Roth has often stated that it is not the idea of equal rights for women with which he
disagrees. Instead, he resists any system of belief that would demand women—or
men, or Jews, or Americans—think and act in a prescribed way. When questioned by
Hermione Lee about "the feminist attack on you," Roth counters by stating that Lucy
has nothing to do with feminism:
When She Was Good is not serving the cause—that's true. The anger of this
young woman isn't presented to be endorsed with a hearty "Right on!" that
will move the populace to action. The nature of the anger is examined, as is
the depth of the wound. So are the consequences of the anger, for Lucy as for
everyone. I hate to have to be the one to say it, but the portrait isn't without its
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poignancy. I don't mean by poignancy what the compassionate book
reviewers call "compassion." I mean you see the suffering that real rage is.325
Roth resists a reading of the novel that would demand that it serve a cause or endorse
an explicitly feminist message. And while he readily admits that he does not present
Lucy's anger as a feminist attack on patriarchy, he believes that this decision is
entirely beside the point. For him the novel is not about feminist anger, or even
women's anger, but about the idea of anger itself: an anger that rages so fiercely that
it consumes its own vessel. Were one still to read the novel autobiographically, of
course, this would mean that When She Was Good could in fact be read as Roth's
recognition of his ex-wife as the ultimate victim of her own rage.
Instead of locating my reading of When She Was Good within the narrow
confines of Rothian psychodrama, I want to suggest that the novel represents his first
sustained attempt to explore the pre-reflective and pre-ideological origins of our
moral identities and beliefs. Roth's interest in these questions becomes clearer if we
approach his work from the perspective of Nietzsche's theory of ressentiment. By
seeing Lucy as a victim of her own ressentiment, the broader question of why Lucy is
so obsessed with 'goodness' and what 'goodness' means in the novel becomes central
to the thematic structure of When She Was Good. The questions of how to live well
and how to be a 'good' person are at the heart of all moral and ethical inquiries, and
yet Roth presents us with a character whose very attempts at living well and being
good inevitably make her behave like a monster. Roth suggests that part of Lucy's
problem is her purely reactive approach to her attempts at goodness. Lucy is
singularly unable to create a vision of a 'good' life in her own terms. She cannot
imagine how a life different from her parents and grandparents would appear; she just
knows her life must oppose theirs. Debra Shostak sees this as Lucy's role as the
325 Roth, in an interview with Lee 173.
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apogee of the novel's motif of self-invention. Shostak writes, Lucy's 'self-
righteousness is in effect a mask for her blindness to the implications of her ill-fated
attempts at self-construction.'326 Just as her grandfather Willard attempted to re¬
invent himself as 'civilized,' Lucy has tried to re-invent herself as 'good.' Unlike
Willard, however, who has a clear vision of what a 'civilized' life looks like, Lucy
cannot envision a 'good' life and can only react against the lives of those she scorns.
The actual result of Lucy's reactive sense of goodness is that—just as
Willard's determination to be 'civilized' makes him too forgiving of his son-in-law's
vices—Lucy's determination to be good leaves her absolutely anforgiving of others.
She cannot forgive their flaws, nor excuse their weakness. To combat the same
contingency of life that sent her grandfather searching for 'civilization,' Lucy erects
her own moral system. This moral system does not allow or excuse any failure; it
demands perfection. When she imagines her fellow humanity, she thinks, 'Oh, why
can't people be good? Inside they are only bones and strings and blood, kidneys and
brains and glands and teeth and arteries and veins. Why, why can't they just be
good?'327 Lucy's problem is revealed to be, to a certain extent, that of her Aunt
Ginny's. She can no more imagine the world from another's point of view than could
her aunt. Lucy cannot really believe that Roy might love an uncle that she feels
betrayed her, or that Elbe might love a friend whose lifestyle is the polar opposite to
Lucy's, or that Myra might genuinely love the father Lucy hates. Rather than
imagining these people as having made choices, she imagines them as victims of the
power and vice of others. Roy is overwhelmed by his Uncle, Elbe's superficiality
makes her vulnerable to her friend, and Myra is simply too stupid and weak to see
how corrupt Whitey really is.
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Because she cannot conceive of genuine difference and, instead, associates
anyone different from her with weakness and corruption, Lucy believes herself to be
'good.' She elevates her own moral system over that of others, and she feels that she
is entitled to confront and disparage anyone who falls short of her expectations.
During her flirtation with Catholicism, Lucy has a conversation with Father Damrosch
in which she tells him 'everything' about her family life. His response to Lucy, that
the 'world is imperfect' and that 'we are sinners' prompts her to wonder 'when will
the world be not evil?'328 His answer that this world will not be perfect, that one must
wait for the next life in heaven, does not satisfy her. Lucy's impatience with this life
and her inability to conceive of the afterlife as an acceptable exchange presage her
later attempts to make the world over in her own image. In her own skewed logic,
people are all the same, they should be good, she is good, and so it is her duty to help
make others good as well. For Lucy, this 'logic' is tied up with the idea of
expectations. Because she faults her grandfather and mother for not expecting more
from Whitey, she will now expect more from the rest of society. And rather than
allow others to judge her as she believes they have in the past, she will be the one to
sit in judgment over those she knows to be unworthy.
When She Was Good charts Lucy's course from innocent child, to innocent
victim, to enraged young woman, and finally to self-destructive Fury. In other words,
it charts the genealogy of Lucy's moral vision of life. While, on the one hand, much
of Lucy's life—and death—seems fated, it is my assertion that those who read the
novel as simply naturalistic miss a major factor in Roth's depiction of Lucy.
Although Lucy imagines her life as having been ruined by her family and blames
everyone else in the novel rather than herself, Roth points to another factor in Lucy's
328 Roth, When She Was Good 289.
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life and death. For Lucy is defined less by her family and her society than by her
rage. On the one hand, she is a victim of her towering anger, but, on the other hand,
she also cultivates it. Her anger becomes tied up with her sense of virtue; her self-
righteousness is as much fuelled by rage as by any conscious ideology. In fact, Roth
implies that her rage is her only ideology. Because of her anger, she imagines she is
virtuous; because of her hatred, she imagines she is superior; because of her spite, she
imagines she is good. Lucy never defines why she is better than her peers, she just
knows she is. But Roth implies that all Lucy really 'knows' are her feelings. She
knows she hates her small town and her family, and so she defines herself and her
beliefs strictly in opposition to them. Lucy's interactions with the world have a
decidedly 'moral' inflection, but her morality finds its origins in an impotent and
reactive rage against social circumstance.
Besides exploring the micropolitical and pre-ideological basis of Lucy's
worldview, When She Was Good raises another theme that will continually reappear
in Roth's later novels. Whilst some of Lucy's anger seems natural given her
dysfunctional family, the problem remains of why Lucy chooses self-destruction over
forgiveness. There are moments in the novel when Lucy acknowledges that she
should, genuinely, 'be good:' when she should be more forgiving towards Roy and
more comfortable in her world. When Lucy first learns she is pregnant and is
desperate not to have to marry Roy, she flees back to Liberty Center and her family
home. Her father comes to speak to her about organizing an abortion, which she
desperately wants, and for the first time since childhood she allows herself to see him
as a capable and caring individual. She imagines their renewed relationship and
thinks, 'Could that be? At long last, those terrible days of hatred and solitude, over?
To think she could begin again to talk to her family, to tell them about all the things
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she was studying, to show them the books she used in her courses, to show them her
papers.'329 This paragraph illustrates Lucy's colossal loneliness, but it also illustrates
that Lucy is capable of imagining a relationship with her father. She can envision
how she could be closer to her family, and she can even imagine the benefit that such
a relationship would bring. However, before any such reconciliation can be brought
about, Lucy discovers that her father knows of the abortionist because her mother has
had one. Her rage at her father reasserts itself and she tells her mother that Whitey
victimizes Myra, and then calls her father 'the town drunk.' Lucy, in other words,
would choose anger at her father over happiness, rage at her past over the chance for a
more peaceful future. She would also rather force Roy to marry her and have his
baby, than to make any choice similar to one her mother had made.
In my reading, Lucy's 'fate' is as much of her own making as it is the natural
outcome of her situation. Whilst some of her anger is depicted as deserved, her
destruction at the end of the novel seems to be as much by choice as by decree in that
she has chosen to live a live that is purely reactive, a life dictated by her anger. The
question of the novel then becomes why choose death over compromise? Why must
Lucy choose to assert her ideological view of the world as evil and herself as virtuous
over the chance to live a happier, more contented life? The reader has seen that Lucy
is not, of course, actually better than any other character. Her sense of virtue is based
not on genuine goodness but on a rage so powerful that she must define herself
against the community and family at which she is so angry. This perverse attempt at
self-definition means that, ironically, she is actually defined by those she hates the
most. Among many examples, her insistence that she is not her mother means she has
the baby she does not want and marries the man she wants even less. Her insistence
329 Roth, When She Was Good 180.
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that she will not accept the help of her father means that she gives up her dream of a
college education. Even her looks seem to be defined by others: she will not be seen
to care about herself the way other girls—girls like Ellie Sowerby—do. Lucy's
insistence on being different means that she cannot make any of her decisions for
herself; she must simply react against Liberty Center and her family. And meanwhile
she tells herself that this contrariness is actually spiritual enlightenment; that she is
not just being defiant, but virtuous.
By reading Lucy in the light of Nietzsche's ideas on ressentiment, the question
of why Lucy would choose a destructive reactive life over a more constructive active
life becomes easier to answer. When She Was Good is not about women or feminism
but about goodness—about what being good really means. In the same vein as
Dostoevsky's Notes from the Underground, it satirically plays with the genre of the
'good life,' questioning what underpins people's ideas about goodness and finding
unexpected ulterior motives. In other words, When She Was Good is a text that
deliberately draws upon and reconfigures certain classical philosophical tropes about
what sort of life should be lived to live well. Early in the novel, while Willard sits in
the cold and waits forWhitey's train to arrive, he thinks about all that he has survived.
He wonders why he does not just give up, whether he should fake senility in order
finally to rest and stop having to worry about everything. He resists this temptation,
thinking, "'But Why? Why should I be senile? Why be off my head when that is not
the case!" He jumped to his feet. "Why be getting pneumonia and worrying myself
sick - when all I did was good!".'331 Here Willard's conception of goodness is
revealed to be the same as his conception of civility: both goodness and civility
should protect a person from a brutal world. Willard believes that sacrifice and
331
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conformity to the community means living well, means being good, and yet his
thoughts reveal that this is actually part of a bargain he believes he can strike with the
cosmos. If he is good, he will be rewarded. In other words, Willard's belief that the
good deeds of good people are rewarded with a good life is really a form of self-
preservation rather than genuine altruism. But Lucy represents a far more extreme
moral vision of life, one that is purely reactive and that revels in its will to power.
Through the character of Lucy, Roth takes his exploration of goodness a step
further. Her definition of virtue is one that makes her superior to her perceived
enemies; in the otherwise powerless hands of a lower-middle class young girl, virtue
becomes a powerful weapon. Through his exploration of Lucy's belligerent version
of virtue, Roth establishes the undertone of violence in any ideology that defines itself
as good by defining itself against an 'other.' Lucy's is an image of goodness that
wants others to have to bow down to it and seeks to punish those who do not
capitulate. Lucy's moral vision promises her the ability to impose herself upon her
world: not only to combat the chaos that disturbs her but to grant her the authority and
pleasure of being a 'good person.' And so she absolutely invests herself in her own
moral self-image. She becomes 'good,' and this gives her a sense of power over those
who threaten or challenge her. Through this absolute division of good and evil,
through dividing the world in this binary way, she can elevate her own view of the
world and she can denigrate others. She feels it is within her rights to demand other
people witness her goodness and acknowledge her superiority. And if they fail to do
so, then they deserve her punishment. Lucy feels justified even while committing her
most heinous acts. Julian's family deserves to hear about his infidelities because he
has worked against her; Roy deserves to be attacked because he has betrayed her; her
mother deserves to hear Lucy's venomous form of 'truth' because Myra insists upon
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being weak where Lucy is strong. Unfortunately, Willard and Lucy can attempt to
impose a moral view of the world on life, but life does not have to accept it. When
the contingency of existence reasserts itself, binary ideologies must inevitably
collapse. In other words, subjecting life to a relentless moral reading subdues both
empathy and creativity, and Roth's novel asks to what type of life does this lead. In
Willard's case there remains the niggling doubt that life has not upheld its share of the
bargain; in Lucy's case, it leads to her destruction.
Lucy, like Nietzsche's ascetic, is full of hate, and in her lust for revenge
against the world she allows her rage to consume her. Nietzsche's description of
Schopenhauer, to him a most hated example of asceticism, could be used to describe
Lucy. He writes that Schopenhauer:
[. . .] needed enemies to keep him in a good humour; that he loved grim, bitter,
blackish-green words; that he raged for the sake of raging, out of passion; that
he would have grown ill, would have become a pessimist [. . .] without his
enemies [. . .] but his enemies held him fast, his enemies always enticed him
back again to his existence, his wrath was just as theirs was to the ancient
Cynics, his balm, his recreation, his recompense his remedium against disgust,
332
his happiness.
This describes Lucy's own reactive ideology that, rather than freeing her from her
hated family, makes her absolutely dependent upon them. She needs her enemies to
function, she defines herself through that which she despises. And as such she is
paralyzed, forever attached to that which she hates. Like Willard, she lives a life
according to pre-established generic rules and conventions but, unlike Willard, her
only rule is to work against Liberty Center and her family. Furthermore, When She
Was Good implicates goodness as being an ideological home for violence. To Lucy,
being 'good' means having the right, the responsibility even, to impose herself on
others. There is a link here between morality and violent coercion. After all, if I
332 Nietzsche 75.
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know what is 'good' and you refuse to obey me, then I have the right to treat you as a
criminal. In When She Was Good, Roth begins to trace a genealogy of morality that
will run through many of his novels, and he begins to understand the desire to be
'good' as a desire for supremacy that can have explosive consequences.
When She Was Good raises many of the themes that will continue to
preoccupy Roth's fiction. Rather than an anti-feminist portrayal of a woman who
destroys herself as part of a misogynistic fantasy on Roth's part, When She Was Good
can be read as the moment Roth rounds on his own critics. If they will insist he is
immoral, then he will make the nature of morality the focus of his barbed intelligence.
Rather than an author who revels in immorality, as Howe accuses him of being, Roth
actually questions how our ideas about morality come into being. He is as interested
in the pre-ideological as the ideological, in asking how we come to see the world as
we do. Lucy Nelson also raises another question that vexes Roth and his fiction, and
that is the question of why people will destroy themselves and others rather than
compromise their ideals, no matter how radical, untested, or untenable they prove to
be.
Conclusion
Although Other People and When She Was Good are very different novels,
Amis and Roth share an interest in how ideology shapes the individual's
understanding of the world. Nietzsche's theory of ressentiment and Deleuze's
theories about the micropolitical open up new avenues of understanding ideology, as
well as the novels in question. What makes this interest in ideology ironic is that both
Amis and Roth are so often considered immoral and apolitical writers. And yet this
chapter has examined how two of their most misunderstood and maligned texts
actually embed within their narratives explorations of how individuals 'do ideology'
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in their societies, as well as what it means to be 'good.' In fact, these authors are
anything but apolitical, as they investigate the pre-political forms of ideology that
shape the individual's understanding of his or her world. The next chapter in this
thesis will look at an even more overtly political theme within these author's writings.
It will explore how Amis and Roth narrate history, trauma, and testimony, focusing on
Amis's novel Time's Arrow and Roth's novel Sabbath's Theater.
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Chapter Three
"This is human life. There is a great hurt that everyone has to endure."
-Philip Roth, Sabbath's Theater (1995)
You have to harden your heart to pain and suffering. And quick. Like right
away at the very latest.
-Martin Amis, Times Arrow (1991)
To write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric.
-Theodor Adomo, 'After Auschwitz' (1949)
In recent years, "Trauma" has become a key trope across the academic
spectrum. From psychology to the social sciences and from history to literature, the
task of trying to understand the relationship between trauma and the twentieth and
twenty-first centuries involves many different fields within the humanities. One
critic, commenting on the prevalence of trauma-based literature writes, 'As even the
slightest perusal of current literary and cultural criticism will indicate, the concepts of
mourning and trauma have gained a wide currency.'333 The field of literary criticism
has been especially affected by the concept of trauma:
It is common to find readings of key modern and postmodern texts that
attempt to interpret characters as 'post-traumatic' or even suggest that entire
texts be read as 'traumatized.' Trauma, in other words, has become a key
trope in contemporary culture, a hermeneutical tool by which literary (and
other) texts are deciphered.334
The pervasiveness of trauma theory cannot be denied, and yet many aspects of trauma
theory are paradoxical, especially when incorporated into literary criticism. Indeed,
significant questions trouble the conjunction of trauma theory and literature. The fact
that 'trauma' has become a prevalent theoretical concern and paradigm across the
intellectual spectrum does not mean that the concept's core meaning has been
clarified. Ruth Leys addresses this problem in her introduction to the genealogy of
333 Jonathan Boulter, 'Does Mourning Require a Subject? Samuel Beckett's Texts for
Nothing,' MFS Vol. 50, num. 2 (Summer 2004) 332.
334 Boulter 332.
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trauma. She begins by describing two contemporaneous uses of the word 'trauma'
that occurred in the media in the 'same spring of 1998.'335 One use of the word
'traumatized' described the condition of Ugandan girls 'who had been abducted by a
guerrilla group [. . .] in order to serve as "wives" and fighters in its war against the
Ugandan army.'336 As part of their initiation into the group, the girls had been forced
337
to hack to death another young woman who had been caught trying to escape.
Meanwhile, in the United States, lawyers for Paula Jones were asserting 'on the basis
of expert testimony that, as a result of the trauma of her alleged sexual harassment by
President Clinton, Jones now suffered from post-traumatic stress with long-term
symptoms of anxiety, intrusive thoughts and memories, and sexual aversion.'338 As
Lxys concludes, the disparity between these two 'traumatic' situations reveals both
the generality and the potential elusiveness of the meaning of trauma itself.
In order fully to explore the meaning and scope of the idea of 'trauma,' this
chapter will examine common definitions of the term, as well as raise some of the
problems inherent in applying trauma theory to literature. I will begin by looking at
some of the seminal texts of trauma theory, focusing on critics such as Cathy Caruth,
Dominick LaCapra, and Shoshana Felman. I will also consider various questions
raised by critics such as Ruth Ixys that complicate the relationship between literature
and trauma theory. As a possible response to these questions, I will then offer a
reflection upon Jacques Derrida's essay Demeure: Fiction and Testimony, a text that
suggest ways of understanding trauma and testimony that rethinks the relationship
between truth, testimony, and fiction. Finally this chapter will turn to the fiction of
Philip Roth and Martin Amis in order to explore how two contemporary writers have









attempted to negotiate the difficult relationship between trauma, history and narrative.
In Sabbath's Theater, Roth's traumatized protagonist both represents and
problematizes the relationship between lived experience, narrative, and history. In
very different ways, Martin Amis's Times Arrow uses an extremely complicated and
experimental narrative device in order to reconceive the trauma of the Holocaust
through the eyes of one of its Nazi perpetrators. Both of these authors are fascinated
by questions of history, and the moral and ethical implications of trauma on both the
individual and his or her society. However, these authors are anything but formulaic
in their approach to trauma, and their fictions both refine and upset common theories
about trauma and its effects. But in order to understand the nature of their
interpretation of trauma, it is first necessary to develop our understanding of the
relationship between trauma, rhetoric, and literature.
Trauma: A Critical Overview
Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub, M.D. begin their groundbreaking work on
trauma with a series of rhetorical questions:
As readers, we are witnesses precisely to these questions we do not own and
do not yet understand, but which summon and beseech us from within the
literary texts. What is the relation between literature and testimony, between
the writer and the witness? What is the relation between the act of witnessing
and testifying, and the acts of writing and of reading, particularly in our era?
What is, furthermore, this book will ask, the relation between narrative and
history, between art and memory, between speech and survival?339
These questions dominate contemporary studies of trauma, and they also suggest the
complexity of the problem of defining the concept, particularly in its relation to
literature. The works of Felman, Cathy Caruth, and Dominck LaCapra—three
seminal figures in trauma theory—all attempt to answer the questions formulated by
339 Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub, M.D, Testimony: Crises ofWitnessing in Literature,
Psychoanalysis, and History (London: Routledge, 1992) xiii.
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Felman and Laub.340 All three also trace their research back to Sigmund Freud. As
Leys explains, Freud was one of a group of turn-of-the-century figures who used the
word trauma 'to describe the wounding of the mind brought about by sudden,
unexpected, emotional shock. The emphasis began to fall on the hysterical shattering
of the personality, consequent on a situation of extreme terror or fright.'341 As Freud
often uses examples from literature to represent various aspects of his definition of
trauma, his writings are of special interest for literary critics interested in trauma
theory.
In her reading of Freud, Cathy Caruth points out that although the etymology
of the word trauma points to a physical wounding, 'the term trauma is understood as
a wound inflicted not upon the body but upon the mind.'342 Such mental wounds
resist the straightforward healing processes of physical damage:
The wound in the mind—the breach in the mind's experience of time, self, and
the world—is not, like the wound of the body, a simple and healable event, but
rather an event that [. . .] is experienced too soon, too unexpectedly, to be fully
known and is therefore not available to consciousness until it imposes itself
again, repeatedly, in the nightmares and repetitive actions of the survivor.343
For Freud, the traumatic experience haunts its victim. The psychological wound
cannot heal; instead, it torments the bearer through the experience of obsessive
memory and compulsive grief: 'the experience of a trauma repeats itself, exactly and
unremittingly, through the unknowing acts of the survivor and against his will.'344
Fundamental to this conception of trauma are the oft-repeated words unknown and
340 Jonathan Boulter writes in a footnote that 'Certain texts have become "classics" of trauma
theory: Caruth's Unclaimed Experience and LaCapra's Writing History, Writing Trauma are critical
touchstones' (346). He goes on to list Felman as another 'crucial resource' (346).
341 Leys 4.
342 Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative and History (Baltimore and




unknowing. What makes psychic trauma more dangerous and challenging than a
physical injury is its enigmatic nature:
[. . .] trauma seems to be much more than a pathology, or the simple illness of
a wounded psyche: it is always the story of a wound that cries out, that
addresses us in the attempt to tell us of a reality or truth that is not otherwise
available. The truth, in its delayed appearance and its belated address, cannot
be linked only to what is known, but also to what remains unknown in our
very actions and our language.345
Physical wounds such as broken bones or contusions are usually obvious and,
therefore, relatively straightforward to identify and, if possible, to heal. But Caruth's
definition of a traumatic wound is far more ambiguous and, as such, more
threatening, in some ways, than a physical hurt. Caruth believes that the fundamental
nature of trauma is enigmatic: it 'cries out' and yet, unlike a fracture or cut, it can
neither be seen nor understood. Trauma, in Caruth's definition, is in possession of 'a
reality or truth' at the same time that it cannot fully explain or make explicit exactly
what that truth is or what reality the trauma voices. It is important that Caruth makes
an apparently contradictory connection between the unknown and the truth because,
in her estimation, trauma tells us something that we cannot or do not wish to confront.
Trauma attempts to reveal truths that we have either suppressed or of which we are
not fully cognizant. More controversially, Caruth implies that this relationship
between trauma and the unknown reflects something that is fundamentally enigmatic
in ourselves and our language. In other words, those aspects of trauma that are
resistant to comprehension actually represent something resistant about all human
experience and its expression through speech or writing. As such, the mysterious
nature of trauma raises 'a central problem of listening, of knowing, and of




incomprehensible involved in trauma, in tragedy, and in loss that belies expression:
we cannot explain why we are haunted by our memories because we cannot fully
understand what those memories mean. In her explanation of trauma, Caruth
introduces many of the key themes that both sustain and complicate her theory. Her
definition of trauma as a form of haunting—in that it is both repetitive and
enigmatic—is echoed by many other trauma theorists. And yet, in her apparent desire
to define trauma as universal—as something that can be experienced by people other
than the individual victim—Caruth's theories create as many problems as they
address.
The inability of the subject of trauma fully to comprehend his or her own
experience places inevitable constraints upon the possibility of traumatic narrative.
The Holocaust survivor Elie Wiesel has said that, 'If the Greeks invented tragedy, the
Romans the epistle and the Renaissance the sonnet, our generation invented a new
literature, that of testimony. We have all been witnesses and we feel we have to bear
testimony for the future.'347 Developing this theme, Felman suggests that we live in
an 'Age ofTestimony, an age, whose writing task (and reading task) is to confront the
horror of its own destructiveness, to attest to the unthinkable disaster of culture's
breakdown, and to attempt to assimilate the massive trauma, and the cataclysmic shift
in being that resulted with some reworked frame of culture or within some
revolutionized order of consciousness.'348 Both popular and academic culture
scrutinizes natural disasters such as earthquakes and tsunamis, and entire television
channels are dedicated to historical events such as the World Wars, Korea, Vietnam,
the Holocaust, and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Also evident is a more
open attitude towards and a greater understanding of personal traumas such as rape,
347 Elie Wiesel, as quoted by Felman, 113-114.
348 Felman 114.
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incest, and other types of sexual abuse. This curiosity in traumatic narratives means
that traumatic testimonials—both real and fictional—can appear ubiquitous.349
Despite this apparent ubiquity, however, the act of testifying to one's trauma is not as
straightforward as it may appear.
Felman identifies two major factors that may inhibit or put into question the
integrity of testimonial statements. To start with, she asserts the solitary status of the
witness to traumatic events. Felman writes:
Since the testimony cannot be simply relayed, repeated or reported by another
without thereby losing its function as a testimony, the burden of the witness—
in spite of his or her alignment with other witnesses—is a radically unique,
noninterchangeable and solitary burden. 'No one bears witness for the
witness,' writes the poet Paul Celan. To bear witness is to bear the solitude of
a responsibility, and to bear the responsibility, precisely, of that solitude.350
In response to Celan's remarks—the truth of which Felman takes for granted—
Felman argues that the act of testifying marks one as unique, as someone who has
been forced to carry a special burden that is exclusively his or her own. No one else
can fully understand what the victim has suffered; and, therefore, no one else can
speak in his or her name. By testifying as a victim, the subject articulates the
349 See James Berger, 'Trauma and Literary Theory,' Contemporary Literature, Vol. 38, No.
3 (Autumn, 1997)571-572.
Berger writes about the prevalence of traumatic narrations in popular culture in the United
States:
First we can look at a popular culture and mass media obsessed by repetitions of violent
disasters: at the successions of Die Hards, Terminators, and Robocops, as well as Nightmares
on Elm Street, disease and epidemic films, and now the return of the 'classic' disaster films of
twisters and turbulence and the repeated sequences of mini-apocalypses within each film; at
'real life' cop shows; and at the news itself, that never exhausted source of pure horror. [. . .]
We can look next at the preoccupation with family dysfunctions—child abuse, incest, spousal
abuse—in the media, most strikingly on the talk show circuit. [. . .] Along with the interest in
family breakdown and violence comes the interest in the enigmatic figure of the survivor, the
one who has passed through the catastrophe and can tell us what it is like. |.. .] Over the past
fifteen years, there has been an enormous growth in the interest in eyewitness accounts and
testimonies of all kinds: by victims of child abuse, Holocaust survivors, survivors of near-
death experiences, and so on. f. . .] Finally, most generally and perhaps most obviously, the
late twentieth century is a time marked, indeed, defined, by historical catastrophe. World
wars, local wars, civil wars, ideological wars, ethnic wars, the two atomic bomb attacks, the
cold war, genocides, famines, epidemics, and lesser turmoils of all kinds—these events, and
the visual representations of these events, have in large part shaped contemporary American
modes of viewing the world.
350 Felman 3.
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singularity of his or her situation and embarks on a journey that must be his or hers
alone. Felman believes that the testifier takes on a 'radical human condition of
exposure and vulnerability.'351 But Felman appears to undermine her own assertions
by claiming that a person also comes to represent other victims by engaging with his
or her identity as a victim through testifying. Felman writes, 'And yet, the
appointment to bear witness is, paradoxically enough, an appointment to transgress
the confines of that isolated stance, to speak for other and to others.'352 By testifying
as a victim, a person signals his or her inimitability and embarks on a journey that
must be a solitary one, but, paradoxically, he or she also engages not only with his or
her audience but also with other victims of similar crimes or situations. In other
words, Felman claims that testifying alienates the individual victim, and yet she
contradictorily and controversially assumes that, by testifying, a person can become
representative of their specific type of victimization, or that a single victim can speak
for many in a way that implicates the witness in his or her testimony.
Like Caruth, Felman also believes that the excessive and unknown nature of
trauma often belies narration. Testifying witnesses not only risk marking themselves
out as different but also find articulating their experience difficult. Felman writes:
As a relation to events, testimony seems to be composed of bits and pieces of a
memory that has been overwhelmed by occurrences that have not settled into
understanding or remembrance, acts that cannot be constructed as knowledge
nor assimilated into full cognition, events in excess of our frames of
reference.
Just as Caruth referred to trauma as unknowable or unavailable to consciousness,
Felman refers to the traumatic experience as 'overwhelming.' Trauma overwhelms
both the subject's consciousness—impinging on memory—as well as the subject's





belie verbal expression. However, Felman does offer a solution, of sorts, to this
dilemma:
[. . .] Freud makes a scientific statement of his discovery that there is in effect
such a thing as an unconscious testimony, and that this unconscious,
unintended, unintentional testimony has, as such, an incomparable heuristic
and investigative value. Psychoanalysis, in this way, profoundly rethinks and
radically renews the very concept of the testimony, by submitting, and by
recognizing for the first time in the history of culture, that one does not have to
possess or own the truth, in order to effectively bear witness to it; that speech
as such is unwittingly testimonial; and that the speaking subject constantly
bears witness to a truth that nonetheless continues to escape him, a truth that
is, essentially, not available to its own speaker.354
In other words, a person testifying about a traumatic experience does not need to
know or understand the truth in order to express the truth of their experience. Felman
even implies that by not consciously knowing the truth, the subject's testimony has a
greater fidelity to the truth in so far as his or her subconscious can reveal more about
the nature and the effects of the traumatic experience than the conscious mind. This
focus on the unconscious and indefinable aspects of our experience raises a problem
inherent to Felman's and Caruth's work: the problematic status of the 'history' that
their analyses seek to explore.
LaCapra: History and Testimony
Like many other writers on trauma, Caruth and Felman focus their attention
upon determinate historical events, such as the Holocaust. By doing so, these writers
appear to assume that witnesses or victims of traumatic historical events have special
access to the truth about a particular historical moment. Yet, they also insist that the
nature of trauma is fundamentally mysterious and enigmatic. In effect, their theories
suggest a contradictory relationship between trauma, testimony, and historical
consciousness. As LaCapra writes, 'It is noteworthy that, although Caruth's subtitle
354 Felman 15.
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refers to history, she approaches history only through the medium of theory and
literature, thus not including historiography itself and the contributions or the
resistances it might pose to her analysis in both intellectual and institutional terms.'355
LaCapra continues by arguing that although Caruth claims a continuing interest in
history and the nature of historical experience, the very nature of historiography
makes it resilient to the definition of trauma theory that Caruth espouses. In his own
work, LaCapra reveals why writing history is so difficult by identifying 'two
approaches to historiography,' and he raises a series of problems regarding the
narration of historical trauma that Caruth avoids.356
LaCapra begins by identifying 'a documentary or self-sufficient research
357
model' of historiography. In this model, the historian looks for factual evidence,
such as primary, archival documents that are then analyzed in order to put 'forth
testable hypotheses'.358 Here, the stylistic features of historical writing are
'subordinated to content in the form of facts, their narration, or their analysis. [. . . ] In
other words, writing is a medium for expressing a content, and its ideal goal is to be
transparent to content or an open window on the past.'359 This documentary or
research model of historiography, LaCapra claims, radically puts into question the
possibility of any relationship between literature, traumatic testimony, and
historiography. Because of the emphasis that this model places on archival or
documentary evidence, the traumatized testimony of a single person who may or may
not remember 'the facts' accurately may well be relegated to a footnote—that
shadowy place where 'the limit of history and the beginning of fiction is probably
355 Dominick LaCapra, Writing History, Writing Trauma (Baltimore and London: The Johns






reached'.360 There is, however, a second approach to historiography that LaCapra
labels 'radical constructivism.' Radical constructivist historians, LaCapra continues,
'accept the distinction between historical and fictional statements on the level of
reference to events,' but they also 'question it on structural levels.'361 Prominent
reconstructionists such as Hayden White and Frank Ankersmit argue that no matter
how unbiased and impersonal historicists' vision of history may claim to be, their
vision is 'so stained by one set of projective factors or another that, at least on a
structural level, it reflects back only the historian's own distorted image.'362 To claim
that documentary approaches to history are still inflected by a historian's own
personal perspective is a very contentious claim. This position implies that history
can never be objectively true, and this problem of what defines the truth is really at the
heart of both of the approaches to history that LaCapra identifies. Those who agree
with the first approach to history as well as those who consider themselves radical
constructivists both claim to have a more complete understanding of the truth. For the
former, the truth is that which can be documented. For the latter, the truth is a much
more fluid concept that includes the perspectives of witnesses, be they fallible or not.
LaCapra identifies the tension between the two approaches as involving the subtle
difference between 'right things' and 'true things':
In other words, saying the right things may not be limited to but does
constitutively require saying true things on the levels of both statements
referring to events and broader narrative, interpretive, or explanatory
endeavours. How to adjudicate truth claims may differ in significant ways
with respect to events and to broader endeavours (such as interpretations or
readings of the past), but truth claims are at issue on both levels.
LaCapra suggests that understanding the full scope—or the 'right things'—of a





LaCapra uses Toni Morrison's novels as an illustration of how fiction can grant a
reader powerful 'insight into phenomena such as slavery [. . .] which may be difficult
to arrive at through restricted documentary methods.'363 Telling someone the 'true'
facts and figures of slavery's barbarity may not be as effective in depicting the horrors
of slavery as showing the cruelty and inhumanity through an imaginative narrative
account written from the perspective of a slave. Whilst this example uses a work that
is explicitly fictional, even eyewitness testimony can reveal the tensions between what
is 'right' and what is 'true.'
Later in his book, LaCapra quotes Dori Laub's interview of a survivor of
Auschwitz narrating her eyewitness account of the Auschwitz uprising. The survivor
was interviewed as part of the Video Archive for Holocaust Testimonies at Yale, for
which Laub was an interviewer, and the tape was subsequently viewed at a conference
by an audience culled from various academic pursuits.364 In the interview, the woman
speaks of the moment when she saw the four chimneys at Auschwitz exploding and
how her overwhelming emotion was disbelief. For the prisoner at that moment,
seeing those most obvious symbols of Nazi oppression and genocide explode 'was
unbelievable.'365 The responses to this woman's emotionally vivid testimony
gathered from the audience and recounted by Laub are telling. An historian in the
audience declared that the woman's testimony was factually incorrect, given that only
one of the four chimneys at Auschwitz was destroyed in the uprising. Disturbed by
this factual error, he concluded that the veridical status of her entire narrative was
questionable. However, the psychoanalyst—Laub himself—had a radically different
point of view. He argued that the point of the survivor's testimony had been missed





number of chimneys that were destroyed upon a particular day, the woman was
actually testifying to 'something else, more radical, more crucial: the reality of an
unimaginable occurrence. One chimney blown up in Auschwitz was as incredible as
four. The number mattered less than the fact of the occurrence.'366 What is at stake
in this exchange is the fundamental status of what is 'true' and what is 'right' in their
relation to traumatic experience. To the historian, giving an accurate account of
documented events is to tell the truth, and telling the truth is the most important part
of writing history. But the psychoanalyst argues that the meaning of the event
harbours another kind of truth, and that although the woman is factually incorrect, her
account of being in Auschwitz tells of an entire reality that supersedes those facts that
the psychoanalyst implies are mere details. Laub obviously has no difficulty in
dismissing the qualms of the historian when confronted with an eyewitness who
incorrectly remembers the details of a certain historical event. And yet it is important
that Laub is not himself a historian. That LaCapra gives this exchange as an example
of the tension between 'types' of historiography is telling, and seems to imply that
although there are some historians who are willing to explore more than just 'the
truth', it often remains the province of other disciplines—such as literature or
psychoanalysis—to explore what is 'right'.
What is at stake for LaCapra, Caruth, and Felman, amongst others, is whether
or not it is possible to write about trauma in a way that simultaneously heeds the
demands of subjective experience while also attempting to keep faith with historical
fact. This problematic has obvious implications for literature, especially when
literature takes as its subject traumatic experiences that are as much historical events
as they are personal. LaCapra continually refers to the case of Binjamin
366 Dori Laub, as quoted by LaCapra, 88.
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Wilkomirski's book Fragments: Memories ofa Wartime Childhood which was
originally believed to have been 'the memoir of a child survivor in a concentration
camp.'367 The book received literary prizes as well as the acclaim of other
survivors.368 It was soon revealed, however, that Wilkomirski had almost certainly
not been in a concentration camp.369 Readers felt betrayed by Wilkomirski, who, for
his part, refused to admit whether or not the contents of the book were 'real' or
fictional.370 For LaCapra, Wilkomirski's case not only exemplifies the sort of truth-
claims that complicate the writing of historical trauma; it also represents the
constitutive—but potentially dangerous—role of empathy and experience in both
history and trauma studies.
LaCapra's own definition of history seems to be a hybrid of the two models he
elaborates at the beginning of his book:
I would begin by noting that the position I defend puts forth a conception of
history as tensely involving both an objective (not objectivist) reconstruction
of the past and a dialogic exchange with it and other inquirers into it wherein
knowledge involves not only the processing of information but also affect,
empathy, and questions of value. 71
LaCapra postulates that this 'third position' differs from the first two approaches
insofar as 'it involves a critical and self-critical component that resists closure.'372
LaCapra believes that extreme historical situations must inevitably include such
subjective elements as excess, experience, empathy, and identification, and his
definition gives LaCapra space to explore all these problematic aspects of the
conjunction of history and literature that the first two models either ignore or assume.








this thesis, in that these concepts help to define the reasons for and problems with
fictionalizing trauma. The idea that someone 'knows' more about a situation through
experiencing it is illustrated by the case ofWilkomirski's 'memoir.' People assumed
that his experience as a survivor was what made it possible for him to write such a
powerful and realistic narrative, but when they discovered that he was probably not a
child survivor, the story that had once seemed 'true' became 'false.' As LaCapra
explains, Wilkomirski's case illustrates how 'one has a series of interrelated problems
involving the question of experience' that all seem to point back—again—to the truth
claims of the individual witness, victim, or historian.
LaCapra does not believe, however, that the role of experience is insuperable.
Instead, he concludes his section on experience 'by contending that the problem of
07A
experience should lead to the role of empathy in historical understanding.'
Empathy, while it should not be conflated with objectifying or identifying with a
historical event, offers a way to understand historical traumas:
As a counterforce to [the] numbing [effect of objectification], empathy may be
understood in terms of attending to, even trying, in limited ways, to recapture
the possibly split-off, affective, dimension of the experience of others.
Empathy may also be seen as counteracting victimization, including self-
victimization. It involves affectivity as a crucial aspect of understanding in
the historian or other observer or analyst. [. . .] Empathy in this sense is a form
of virtual, not vicarious, experience related to what Kaja Silverman has termed
heteropathic identification, in which emotional response comes with respect
for the other and the realization that the experience of the other is not one's
375
own.
The sort of empathy that LaCapra describes is in no way a pathological form of
identification, in which a person really does think he or she is the other.376 Rather,




376 LaCapra writes, 'But objectivity should not be identified with objectivism or exclusive
identification that denies or forecloses empathy, just as empathy should not be conflated with
unchecked identification, vicarious experience, and surrogate victimage' (40).
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observer '377 This understanding of an affective relationship between the victim and
witness sanctions the existence of emotional responses in the historian faced with
highly emotional and tragic situations or testimonies. But it also implies the
possibility of a relationship between fiction and history. After all, if a person can
empathize with a victim or with a historical period, then certainly he or she can write
about it. In this sense, Wilkomirski's 'memoir' can still be accepted as a powerful
portrayal of surviving a horrendous, nearly impossible situation, even if it is based on
imagination rather than experience.
Meditating upon the crucial role empathy might play in our understanding of
history, LaCapra extends the possibility that literature might offer a valuable space in
which to explore the experience of trauma:
Still, historiography is subject to constraints different from those of literature,
or at least of fiction, despite the important features these modes of discourse
share (notably with respect to narrative procedures). The counterpart is that at
least certain forms of literature or art, as well as the type of discourse or theory
which emulates its object, may provide a more expansive space (in
psychoanalytic terms, a relatively safe haven) for exploring modalities of
responding to trauma, including the role of affect and the tendency to repeat
traumatic events. At times art departs from the ordinary reality to produce
surrealistic situations or radically playful openings that seem to be sublimely
irrelevant to ordinary reality but may uncannily provide indirect commentary
or insight into that reality.378
Here LaCapra echoes Caruth in his belief that one crucial function of art is to enable
us to experience previously unknowable and seemingly irreal aspects of traumatic
discourse. As Caruth puts the matter, 'If Freud turns to literature to describe
traumatic experience, it is because literature, like psychoanalysis, is interested in the
complex relation between knowing and not knowing.'379 At the point where
traumatic experience exceeds our limits of comprehension, art offers a way of





represent otherwise unspeakable situations. According to LaCapra, art's ability to
express irreal events occurs because art allows for an imaginative process of empathy
in which the witnesses to trauma, through experiencing the testimony of survivors,
can attempt to understand a victim's experience. He writes that, 'empathy is a
counterforce to victimization, and—without giving empathy an exclusive or
primordial position—one may argue that its role is important both in historical
understanding and in the ethics of everyday life.'380 The imaginative process LaCapra
describes helps both victim and witness to resist the reifying process of victimization
with the transformative experience of empathy: the victimized other 'becomes'
oneself, at least to the extent that I can imagine 'it could happen to me.' This, again,
is not the sort of 'unchecked identification, vicarious experience, and surrogate
victimage' to which LaCapra objects.381 Rather, empathy helps to erase 'the binary
logic of identity and difference' that distinguishes the victim from the victim.382
LaCapra insists that his definition of empathy should not be interpreted as
encouraging total identification with victims or situations. But Ruth Leys worries that
definitions of trauma have become so elastic as to risk meaninglessness as well as to
encourage identification, a situation she appears to blame literary critics such as
Caruth for creating. Leys is at odds with many aspects of Caruth's theories, but she is
especially concerned with what she sees as a tendency ofmany contemporary theories
of trauma to conflate the victim of, and the witness to, traumatic experience. She
writes:
Inherent in Caruth's theory of trauma is the belief that the trauma experienced
by one person can be passed to others. The basic model for that transmission





her traumatic experience, and a witness who listens and is in turn
contaminated by the catastrophe.383
Leys employment of the word 'contaminated' is crucial here. She does not believe
that the process of 'performing' trauma for the benefit of a witness has any practical
or ethical utility. Instead, the result of such a process is 'that individuals or groups
who never experienced the trauma directly themselves are imagined as "inheriting"
the traumatic memories of those who died long ago.'384 In this scenario, witnesses
vicariously assume the position of the victim, even if they are themselves historically
distant from the actual event. Leys fears that encouraging witnesses to believe they
have 'inherited' trauma makes an event that is both individually experienced and
historically specific representative of a general sense of victimization. To
demonstrate this, she uses an example from Felman regarding cultural narratives of
the sexual victimization of women to illustrate how such 'inheritance' narratives
make the individual victim representative of all women's suffering in a purportedly
misogynistic society.385 This general sense of victimization strips the event of any
historical specificity or meaning, while it also assumes that the witness to an event
suffers as much as the actual victim. This type of thinking cannot do justice to either
the complexities or the specificities of the historical event, and—more
problematically—it also assumes the rationale of the attacker or oppressor. Such
thinking 'explains' the Nazi or the rapist as an anti-Semite or a misogynist, a
rationalization that ignores the complicated social, cultural, and psychological
processes that contribute to prejudices such as misogyny and anti-Semitism. Taking
this logic a step further, such labels could actually exculpate perpetrators by turning
them into the victim of whatever prejudice they have absorbed from their culture.
383 Leys 284.
384 Leys 284.
385 See Leys, 284.
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Thus LaCapra claims that in the controversial book Hitler's Willing Executioners:
Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust, Daniel Jonah Goldhagen comes close to
justifying the crimes of Nazi war criminals by means of his emphasis upon '"the
ubiquity of eliminationist anti-Semitism in Germany".'386 Because Goldhagen
believes so firmly that only Germany—by being Germany—was capable of
prosecuting the Holocaust, we are confronted with the proposition that eliminationist
anti-Semitism 'refers to a generations-old phenomena of German culture which
created a direct path to the Holocaust.'387 The guiding thread of such a narrative
would be that Germans had to do what they did because they were fated to do so by a
strain of culturally engineered anti-Semitism that was as irrefutable as destiny. In
effect, LaCapra implies that Goldhagen undermines the title of his own book by
presenting Germans as fated or destined, rather than willing, executioners.
Leys identifies the same blurring of boundaries between victims, witnesses,
and perpetrators in Caruth's work. Caruth begins Unclaimed Experience with her
own reading of a case developed by Freud: the story of Tancred and Clorinda from
Tasso's Gerusalemme Liberata,388 In the story:
Its hero, Tancred, unwittingly kills his beloved Clorinda in a duel while she is
disguised in the armour of an enemy knight. After her burial he makes his
way into a strange magic forest which strikes the Crusaders' army with terror.
He slashes with his sword at a tall tree; but blood streams from the cut and the
voice of Clorinda, whose soul is imprisoned in the tree, is heard complaining
that he has wounded his beloved again.389
Caruth uses this story to illustrate how 'the experience of a trauma repeats itself,
exactly and unremittingly, through the unknowing acts of the survivor and against his




389 Freud, as quoted by Caruth, 2.
390 Caruth 2.
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victim of this story is Clorinda, not Tancred. It is Clorinda who is twice assaulted:
once in the duel and once after her spirit has been encased in the tree. And yet it is
Tancred, the perpetrator of the crime, who becomes—at least in Caruth's reading of
Freud—the repository of the trauma that this incident engenders.391 This conflation
of Tancred and Clorinda signals what Leys believes is Caruth's 'primary commitment
to making victimhood unlocatable in any particular person or place, thereby
permitting it to migrate or spread contagiously to others.'392 Leys reasons that Caruth
needs to maintain this 'contagious' definition of trauma in order effectively to apply
trauma theory to literature, claiming that 'the primary importance of the contagion is
that it allows her to imagine how the reader might be implicated in the trauma of
others'. As Leys argues, however, there are victims of trauma and then again there
are witnesses to trauma; worryingly, Caruth fuses the two. Even more ominously,
Caruth also erases the distinction between victim and perpetrator by representing
Tancred as the story's traumatic victim. Leys explains:
But her discussion of Tasso's epic has even more chilling implications. For if,
according to her analysis, the murderer Tancred can become the victim of the
trauma and the voice of Clorinda's testimony to his wound, then Caruth's
logic would turn other perpetrators into victims too—for example, it would
turn the executioners of the Jews into victims and the "cries" of the Jews into
testimony to the trauma suffered by the Nazis.394
Clearly Caruth never intended to identify the Nazis as victims of trauma; Leys uses
this example to illustrate the 'the sloppiness' of Caruth's theoretical arguments.395
More important to my argument, however, is Leys's insistence that definitions of
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put the matter plainly: If both Paula Jones and Ugandan victims of rape and genocide
are equally to be thought to be victims of trauma, what force and specificity does the
concept of trauma really contain?
Derrida: Fiction and Testimony
Notwithstanding Leys's reservations, the intertwining of traumatic experience
and the nature of testimony is a recurrent motif in contemporary literary and cultural
theory. In his essay Demeure: Fiction and Testimony, Jacques Derrida reflects at
length upon this relationship. Demeure takes as its inspiration a short story entitled
The Instant ofMy Death by Maurice Blanchot. The story recounts the near-execution
of a French resistance fighter by a troop of traitorous Russian soldiers fighting for the
Nazis. At the last second, after the man has accepted that he is about to die, the
lieutenant is distracted by an explosion and one of the soldiers lets the man escape.
The narrator intimates that the man lived for the rest of his life as one who thought
himself to be already dead. Blanchot finds a provoking and perturbing sentence to
express his narrator's seemingly paradoxical condition: 'As if the death outside of him
could only henceforth collide with the death in him.'396 What fascinates Derrida
about this story is that Blanchot writes it as a literary fiction. The narrator, the 'I' in
397
the story, refers to the man facing execution as someone he 'remembers.'
However, the tale Blanchot narrates is really his own. Derrida quotes a personal letter
from Blanchot in which he recounts the story of his own near execution at the hands
of the Nazis, and Derrida warns us 'He [Blanchot] is telling the story, and it
398
happened.' What interests Derrida about the relationship between the story and the
396 Maurice Blanchot, 'The Instant ofMy Death,' The Instant ofMy Death/Demeure: Fiction
and Testimony, trans. Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2000) 9.
397 Blanchot 3.
398 Jacques Derrida, 'Demeure: Fiction and Testimony, The Instant ofMy Death/Demeure:
Fiction and Testimony, trans. Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2000) 52.
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letter is the fact that the letter is not supposed to be fiction; the letter is a testimonial to
an actual event. And yet, 'it says the same thing' as the story; 'It testifies to the
reality of the event that seems to form the referent of this literary narrative entitled
The Instant ofMy Death and published as literary fiction.'399 This central paradox
upon which the essay turns—how the same truth can be represented in both a
testimonial letter and in a piece of fiction—impels Derrida to probe the strange and
enigmatic relationship between fiction, testimony, and truth telling.
Derrida's pivotal conviction is that because the ability to testify requires in the
first place a singular act of witness, there can be no exterior or objective proof of the
traumatic experience that has been endured. As he remarks, 'I can only testify, in the
strict sense of the word, from the instant when no one can, in my place, testify to what
I do.'400 Because testimony involves the singular experience of an individual witness,
who 'must be irreplaceably alone,' according to Derrida, 'testimony always goes hand
in hand with at least the possibility of fiction, peijury and lie.'401 This apparently
contradictory relationship between testimony and fiction operates on a number of
levels. Most obviously, some victims are the only ones—besides the perpetrator—
'involved' in a particular crime. In the absence of physical evidence, there can be no
absolute guarantee as to the honesty or dishonesty of their testimony. On a more
complicated level, a person testifying might fervently believe that he or she is telling
the truth, and yet they might actually lie. Such was the case of the Auschwitz
survivor who 'saw' all four chimneys blow up during the Auschwitz uprising. But it
is from problems of testimony like this that Derrida extracts a more general principle:
that the act of testifying carries within it the possibility of dissimulation only helps to





At the root of the relationship between fiction and testimony lies what Derrida
calls 'a question today of lies and truth'.402 In order to look at this question more
closely, Derrida appeals to the sphere of law:
In our European juridical tradition, testimony should remain unrelated to
literature and especially, in literature, to what presents itself as fiction,
simulation, or simulacra, which is not all literature. When a testifying witness,
whether or not he is explicitly under oath, without being able or obligated to
prove anything, appeals to the faith of the other by engaging himself to tell the
truth—no judge will accept that he should shirk his responsibility ironically by
declaring or insinuating: what I am telling you here retains the status of a
literary fiction. And yet, if the testimonial is by law irreducible to the fiction,
there is no testimony that does not structurally imply in itself the possibility of
fiction, simulacra dissimulation, lie, and perjury—that is to say, the possibility
of literature, of the innocent or perverse literature that innocently plays at
perverting all of these distinctions.403
According to Derrida, the law assumes that the relationship between truth and
testimonial is a straightforward one. And yet—as the Auschwitz survivor's mistaken
but meaningful testimony represents—the boundaries between truth and fiction are
actually difficult to define. For his part, Derrida argues that it is impossible absolutely
to distinguish between fiction and testimony. Returning to the testimony of the
Auschwitz survivor, it is clear that in any objective sense her memory of four
exploding chimneys is, in fact, a fiction. However, as Dori Laub has argued, it is a
fiction that actually reveals something fundamental to the woman's historical
experience that is as 'truthful' as the accepted historical record of that day's events.
The word fiction, as this example suggests, can paradoxically testify to a form of
truth. Blanchot helped to illuminate the suggestive possibilities of this paradox by
using both a fictional narrative and a non-fiction epistle to tell the same story in two




'true' letter and a 'fictional' short story—not only adequate but also necessary as
means to speak of his traumatic experience.
Fiction, for Derrida, is not only an appropriate form in which to express the
existential truth of testimonial statements but also an imaginative resolution of the
inherent contradictions of testimony itself. As Blanchot's title—'The Instant ofMy
Death'—implies, the testimonial of survivors often means that they are testifying to
an experience that they cannot actually have had.404 As such, Blanchot's carefully
chosen title points to an essential link between fiction, testimony and truth:
What runs through this testimony of fiction is thus the singular concept of an
'unexperienced experience.' Nothing seems more absurd to common sense, in
effect, than an unexperienced experience. But whoever does not try to think
and read the part of fiction and thus of literature that is ushered in by such a
phrase in even the most authentic testimony will not have begun to read or
hear Blanchot.405
According to Derrida's critique of Blanchot's 'testimony of fiction,' Blanchot's desire
to testify to an event that never actually happened reveals the irreducible relationship
between history and fiction. More than this, it illuminates the way imaginative
writing exposes the buried kernel of 'truth' in testimonial experience otherwise left
uncovered by 'historical' retrospection. It is for this reason Derrida believes that
Blanchot employs the resources and strategies of literary fiction to undermine the
referential status of 'historical' memory. Blanchot's refusal to 'sign' his story,
Derrida suggests, underscores his belief that 'Literature serves as real testimony.'406
Blanchot understands that because the nature of testimony is everything Derrida





'extraordinary'—that the only person finally responsible for defining what is true and
what is real is the reader or witness.407
Derrida also argues that Blanchot's fictional recreation of his potentially tragic
war time history significantly broadens the range of its implication. Because
testimony harbours an inexpressible secret or enigma at its core, the reader has a
crucial role in determining the meaning of the experience it records. For as Derrida
explains:
[. . .] we can only judge it to be readable, if it is, insofar as a reader can
understand it, even if no such thing has ever "really" happened to him, to the
reader. We can speak, we can read this because this experience, in the
singularity of its secret, as 'experience of the unexperienced,' beyond the
distinction between the real and the phantasmatic, remains universal and
exemplary.408
Derrida's phrase 'we can only judge it to be readable, if it is' rather curtly summarizes
the role of the writer in making his or her work not only 'readable' but also
'universal' and 'exemplary.' It is the writer's responsibility, as well as the mark of
his or her talent, to make a story mean something for those who never experienced
anything similar. The writer is also responsible for making his or her story an
example of something larger, in imbuing a story with meaning beyond its own
specificities. Derrida uses the example of Dostoyevsky's own near-execution to
reinforce his point: 'Dostoyevsky would have described the same survival, and he
would have done it altogether otherwise. He would have written, he will have
written, another, very different text. Dostoyevsky is another story entirely.'409
Dostoyevsky and Blanchot endured the same terrible experience: they were both upon
the point of execution; they both had to confront the fact that they were about to die;
and they were both released at the very last moment. Yet the fact that they endured




almost identical experiences does not mean that they will tell similar stories.
According to Derrida, narrating an experience so that a reader genuinely understands
it requires more than merely reproducing the facts in chronological order. Otherwise,
both Blanchot and Dostoyevsky would naturally recreate similar narratives to describe
their similar experiences. Their differing narratives illustrate how fiction, when
written well, can be more accessible to a reader than bare facts. Demeure attests to
the processes by which writers—even of fiction—become the clearest voices for
testifying to experiences, even those that are actually 'unexperienced.'
These reflections upon Derrida and Blanchot have sought to elucidate some of
the key complexities of testimonial statements. Several of the issues identified
resonate at the heart of Martin Amis's and Philip Roth's fiction. To begin with,
Time's Arrow and Sabbath's Theater are both novels that are animated by the nature
of testimonial statements and are linked by a shared preoccupation with what LaCapra
calls the tension between 'right things' and 'true things.' Both writers are interested
in if, and how, fiction can get to the kernel of truth about a historical event, and both
writers use extremely non-traditional—even controversial—forms of narration to
explore this problem. Finally, both Amis and Roth attempt to come to terms with
those discomfiting aspects of trauma theory—such as identification and the role of the
perpetrator—that seem to resist straightforward analysis by even the most adept
theorists. The remainder of this chapter will establish a connection between recent
theoretical reflections upon traumatic experience and Amis's and Roth's writing in
order to examine the ways in which their work explores some of the most
controversial and compelling questions raised by trauma theory.
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Approaching Auschwitz: Amis and Time's Arrow
Martin Amis's novel, Time's Arrow, fictionally reworks many of the problems
inherent to trauma theory. The novel takes as its subject the major traumatic event of
the twentieth century: the Holocaust. But unlike many more conventional Holocaust
narratives the protagonist is a Nazi doctor complicit in a series of war crimes,
including personally fitting the Zyklon B pellets used to gas the victims of
Auschwitz.410 The novel also defies convention in its narrative structure by pointing
time's arrow backwards. The life story of Odilo Unverdorben is being narrated by his
unspoiled soul or conscience, who witnesses the entirety of Odilo's life beginning at
the moment of his 'birth' from a heart attack as an elderly man living in America, to
his 'death'—really the moment of his conception—when his father 'will come in and
kill me with his body.'411 As this example suggests, time and causality ran backwards
throughout the course of the novel. Although the narrator learns to 'translate' the
reversed text of the novel so that all of its narrative terms run forward in time, the few
sections of dialogue in which Odilo appears run in reverse order.412 This reversal of
temporality and causality is not confined to narrative and speech. All human bodily
functions also run backwards in times. Thus people ingest their nourishment from the
toilet every morning, regurgitate it as food that they un-cook and un-prepare in order
for it to be packaged and put back into the refrigerator or cupboard, where it sits until
it is returned to the supermarket for money. In both literal and symbolic terms, the
toilet becomes the focus of this world's economy, where faeces becomes a vitally
important natural resource. To speak in the novel's own terms, without shit, there
410 Please note that although I will mainly use the protagonist's original German name, Odilo
Unverdorben, in my discussion of the novel, Odilo is also known of in the book as Tod Friendly, John
Young, and Flamilton de Souza.
411 Martin Amis, Time's Arrow (1991: London: Vintage, 2003)172.
412 The first bits of spoken dialogue represented for the reader are given as 'Dug. Dug' and
'Oo y'rrah?' (14)- The narrator translates this as 'Good. Good' and 'How are you?' (14). The first
example of a conversation in reverse occurs on p. 21.
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would be no life, an axiom dramatized most powerfully in the story of Odilo's
activities at Auschwitz.
At the beginning of the novel, Odilo is living under the pseudonym of Dr. Tod
T. Friendly, a convivial elderly gentleman who spends his days puttering in his garden
and tousling the hair of neighbourhood children.413 There are dark intimations,
however, threatening what appears to be a peaceful existence. Although the narrator
lacks direct access to Tod's thoughts, he is at the same time 'awash in his emotions,'
and senses a perpetual undercurrent of 'fear and shame' in his every thought and
action.414 Meanwhile, amysterious figure looms over Tod's dreams: 'a male shape,
with an entirely unmanageable aura, containing such things as beauty, terror, love,
filth, and above all power. This male shape or essence seemed to be wearing a white
coat (a medic's stark white smock). And black boots. And a certain kind of smile.'415
Both Odilo and the narrator are obviously disturbed by these dreams, and the night
remains a time of anxiety for them both, but in other ways their shared life continues
to improve. As we now begin to expect from the novel's reversal of cause and effect,
Tod gets increasingly younger and stronger as his 'life' progresses, and all of the
aches and pains of old age steadily decrease. As he grows younger, Tod also gains a
romantic life, but the novel's dispersals and displacements of narrative order mean
that his love affairs begin with arguments, culminate in lovemaking, and end with
tentative greetings. Similarly, when Tod begins his career as a doctor, the reversal of
time means that in the narrator's eyes doctors make happy and healthy patients sick
and miserable through their minstrations.
Odilo's life as Tod Friendly ends with a panicky train ride to New York City,





unfolds, the narrator is 'filled with dread' because he senses that he is getting closer to
Tod's terrible secret; 'I will know the nature of the offence; he thinks to himself,
'already I know this.416 But what he finds in New York is not a revealed secret but a
new life as John Young, a wealthy and important surgeon who carries on innumerable
affairs with his nurses and patients. He continues growing younger, healthier and
ever more attractive, while the earth heals itself from the ravages of time and the
deprivations ofmankind.417 And yet despite his increasing youth and health, the
narrator remains unhappy with Odilo and disconnected from the body in which he
lives. He falls into a sort of slumber, and many years of Odilo's life pass by without
the narrator's awareness. But upon awakening again, the sense of unease and
impending doom on the part of the narrator increases as the narration of the
significant events of Odilo's life quickens in pace. Young leaves America for Europe
in 1948, landing in Portugal, where he lives as a wealthy gold merchant. But soon he
is again travelling, this time uncomfortably and in great haste. First he visits the
Vatican, where he purchases from a Catholic priest his true name: Odilo
Unverdorben. From there his hectic trip continues until, after alternately travelling
and hiding, he arrives at Auschwitz.
Odilo's activities at Auschwitz, and the narrator's interpretation of them,
inaugurate the moment when the novel stops being an imaginative and playful
exercise in a life lived backwards and becomes increasingly disturbing and
controversial. To the narrator's tremendous joy and admiration, Odilo and his fellow
Nazis use all of the shit that is available at Auschwitz—or 'Anus Mundi' as it is called
by the guards—to create a race.418 The narrator, who for the first time in the book





To make a people from the weather. From thunder and from lightening. With gas,
with electricity, with shit, with fire.'419 Corpses are shovelled from the ground or
assembled from ash and air in ovens, taken to the 'Sprinkleroom,' gassed to life, and
then given personal effects—everything from clothes that fit amazingly well to gold
teeth and glasses.420 The gold is generously donated by the doctors and guards
themselves; the narrator is particularly proud that Odilo bestows his own carefully
amassed hoard upon the assembled Jews 421 Finally, the Jews are taken by freight car
to stations where the Nazi guards enact more miracles by parsing together 'familial
unions and arranged marriages' that appear absolutely natural 422 These new units are
then dispersed to ghettoes, where the Jews are allowed to recover from their
experiences before they re-enter German society. This moment of reintegration is a
climactic moment for the narrator: 'this was our mission after all,' he reflects 'to
make Germany whole. To heal her wounds, and make her whole'.423 With the
restored image of a unified pre-war Germany, Odilo and his Nazi brothers bring their
turbulent journey to a triumphant conclusion.
But the novel does not end with the narrator's climactic victory. From this
point, Odilo loses his ability to perform the 'miracles' of creation that he conducted at
Auschwitz. Now his miraculous resurrection of seemingly dead matter brings to life a
series of physically deformed or mentally disturbed individuals. At this point, the
narrator once again announces his renewed separation from Odilo:
Fully alone.
I who have no name and no body -1 have slipped out from under him
and am now scattered above like flakes of ash-blonde human hair. No longer
can I bear with the ruined god, betrayed and beaten by his own magic. Calling








put them back together again. For a while it worked (there was redemption);
and while it worked he and I were one, on the banks of the Vistula. He put us
back together. But of course you shouldn't be doing any of this kind of thing
with human beings. . .The party is over. [. . .] I'll always be here. But he's on
u- 424his own.
The narrator remains in this disappointed and disrupted state for the rest of Odilo's
story. He watches detachedly as Odilo gets married, then gets engaged, courts his
girlfriend, and finally loses her forever with an introduction. He accompanies Odilo
coolly through medical school, on camping trips with youth organizations, and then
through the vicissitudes of childhood. Finally he is with Odilo in the womb, in the
moments before he is 'murdered' through his conception. The only satisfaction he
derives from these pre-Auschwitz years comes from seeing the 'brisk assimilation' of
'his' Jews 'and the others I made' into German society.425 Ultimately Odilo dies a
calm and untroubled death, free from the terrible nightmares that plagued his very
first moments. But it is here, at the moment of Odilo's 'death' that the narrator
experiences the epiphany that gives the novel its title:
When Odilo closes his eyes I see an arrow fly - but wrongly. Point-first. Oh
no, but then . . . We're away once more, over the field. Odilo Unverdorben
and his eager heart. And I within, who came at the wrong time - either too
soon, or after it was all too late.426
These closing lines imply that much like Amy Hide in Other People, Odilo
Unverdorben will be forced to live his life again. But time's arrow will run forward
this time, and the narrator realizes the horror that this point-first narration implies.
In writing such an audaciously experimental novel about a subject as morally
and politically charged as the Holocaust, Amis was aware that he was taking
enormous risks with his readership. As he remarked in an interview:
I felt I was in a forest of taboos throughout writing this book. This is the most
difficult and sensitive subject ever, I think, but I do believe, as a writer, that
424 Amis 156.
425 Amis 163, 171.
426Amis 173.
163
there are no No Entry signs. People say, legitimately in a way, what am I as
an Aryan doing with this subject? But I'm writing not about the Jews, I'm
writing about the perpetrators and they are my brothers, if you like. I feel a
kind of responsibility in my Aryaness for what happened. That is my racial
link with these events, not with the sufferers but with the perpetrators.427
In this interview Amis anticipates a myriad of potential criticisms of the book. One
class of criticism begins from the recognition that he can have had no first hand
experience of the holocaust. After all, he is not Jewish; he never survived a
concentration camp, and he was bom four years after the end of WorldWar II. The
palpable unease that Amis experienced in response to this charge is evident in the
series of interviews, like the one above, which he gave upon the novel's publication.
James Wood captures something of Amis's unease in his observation of the fact that
the novel 'has an afterword which reads like a massing of Jewish friends on his
behalf. Woods believes that this 'massing' reveals that 'Amis is a little nervous,
perhaps a little defensive' about the entire subject.428 But Amis had good reason to
feel trepidation about engaging with such a difficult subject. It is a commonplace
from Theodor Adorno's famous remarks about the relationship between art and
Auschwitz that the Holocaust is an intensely problematic subject for literature. In
David H. Hirsch's words:
The futility of all attempts at representation was encapsulated in Theodor
Adorno's famous dictum (which he later recanted), that it is not possible to
write poetry after Auschwitz. [ . . . ] Basically, Adorno raises the issue that any
literary representation of Nazi atrocities would aestheticize, and thus make
acceptable, the horrors and cruelty.429
The issues Hirsch raises are significant and have had a continuing afterlife in post-war
cultural criticism. We can think about these issues in the following ways. On the one
hand, the Holocaust 'represents' an absolutely inhuman event that seems to go beyond
427 Martin Amis, in an interview with Eleanor Wachtel (1996), reprinted by Nicolas Tredell.
428 James Wood, 'Portrait: The Literary Lip of Ladbroke Grove,' The Guardian Sept. 7, 1991,
Feb. 12, 2007 <http://www.martinamisweb.com/reviews files/Wood LitLip Amis.doc>.
429 David H. Hirsch, The Deconstruction ofLiterature: Criticism after Auschwitz (Hanover,
NH and London: University Press of New England, 1991) 158.
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the limits of empathy or explication. But on the other hand, 'the Holocaust' is one of
the most overdetermined events of modern history: an experience that is continually
relayed and reconfigured by films, books, documentaries and public memorials and
acts of consecration. So diffuse is the implication of the term 'the Holocaust' that it
has come to mean both the physical act of racial extermination and the cultural and
ideological preconditions that produce the event it seeks to memorialize. As Naomi
Mandel observes:
f. . . ] Auschwitz has come to represent the Holocaust for contemporary
imagination. When we say 'Auschwitz' we do not mean the concentration
camp in occupied Poland, or we do not mean merely that; we also refer to the
vast network of bureaucracy, regional and personal politics, personal and
impersonal betrayals and hatreds, German nationalist and racist presumptions
that found expression in National Socialism and a leader in Hitler, the
scapegoat mentality and delusional ideology produced by a centuries-old anti-
Semitism—in short the immense, cumulative, complex, profound, prosaic,
stunning, and disturbingly banal process that produced what is known as the
Holocaust.430
The continuous historical representation of an 'unrepresentable' historical event has
another important consequence for contemporary reflection. Although as Mandel
points out, the experience of the Holocaust is at one level 'unspeakable, unthinkable,
inconceivable, incomprehensible, and challenging', the Holocaust is always already
determined in the public imagination by a specific array of texts and images.431 In
order to be faithful to the 'unrepresentable' experience of the Holocaust the writer of
fiction must somehow rupture or break with the historical 'real'; but in order to be
faithful to the testimonial experience encoded in 'the Holocaust' she must also respect
the authenticating statements of the survivors themselves. The writer must recreate
aspects of the experience of the Holocaust without aestheticizing the experience that it
430 Naomi Mandel, 'Rethinking "After Auschwitz": Against a Rhetoric of the Unspeakable in
Holocaust Writing,' boundary 2 (28:2, 2001) 203-4
431 Mandel 204.
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seeks to reproduce. These demands, and the tensions they engender, are at the heart
of Time's Arrow.
Representations of Holocaust history are also vulnerable to other objections.
The very question of why did the Holocaust 'occur' risks eliding inquiry with
justification, in Andrew S. Gross and Michael J. Hoffman words:
In well-known statements, such figures as Elie Wiesel and Claude Lanzmann
have announced that the mere question of 'why the Holocaust' is somehow
obscene, because it suggests that some justification may actually exist for the
Shoah. A 'why' implies a 'because,' according to this argument, and
'because' suggests the Nazis might have sufficient reasons, or the Jews might
have given them sufficient cause, for creating ghettos and death camps.432
An understanding of these moral complexities is crucial to a reading of Time's Arrow.
So much is apparent from the ostensible subject of Amis's fiction, as the novel is
narrated by the soul or conscience of a Nazi war criminal. The moral recoil provoked
in the reader at the prospect of such a compromised narrator is greatly accentuated by
the novel's inverse narrative logic which colludes with Amis's narrator to produce an
image of an Auschwitz that is progressively cleansed of corruption as its narrative
'unfolds.' In other words, this choice of experimental narrative very obviously runs
the risk of being read as a justification for the Holocaust. How Amis eludes this
problem, and why he chose to take such a risk in the first place, suggests a
relationship between fiction and history that attempts to make possible an
understanding of the apparently inexplicable.
The character of Odilo Unverdorben, Amis's Nazi doctor, is the locus of many
of his displacements of our historical understanding. It is worth noting that Nazi
doctors have always been of particular fascination to historians of the Holocaust, and
Amis credits Robert Jay Lifton's book The Nazi Doctors as the inspiration for Time's
432 Andrew S. Gross and Michael J. Hoffman, 'Memory, Authority, and Identity: Holocaust
Studies in Light of the Wilkomirski Debate,' Biography 27.1 (Winter 2004) 25-26.
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Arrow 433 The very idea of a Nazi doctor is, of course, a moral contradiction in terms.
Time's Arrow sharpens the terms of this contradiction by scrupulously imagining
elements of Unverdorben's ethical imagination. At the beginning of the novel we see
him paying fastidious medical attention to the sick and elderly in America yet in
Auschwitz he is subsequently responsible for the gassing of roomfuls of innocent
victims. As Unverdorben 'ministers' to his 'patients' the reader is gradually exposed
to the character of his macabre 'scientific' experiments:
As to the so-called 'experimental' operations of 'Uncle Pepi' [a character
based on Joseph Mengele]: he had a success rate that approached - and quite
possibly attained - 100 per cent. A shockingly inflamed eyeball at once
rectified by a single injection. Innumerable ovaries and testes seamlessly
grafted into place. Women went out of that lab looking twenty years younger.
[ . . . ] 'Uncle Pepi' never left any scars.434
Odilo illustrates the ultimate paradox that is the Nazi doctor: someone who has sworn
an oath to do no harm becomes not only a mass murderer but a sadistic torturer.435
But this sort of schism in the Nazi doctor represented by Odilo's two apparently
contradictory lives—one as a healer and one as a killer—represents documented
characteristics of the Nazi doctor.
To murder in the name of a perverse idea of 'life' places an enormous strain
upon the ethical subjectivity of the Nazi doctor. In his analysis of this tortured and
torturing figure, Lifton has drawn attention to the psychological 'doubling' and
'psychic numbing' to which he is prone:
'Psychic numbing' is a form of dissociation characterized by the diminished
capacity or inclination to feel, and usually includes separation of thought from
feeling. 'Doubling' carries the dissociative process still further with the
formation of a functional second self, related to but more or less autonomous
from the prior self.436
433 Amis tells James Wood 'When I read Robert Jay Lifton's The Nazi Doctors, I knew that
my subject had arrived.'
434 Amis 143.
435 Amis recounts the Hippocratic Oath on p. 32.
436 Robert J. Lifton and Eric Markusen, The Genocidal Mentality: Nazi Holocaust and Nuclear
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These features of psychological doubling and psychic numbing are evident in Amis's
representation of Odilo Unverdorben. Yet they are not the only reason Unverdorben's
psychological motivations remain opaque. Amis's decision to narrate the novel in
reverse crucially obfuscates our understanding of motivation, causality, and
consequence. But this obfuscation is ultimately intended as a perverse kind of
illumination because it is precisely by reversing the temporal logic of twentieth
century history that the novel seeks to reveal the self-deluding 'Utopian qualities' of
Nazi historical self representations. James Wood has helpfully elucidated some of the
moral complexities of the 'backward world' of Time's Arrow.
There is something wistful, wildly naive about this backward world, in which
Nazis help poor Jews on to their feet and out of the gas chambers into innocent
air. When Amis's benign Nazi looks at his prospering Jews and asks, 'Our
perpetual purpose? To dream a race,' he means the Jews, not the Aryans. [. . .
] By reversing the narrative Amis not only moves us with a vision of what
might have been in some benign world, but hints also at the very moral
delusion of the Nazis. Did not these evil men believe precisely that they were
doing good, dreaming a race, turning back history and time? The Nazis first
attempted to turn the Holocaust into a Utopian narrative, not Amis.437
Amis's disorientating narrative device does more, however, than draw attention to the
perversely 'utopian' quality of Nazi ideology and self representation. Denied the
security of the accepted image of Holocaust history, the reader is forced to make
sense of its atrocious materials in all of their horror and immediacy. As Donald E.
Morse points out:
By so involving the reader Amis insures that far from aestheticizing the
atrocities or providing aesthetic pleasure from the misery and pain of the
victims as Adorno feared, this process renders them part of the reader's
immediate experience since in re-reversing time as read the reader must impel
time forward towards the full banality of its horror, for all the potentialities
437 James Wood, 'Slouching Towards Auschwitz to be Born Again,' The Guardian September
19, 1991, Sept. 192007,
<http://www.martinamisweb.com/reviews_filesAVood_slouchAuschTA91.doc>.
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which become possibilities, only one will be actualized. Thus historical
reality is brought back to consciousness through imagination.438
If Odilo Unverdorben's 'progression' from benevolence to malevolence enacts the
ethical corruption at the heart of the image of the Nazi doctor, he also personifies the
truth of Hannah Arendt's insight into 'the banality of evil.'
Following his crushing disappointment at having to leave the 'great work' at
Auschwitz behind, the narrator belatedly realizes that 'Odilo is, it turns out, innocent,
emotional, popular, and stupid.'439 Now he finds it increasingly difficult to reconcile
his memories of their 'triumphs' at Auschwitz with Odilo's unexceptional pre-war
incarnation:
I've come to the conclusion that Odilo Unverdorben, as a moral being, is
absolutely unexceptional, liable to do what everybody else does, good or bad,
with no limit, once under the cover of numbers. He could never be an
exception; he is dependent on the health of his society, needing the sandy
smiles of Rolf and Rudolph, of Riidiger, of Reinhard.440
The narrator's description of Odilo here bears an uncanny likeness to Arendt's picture
of Eichmann, a connection made more explicit when it is revealed that Odilo was
born in Solingen, 'the birthplace of Adolf Eichmann.'441 Indeed, the narrator's
growing disenchantment with Odilo echoes the opinions of Eichmann's judges at his
war crimes trial in Jerusalem, as Arendt recounts:
the judges did not believe him, because they were too good, and perhaps also
too conscious of the very foundations of the profession, to admit that an
average, 'normal' person, neither feeble-minded nor indoctrinated nor cynical,
could be perfectly incapable of telling right from wrong.442
438 Donald E. Morse, 'Overcoming Time: "The Present of Things Past" in History and
Fiction,' The Fiction ofMartin Amis: A Reader's Guide to Essential Criticism, Ed. Nicolas Tredell
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The perplexity of Eichmann's judges prefigures the question rising to the lips of
Amis's narrator: how can such 'exceptional actions' have been committed by such an
unexceptional personality.
Arendt's remarks about the Eichmann trial also illuminate the key role of
euphemism in Nazi descriptions of concentration camp life. She is particularly
astringent upon Nazi use of Sprachregelung or the 'language rule' that 'meant what in
ordinary language would be a lie.'443 Arendt's account is rich in examples of the
Nazi's use of these innocuous terms to deflect attention from the killing machines at
the heart of concentration camp existence. In a similar vein, the narrator of Time's
Arrow highlights these 'language rules' when he gives what he describes 'revealing
examples of camp argot': 'The main Ovenroom is called Heavenblock,' he tells us,
and, 'its main approach road Heavenstreet. Chamber and Sprinkleroom are known,
most mordantly, as the central hospital.'444 The net effect of this language system
according to Arendt, 'was not to keep these people ignorant of what they were doing,
but to prevent them from equating it with their old "normal" knowledge of murder
and lies.'445 Arendt's conclusion is that Nazis such as Odilo did have a clear
knowledge of what was, in fact, right and wrong; they knew the difference between
good and evil. And yet they were able to separate what they knew from what they
did.
Arendt links the Nazi's manipulation of these bloodless 'language rules' to
their capacity for moral self-deception. As she remarks of Eichmann:
The longer one listened to him, the more obvious it became that his inability to
speak was closely connected with an inability to think, namely to think from
the standpoint of someone else. No communication was possible with him,






safeguards against the words and the presence of others, and hence against
reality as such.446
Arendt's description of Eichmann has an uncanny resemblance to Amis's narrator's
description of Tod Friendly's 'feeling tone' or 'sensing mechanism':
Tod has a sensing mechanism which guides his responses to all identifiable
subspecies. His feeling tone jolts into specialized attitudes and readinesses:
one for Hispanics, one for Asians, one for Arabs, one for Amerindians, one for
blacks, one for Jews. And he has a secondary repertoire of alerted hostility
towards pimps, hookers, junkies, the insane, the clubfooted, the hare-lipped,
the homosexual male, and the very old. f. . . ] The way Tod feels about men,
about women, about children: there is confusion.447
Here the temporal reversal of Amis's narrative pays dividends: far from providing
evidence of Tod's homosexuality, the rather curious conclusion drawn by the narrator
who has yet to encounter the grim history of Nazi concentration camp rule, each of
these 'subspecies' glossed in this list were in fact victims of Nazi barbarity. And yet
Tod Friendly's 'confusions', it should be noted, are not limited to the groups of
people listed here: he is incapable of recognizing alterity in general. As the last line
of the passage suggests, Odilo is confused about everyone. Neil Easterbrook writes
that 'While he [Odilo] has no difficulty recognizing human agency, the essence of
human subjectivity eludes both Tod and the narrator.'448 But while this inability to
recognize 'the other,' as such, helps to explain Odilo's inhuman violence and amoral
sensibility, it leaves open the question of how he was able to return to a relatively
normal life after the end ofWorld War Two.
A common theme of Arendt's and Amis's work is the attempt to think the very
limit of human motivation and action. The terrifying paradox that underpins both
Amis's and Arendt's depiction of particular Nazis is Arendt's famed premise about
446 Arendt 49.
447 Amis 49-50.
448 Neil Easterbrook, '"I know that it is to do with trash and shit, and that it is wrong in time":
Narrative Reversal in Martin Amis's Time's Arrow' The Fiction ofMartin Amis: A Reader's Guide to
Essential Criticism, Ed. Nicolas Tredell (Cambridge: Icon Books, 2000) 137.
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'the banality of evil.' We see shadows of Odilo in the anecdotes that Arendt tells
about Eichmann, such as how he called Lolita 'Quite an unwholesome book.'449 How
can a man sensitive to what is 'wholesome' participate in the horrors of Auschwitz?
Much like Odilo's own narrator, for whom Odilo's thoughts remain a mystery despite
their intimate proximity, Arendt constantly refers to the fact that Eichmann's judges
and the members of the court's audience could not understand Eichmann as they
simply 'did not believe him.' His very being illustrated a disparity between word and
deed, and the more that was revealed about him the less he made sense. The obscurity
of Eichmann, as a subject, is mirrored in the backwards narrative of Odilo
Unverdorben's life. Odilo remains a mystery to his narrator, and yet crucial aspects
of his character are revealed in his memories and dreams. Like Eichmann, Odilo must
remain a mystery, but the way that Amis depicts his relationship to memory and
identity calls into question those aspects of trauma theory that, as Leys warns,
threaten the division between perpetrators and victims.
In many ways Odilo Unverdorben and his narrator represent a text-book case
of a traumatized victim. Odilo is haunted by nightmares, and this haunting has
physical manifestations: for example, at the end of his life, Odilo cannot abide the
sight of himself in a mirror.4''0 The narrator fears for Odilo, who lives in a constant
state of anxiety, stress, and fear of persecution. But the terrible irony of the situation
is that the monstrous and terrifying figure that haunts Odilo's dreams is none other
than Odilo himself. The white medic's coat and the black Nazi boots are Odilo's, and
he is not the victim of trauma but the perpetrator. As such, his apparent haunting is
not the trauma of the victim but 'the guilt and the tyranny of memory.'451 Wood
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knows what has already happened, is not unlike the way in which a guilty man (say a
Nazi war criminal) goes back, again and again, over past crimes. Memory, especially
guilty memory, forces us to live our lives backwards.'452 Here Wood suggests that all
memory is not traumatic memory and that sometimes a man like Odilo is haunted
because he deserves to be haunted. In turn, such a suggestion questions Caruth's
reading of Freud's argument about Tancred and Clorinda. Just because Tancred is
cursed by memories of his murder of Clorinda does not mean that he should be seen
as a victim of trauma. In other words, Amis appears to question those aspects of the
definition of trauma theory that appear to collapse the divide between victim and
perpetrator.
Amis's backwards narration not only defies any definition of trauma that
would appear to make the perpetrator into a victim but also suggests that there is
something fundamentally dangerous about Odilo Unverdorben. Reconsider the
narrator's rejection of Odilo after Auschwitz:
No longer can I bear with the ruined god, betrayed and beaten by his own
magic. Calling on powers best left unsummoned, he took human beings apart
- and then he put them back together again. For a while it worked (there was
redemption); and while it worked he and I were one, on the banks of the
Vistula. He put us back together. But of course you shouldn't be doing any of
this kind of thing with human beings. . .453
Here the narrator admits that the Holocaust is a 'project' that should never have
happened. But the narrator is thinking this only because he is angry and resentful that
the 'magic' had to end. He remains unaware of the real atrocities that occurred and
still thinks of Auschwitz as a site of miracles. Odilo's soul still believes he was the
sort of god that populated the Nazi's racist ideology, 'which led all too many of the
German people to believe they were a superrace and the SS to believe they were
452
Wood, 'Slouching Towards Auschwitz to be Born Again'.
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gods' 454 1° fact' Odilo himself reveals an adherence to Nazi ideology that is almost
superficial. Until the end of his natural days, Odilo continues to read about Atlantis
and Nordic superraces in American tabloids, and, unlike the narrator, he is obviously
an ardent racist and anti-Semite 455 He is a man well-versed in hate. But it is the
narrator who truly understands the grand narrative of the Nazi cause. He understands
the Nazi delusion that they were 'dreaming a race,' and that they are 'making
Germany whole.' Indeed, the narrator who—like many of Amis's narrators—had
seemed to be a moral compass turns out to be as dangerous and untrustworthy as
Odilo himself.456
Neil Easterbrook concludes that much of the ethical force of Time's Arrow lies
in the way in which it helps compel its readers towards reflection on the human
capacity for moral forgetfulness. '[H|owever banal evil may really be,' he suggests,
'the most trivial individual, innocent and aimless, perhaps even like ourselves, may
one day quietly dedicate himself to genocide.'457 Like Morse, Easterbrook claims that
Amis employs the technique of narrative reversal to encourage his reader to engage in
acts of moral self-reflection. Such moral self-reflection goes considerably beyond
critique by asking each of us as readers to put ourselves in the place of the
perpetrators of inhuman violence and callousness. If we take this a step further and
self-consciously reflect upon not only Odilo's monstrous acts but also the narrator's
genuine belief that a man like Odilo could 'dream a race,' then what we have is an
indictment not only of a specific ideology—National Socialism—but also of any
ideology that would disallow empathy and encourage seeing subjects ofhuman life as
454 Hirsch 152-153.
455 Amis 20.
456 All three books by Amis discussed in this thesis have unreliable narrators revealed to be
perpetrators of awful crimes: Prince, the murderer-narrator in Other People, Samson, also a murderer-




objects. Amis detects evidence of this capacity for inhuman objectification in those
places where Odilo's empathy should reside; it is partly, of course, the presumptive
'humanism' of Odilo's soul's declaration that 'the Jews are my children' that allows
Odilo to butcher them.458 This is where Amis's backwards narration succeeds in
giving Time's Arrow its grotesque magnetism. He wants, as Easterbrook suggests, for
us to reflect on what might make people commit such evil deeds. And he also wants
us to follow the maxim 'never forget.' But by inscribing these notions into the fabric
of such a difficult and unconventional narrative, Amis suggests that the Holocaust,
and especially the subject of its perpetrators, is actually resistant to narration, and
especially to the straightforward narration of typical historiography. He also suggests
that maintaining a sense of the uncanny, indefinable, and resolutely evil nature of the
Holocaust should not be sacrificed to the project of remembrance. The excess, the
obscurity, and the monstrousness of the Holocaust must be remembered and re-
invoked along with the facts; otherwise the Holocaust risks becoming just another
historical event.
Perpetrating Victimization: Roth and Sabbath's Theater
The protagonist of Philip Roth's Sabbath's Theater has suggestive affinities with
many of those aspects of trauma theory outlined by Cathy Caruth and Shoshana
Felman. As a boy, Mickey Sabbath's loving family was destroyed by the horrific
death of his older brother, Morty, in World War Two. After this loss, his once happy
and energetic mother descended into a depressive state in which she remained until
her death. The novel focuses on how these traumatic events haunt the adult Sabbath,
affecting every aspect of his life. Throughout the novel, he fantasizes about his
mother, imagining lengthy conversations with her ghost. Sabbath also repetitively
458 Amis 160.
analyzes the historical facts and events surrounding his brother's death. Sabbath
cannot stop thinking about both losses, although these memories are unwilled and
uncontrollable. Sabbath's childhood losses correspond to Caruth's definition of
trauma as 'experienced too soon, too unexpectedly, to be fully known' and 'therefore
not available to consciousness until it imposes itself again, repeatedly, in the
nightmares and repetitive actions of the survivor.459 On one level, Roth seems to have
created in Mickey Sabbath a textbook definition of a victim of trauma.
However, the difficulty with reading Sabbath as a traumatized victim is that
Roth portrays Sabbath to be as much a perpetrator as a victim of trauma. This choice
of characterization reveals a striking contrast between Time's Arrow and Sabbath's
Theater. Whilst Time's Arrow has as its protagonist a Nazi doctor made good through
Amis's backwards narration, Sabbath's Theater presents the reader with a protagonist
who is both a tragic victim and also a particularly offensive human being. In other
words, these two novelists are interested in protagonists that complicate the
definitions of victim and perpetrator, and yet they utilize completely different
narrative strategies to do so. In Time's Arrow, the narrating soul of the murderous
Nazi doctor genuinely wants to do good, but it is the genuinely traumatized Sabbath's
self-stated goal 'to affront and affront and affront till there was no one on earth
unaffronted.'460 The question then becomes why Roth would choose such an
alienating and objectionable protagonist to represent victimization, as Sabbath's
ability 'to affront' is unquestionable.
In order to give a sense of the outrageousness of Sabbath's conduct, a few
textual details are required. The novel begins by introducing Sabbath's married lover
Drenka, a woman with whom, through the course of the novel, he engages in such
459 Caruth 3-4.
460
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'aberrant' sexual behaviours as sodomy, golden showers, and a menage a trois with
another woman. Many of these scenes are reproduced for the reader in lingering
detail, including the contents of a tape that Sabbath mentions he and Drenka enjoy
listening to whilst masturbating. The tape is actually of Sabbath being secretly
recorded by a twenty-year-old college student named Kathy Goolsbee. Because of his
arthritic, deformed fingers, the once great puppeteer Sabbath has had to become a
teacher at the local college, where he spends much of his time trying to seduce his
students. Kathy is his latest conquest with whom he engages in phone sex when she
calls to tell him she will be late with a project. He records their session to add to his
taped collection but is unaware that Kathy also makes a recording that finds its way to
both the college administration as well as a women's rights group. The college
dismisses Sabbath from his position, and the women's rights group makes the tape
available as an example of sexual harassment to anyone who calls an 800 number.461
While this incident makes him a pariah in his town, ends his teaching career, and
causes his alcoholic wife to attempt suicide, Sabbath continues to see himself as the
real victim. It was 'losing those girls that killed him, a dozen of them a year, none
over twenty-one, and always at least one' for him to seduce.462 Despite his sense of
victimization at 'losing those girls,' Sabbath still enjoys calling the 800 number, and
he and Drenka often listen to Kathy's tape from motel telephones. Mickey's
treatment of his lovers as well as his blase attitude towards social norms undercuts his
identity as a victim of trauma.
The fact that Mickey also mistreats his wives further complicates his identity
as a victim of trauma by actually implicating Sabbath in traumatizing acts. He
461 The organization names itself SABBATH—women against Sexual Abuse, Belittlement,
Battering and Telephone Harassment—and even takes the telephone number 1(800)722-2284, or
1(800)SABBATH (214). 800 numbers are toll free in the United States.
462
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dominates his first wife, thinking of her as 'Nikki his instrument, his implement, the
self-immolating register of his ready-made world.'463 Nikki eventually disappears
from home and the horizon of Sabbath's known world, and she is widely assumed to
be a suicide. Despite his guilt at Nikki's disappearance and his fear that his
mistreatment of her contributed to her breakdown, Sabbath still ridicules and torments
his second wife, Roseanna. During an argument in which she accuses him of
intimidating her, he shouts, 'I do everything to intimidate you, Rosie!'464 The most
obvious forms of intimidation involve mocking the language Roseanna has learned at
Alcoholics Anonymous, as well as taunting her with his knowledge that her father
killed himself when she was a child after she had left him to live with her mother. A
particularly unpleasant scene occurs when he visits Roseanna in the hospital after she
learns of his affair with Kathy and attempts suicide. In her room, Sabbath finds a
letter she has written to her father, explaining how his suicide has affected her life.
Sabbath writes a rejoinder from the father in hell in which Roseanna's father accuses
her of ruining his life and portrays her own breakdown as her punishment for
betraying their sacred bond.465 As if to underscore Sabbath's identity as victimizer
rather than victim, his visit to Roseanna culminates in his attempt to bribe a young
recovering alcoholic, whose wrists are only recently healed from her own attempted
suicide, with a quart of vodka for sexual favours.466
Although Sabbath's sexual proclivities and excesses mean that much of his
attention is given to women, he does not reserve his unpleasantness for women alone.
When his friend Norman finally ejects Sabbath from his home —where Sabbath has
been staying after he leaves Roseanna— for finding a pair of his daughter Debbie's
463 Roth. Sabbath's Theater 201.
464 Roth, Sabbath's Theater 95.
465 Roth, Sabbath's Theater 271.
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underpants in Sabbath's coat pocket, Sabbath's rhetorical attempts at exculpation
include a lengthy tirade against the Japanese. This scene is not the first in the novel in
which he abuses the Japanese who shot down his beloved brother Morty inWorld
War; in one scene he reflects 'How come nobody hates Tojo anymore?'467 Besides
the Japanese, Catholics also incite his rage, as well as his fellow Jews: 'Just read the
Bible, it's all there, the backsliding, idolatrous, butchering Jews and the schizophrenia
of these ancient gods.'468 Sabbath also refers to blacks as 'moolies,' and says that he
cannot be a pimp as 'The black guys have the market cornered.'469 With his vivid
pornographic imagination, his contempt for social proprieties, his racism, and his
sexism, Roth appears to have created in Sabbath a character that is as much a
perpetrator of trauma as a victim.
Doubtless because of Sabbath's excesses, some critics were unable to
recognize in Sabbath anything but the perpetrator of traumatic acts. Many critics who
disliked the novel insist upon identifying Mickey Sabbath with Philip Roth, believing
the former to be a fictional representative of the latter's tastes and appetites. A
persistent theme in criticism of the novel is a concern with Roth's—not Sabbath's—
representation of women. In 'Philip Roth Hates Women,' for example, Julia Keller
finds in Roth's portrayal ofDrenka and Roseanna strong support for her assertion that
the author himself has a problem with women. She claims that women in Roth's
novels 'don't seem to exist at all, independent of men. Roth leaves them be. That is,
he leaves them to be meaningless.'470 Other critics question the aesthetic and political
purpose of Sabbath's social and erotic transgressions. Ruth Wisse observes that
although the book is both funny and desperate, its fundamental weakness is that its
467 Roth, Sabbath's Theater 246.
468 Roth, Sabbath's Theater 278.
469 Roth, Sabbath's Theater 354, 160.
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fictional weight "depends on the possibility of outrage. Who is left today to be
outraged? In the America of OJ. Simpson, who can object to Philip Roth?'471 Wisse
warns that 'Kafka's hunger artist is dying to be part of the colourful scene beyond his
cage. Roth's goes on snatching peanuts from a crowd that is still amused enough to
watch him suffer, but whose moral attention he cannot command.'472 But
notwithstanding Wisse's insistence that Americans are too jaded to be outraged,
Michiko Kakutani's review clearly exhibits a sense of moral indignation. She calls
the novel, 'sour instead of manic, nasty instead of funny, lugubrious instead of
liberating.'471 She believes, furthermore that 'the reader is hard pressed to tolerate,
much less sympathize with Sabbath' as he is a 'loathsome narcissist.'474 Indeed, she
wonders at the 'reader who manages to finish this distasteful and disingenuous
book.'475 Kakutani particularly objects to Sabbath's treatment of Roseanna, the fact
that he 'pays tribute to Drenka, the lust of his life, by urinating on her grave', and
those passages where he 'repeatedly denounces the Japanese'.476 Even some
supporters of Roth found Sabbath's racially motivated hatred insupportable. Mark
Shechner writes that he can understand Kakutani's offence at Sabbath's portrayal of
the Japanese
Having lived in Japan and having many Japanese friends, I could have done
without that; it transforms Sabbath from someone who is merely Rabelasian,
devious, lecherous, larcenous, lying, untrustworthy, and desperate—all of
which fall under my umbrella of tolerance—into something a tad more
loathsome than that477
471 Ruth R. Wisse, rev. of Sabbath's Theater, by Philip Roth, Commentary Dec. 1995: 64.
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As these citations demonstrate, many readers not only disliked the novel; they found it
morally reprehensible.
But although several critics reviled Sabbath's Theater in the strongest terms,
others championed the novel on account of its stylistic virtuosity. For Alan Cooper,
the novel is 'filled with passages so beautifully composed, so able to fuse idea with
apt emotion, that one emerges aware of having been in the hands of a master
writer.'478 Echoing this judgement William H. Prichard observes that, 'Mr. Roth's
genius for juxtaposing impressions, feelings and names that usually don't belong
together continually enlivens the narrative. His extraordinarily active style revels in
the play of words'.479 James Wood was one of the novel's most eloquent defenders,
calling the novel, 'extraordinary' and of 'great power' 480 Wood believes the 'women
with whom [Sabbath] engages ... are solidly realized. They are not just clouds of
male desire.'481 He even refutes claims that the sexual acts and attitudes it depicts are
vulgar, arguing instead that the novel's presentation of sex has, 'at least a personal
inflection, and a metaphysical dignity.'482 Developing his theme in more general
terms, Wood acknowledges that 'Sabbath's grossness, his racist rants, will doubtless
provoke the usual imprecations; but it should be clear that the novel's offense is not
political, it is metaphysical. Sabbath's offenses are against life. They have not
worked if they do not disgust.'483 In Wood's reading of Sabbath's Theater, the novel
is clearly meant to offend but not in the way that readers like Keller and Kakutani
suggest. Instead, the disgust the novel provokes in its readers is part of its grand
478 Alan Cooper, 'Roth Celebrates Sabbath: Keeping the Faith in Erotic Redemption' Forward
Sept. 1. 1995, Feb. 2, 2006 www.highbeam.com.
479 William H. Prichard, 'Roth Unbound,' The New York Times on the Web, Sept. 10 1995,
Aug. 8, 2006 www.nvtimes.com.
480 James Wood, rev. of Sabbath's Theater, by Philip Roth, The New Republic Oct. 23, 1995,





scheme: a great assault on life that should not be overshadowed by the 'usual
imprecations' of overly sensitive readers. Wood was not the only reader to greet
Sabbath's Theater in such celebratory terms; the novel won the 1995 National Book
Award. It has also received considerable academic attention, appearing in many
works of literary criticism, anthologies, and academic journals in which the novel is
read very differently—from an exploration of Jewish identity to homage for the
masculine body.484 Sabbath's Theater sharply divided its readership, defining its
position as one of Roth's most controversial novels.
Despite the obviously offensive nature of its protagonist, a reading of
Sabbath's Theater as simply a vulgar and offensive book is undermined by the epic
proportions of Mickey Sabbath's grief. As one astute critic writes, 'Sabbath's
Theater is a book about loss. It's about how people are deformed by early traumas,
and how they deform themselves in an attempt to heal those early wounds.' The
first loss to leave an indelible mark on Sabbath's character is the death of his older
brother, Morty. After Drenka, Morty is one of the first characters introduced to the
reader, and the aching nostalgia of his description stands in sharp contrast to the
contrapuntal narrative of Sabbath's and Drenka's sexual mischief. The detail with
which Morty is described hints at an altogether different aspect of Sabbath's character
than his public persona of Sadean satyr:
Morty had bad skin and wasn't particularly handsome, he wasn't great in
school—a B-C student in everything but shop and gym—he had never had
much success with girls, and yet everybody knew that with his physical
strength and his strong character he would be able to take care of himself,
whatever difficulties life presented. He played clarinet in a dance band in high
school. He was a track star. A terrific swimmer. He helped his father with
484 Ranen Omer-Sherman writes about the themes of madness and identity in the novel,
specifically Jewish and American identities. Debra Shostak writes about the body, specifically the
male, Jewish, and dying body. Finally Frank Kelleter writes about Sabbath's Theater and 'Death,
Ideology, and the Erotic.'
485 Daniel Schifrin, 'The Louse That Roth Built.' The Jewish Week. Nov. 10, 1995.
www.highbeam.com. Feb. 2, 2006.
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the business. He helped his mother in the house. He was great with his hand,
but then, they all were: the delicacy of his powerful father candling the eggs,
the fastidious dexterity of his mother ordering the house—the Sabbath digital
artfulness that Mickey, too, would one day exhibit to the world. All their
freedom was in their hands. Morty could repair plumbing, electrical
appliances, anything. Give it to Morty, his mother used to say, Morty'11 fix it.
And she did not exaggerate when she said that he was the kindest older brother
in the world.486
This passage begins with a series of common enough observations regarding Morty's
skin and his comportment. These anecdotes are then steadily developed, fleshing out
Morty's character. We learn of his prowess at track, the dutiful help he gave his
mother and father, and the fact that he was a great swimmer. And then Mickey is
overwhelmed by waves of memories concerning that special physical dexterity that
bound together the Sabbath family: his father candling eggs, his mother's
housekeeping, his own puppetry and Morty's own symbolic capacity for repairing
things. And then the wave retreats, leaving the wistful nostalgia of his mother's belief
that Morty can fix everything, and the sad assurance that he really had been the best
older brother a boy could have. This overpowering nostalgia and sense of loss is then
followed without a moment's hesitation by the rest ofMorty's story: 'He enlisted in
the Army Air Corps at eighteen, a kid just out of Asbury High, rather than wait to be
drafted. He went in at eighteen and he was dead at twenty. Shot down over the
Philippines December 12, 1944.'487 Mickey's anecdotes about his family are more
than the meanderings of an elderly mind. In an essay about the obituaries in the New
York Times for the victims of the terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers, Nancy K.
Miller describes the power of the anecdotes given about the victims by friends and
family:
Like the snapshot, the anecdote, through the brevity of its narrative, catches
life in its everyday dimensions. In this particular context, moreover, again like
486 Roth, Sabbath's Theater 15.
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the snapshot, the anecdote's appeal resides in its ability to carry both life and
death, present and past. What once was but recalled to memory somehow still
A.488
Roth's anecdotal portrayal of Morty is an indication of how Sabbath's thoughts are
dominated by the half-life of his brother in his memories. Although he feels Morty's
loss every day of his life, Mickey still constantly addresses him and thinks about him
as if, using Miller's term, he 'still is'. Morty haunts Sabbath; he lives in Sabbath's
memory throughout the novel even as the reader is told of his death before the end of
the first short chapter.
Morty's death precipitates the loss of another of Sabbath's loved ones—his
gentle mother. We are introduced to her by way of 'Drenka's uberous breasts,' the
suckling of which causes Sabbath to be pierced 'by the sharpest of longings for his
late little mother.'489 Despite the circumstances of her introduction, the description of
Sabbath's mother is of a conventionally virtuous home maker. We are told of 'the
alacrity with which she had prepared each spring for Passover,' and of how she
'darted to and fro' performing her chores, all the while 'trilling and twittering a series
of notes as liquidly bright as a cardinal's song'.490 Mickey's childhood memories of
his mother always involve activity. She was ceaselessly, 'Folding things,
straightening things, arranging things, stacking things, packing things, sorting things,
opening things, separating things, bundling things—her agile fingers never stopped
nor did the whistling ever cease'.491 All of this activity is appreciated by her loving
sons and husband, who 'proudly proclaimed to his customers that his wife had eyes in
the back of her head and two pairs of hands.'492 But the personality of his mother
488 Nancy K. Miller, '"Portraits of Grief': Telling Details and the Testimony of Trauma',
differences: A Journal ofFeminist Cultural Studies 14:3, 115.
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changes radically with the death of her eldest son: 'For nearly a year Sabbath's
mother wouldn't get out of bed. Couldn't. Never again was she spoken of as a
woman with eyes in the back of her head.'493 First her behaviour towards her home
changes: no more baking, no more cleaning, no more whistling. And then she begins
to go to the beach to talk to Morty, and then she begins to talk to Morty everywhere,
and 'as the decades passed, she talked to him more rather than less'.494 Eventually,
she ceases to recognize her younger son, dying in her nineties in a nursing home, still
engrossed in her life long conversation with long dead Morty.
The third posthumous character to be introduced is Sabbath's first wife, Nikki,
an actress of great beauty and questionable mental stability who mysteriously
disappears while he is, of course, having sex with another woman. It is the sheer
enigma of Nikki's disappearance that causes Sabbath the most pain. Although he tells
his friend that he stopped reading the papers when he 'found that every day there was
another story about the miracle of Japan', Sabbath actually cannot abide newspapers
because he is condemned obsessively to search in their pages for news of Nikki's
whereabouts 495 He cannot escape the memory of her disappearance; the fact that she
simply ceased to be haunts his every waking thought: 'If there wasn't a body to bury
physically, he could not bury her mentally. Although since moving to Madamaska
falls he'd never told anybody, even Drenka, about the wife who disappeared, the fact
was that Nikki wouldn't die until he did.'496 Sabbath's sense of guilt at his first wife's
disappearance is a palpable fact. Despite the fact that the reader is well aware that he
could not have committed the crime, Sabbath repeatedly tells others that he murdered
Nikki, even explaining how he disposed of the body and why he was able to escape
493 Roth, Sabbath's Theater 15.
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detection.497 Nikki's disappearance has had a powerful effect on Sabbath's life, for
her disappearance epitomises his general sense of bereavement. Remembering his
mother's grief, Sabbath thinks, '[ajll her life she waited not only forMorty but for the
explanation from Morty: why?'498 The insupportable knowledge that he will never
really know what happened to Nikki, that someone can simply vanish, corresponds to
his mother's desire to know why Morty had to die. Indeed, his mother's questions
haunt Sabbath, 'Why? Why? If only someone will explain to us why, maybe we
could accept it. Why did you die? Where did you go?'499 Nikki's disappearance,
because of its mystery, represents the stark enigma of death for Sabbath.
The final character to be presented to us on the first page of the novel, only to
die by the final page of the last chapter, is Drenka herself. After Sabbath's lifetime of
loss, it is Drenka's death that precipitates the breakdown that Sabbath's Theater
records. Despite Drenka's respectable appearance as the village innkeeper's
hardworking and efficient wife, she lives a secret life: 'Inside this woman was
someone who thought like a man. And the man she thought like was Sabbath. She
was, as she put it, his sidekicker.'500 Sabbath prides himself as being her 'most
patient of instructors,' indoctrinating her into a life of sexual lasciviousness, but it
remains unclear how much he really moulds her.501 He is certainly her most
consistent lover, but she seems to have never had any trouble, either before or since
meeting him, in finding other men with whom to entertain herself.502 The sexual
compatibility of Sabbath and Drenka is clear and explicitly described, but there is
more to their relationship than a mutual physical voracity. The vocabulary with
497 Roth, Sabbath's Theater 242-243.
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which Sabbath describes Drenka reveals his admiration for her character and
temperament: he refers to her as a "warrior" who could 'do anything,' even 'challenge
his audacity with hers.'503 Meanwhile Drenka sees Sabbath not only as a lover but as
her connection to America, a role that he embraces. At the motels where they meet to
make love, he sings while they dance to recordings of the jazz artists Morty
introduced him to as a child.504 Mickey also teaches her Morty's opinions about
various artists and songs that Mickey still remembers in obsessive detail.505 In these
and other ways, Mickey narrates for Drenka his own American childhood.506 And so
the double outsider, the artist and the Jew Mickey Sabbath, becomes, for Drenka, the
embodiment of America. As she lies dying of cancer, she tells him, 'Then to be able
to dance with you and hear you sing the music. I suddenly step that close to it. To
America. I was dancing with America.'507 The love that Sabbath has for Drenka is
palpable in his descriptions of her, and yet this sexual and spiritual partner, the first
woman that he has ever met who challenges him and maintains his interest, is another
character dead at the end of the first chapter.
Trauma is Sabbath's Theater's leitmotif, and the novel appears at times to be a
catalogue of characters mutilated by fear, grief, and loss. Roseanna is haunted by her
father's suicides as well as the terrible letter in which he blames her for his own
actions. Nikki's childhood was dominated by the dissolution of her parents' marriage
which resulted in her being overprotected by her mother upon whom she was far too
dependent. When her mother dies suddenly in her forties, Nikki is shattered and
unable to recover. Roseanna, Nikki, and Sabbath himself are also all characters who
sublimate their emotions into self-destructive behaviour. Nikki quite literally
503 Roth, Sabbath's Theater 65.
504 Roth, Sabbath's Theater 226-227.
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disappears, Roseanna attempts to disappear into a bottle, and Sabbath tries to forget
himself in his sexual exploits with women. The irony is that Sabbath seems to
remember his mother and brother most when he is with Drenka. And yet Sabbath
repeatedly rejects any connection between behaviour and personal history. He insists
on seeing himself as an absolutely sovereign subject, whose path in life has been
unaffected by his own personal traumas. Confronted with Roseanna's Alcoholics
Anonymous maxim, 'You're as sick as your secrets,' Sabbath erupts, "'Wrong [. . .]
you're as adventurous as your secrets, as abhorrent as your secrets, as lonely as your
secrets, as alluring as your secrets, as courageous as your secrets, as vacuous as your
secrets, as lost as your secrets, you are as human as—",'50x Sabbath rejects the idea
that he or anyone else is not exactly what they make of themselves. Near the
beginning of the novel, the narrator begins to wonder what would have happened had
Morty survived the war but stops, thinking 'No, Sabbath could only have wound up
Sabbath, begging for what he was begging, bound to what he was bound, saying what
he did not wish to stop himself from saying.'509 But despite such protestations, it is
clear that Sabbath's own life has been to a considerable extent determined by Morty's
death. IfMorty had lived, Mickey's family life would not have deteriorated, and he
would not have needed to escape by joining the Merchant Marines. Without being a
Merchant Marine, he would probably never have discovered puppetry; without
puppetry, he may never have met Nikki; without Nikki he may never have left New
York to escape her ghost, and so on.510 Although Sabbath vociferously claims to have
lived an independent life of his own making, Roth undermines this assertion by
making the reader aware of how many of Sabbath's 'choices' were actually instances
508 Roth, Sabbath's Theater 88.
509 Roth, Sabbath's Theater 31.
510 See p. 81, for Sabbath's 'Romance Run' see p. 153, for his time in Rome see 233-235, and
for his puppetry, see 122-124.
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of Mickey attempting to escape painful realities . In other words, Roth explicitly
creates in Sabbath a subject defined, in many ways, by his traumatic history.
In Sabbath's Theater, Roth's representation of trauma both illustrates and
undermines a number of modern ideas about the ways in which trauma functions in
the life of the individual victim. On the one hand, Mickey is clearly a traumatized
subject. The repetitive and obsessive way he thinks about his brother's death and his
sense of being haunted by his mother's ghost have a clear coincidence with
contemporary theoretical reflection upon traumatic subjectivity. That Mickey does
not understand his trauma is indicated by his constant surprise at his own depth of
emotion as well as the fact that he cannot tell for himself whether his dramatic real-
life performances are genuine or not. And yet Mickey sees himself as anything but a
subjectivity defined by victimization or loss. In fact, Mickey claims to embrace the
chaos that underlies existence. He attempts to define himself in Sadean terms as a
devotee of 'the satanic side of sex'. His sensibility also has a Nietzschean tinge, and
he is working on a 'five-minute puppet adaptation of the hopelessly insane
Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil.'511 Indeed, he embraces the Nietzschean role of
Dionysus, which Raymond Geuss describes as, 'the drive towards the transgression of
512
limits, the dissolution of boundaries, the destruction of individuality, and excess.'
Mickey believes that gesturing towards nihilism symbolizes his independent and
anarchic spirit, forgetting that the role of Dionysian or Sadean anti-hero is also
entirely scripted. In the scene in which Norman confronts Sabbath over his
daughter's stolen underpants, Sabbath declares, 'I am flowing swiftly along the curbs
of life, I am merely debris, in possession of nothing to interfere with an objective
511
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reading of the shit.'513 This pronouncement reveals the fundamentally paradoxical
nature of his self-conception and self-representation. On the one hand, he claims that
he has actively embraced a view of life that allows him to understand objectively 'the
shit' that makes up everyday existence. This image enables him to portray himself as
active and fully in control of his existence: he flows through life by removing any
obstructions that might slow him down. On the other hand, Sabbath also identifies
himself as debris caught in a stream that runs outside of his control. Sabbath is
attempting to define his own desire to live as a Dionysean or Sadean phallic anti-hero
against Norman's self-consciously 'normal' existence. But even Mickey's most
outrageous assertions reveal a grain of insecurity about his ability to create and
control his own destiny in a world he recognizes as both hostile and capricious.
Mickey's divided nature and contradictory understanding of his own existence
alerts us to a fascinating and under-explored aspect of the novel: the fact that
divisiveness is actually the structure of the novel. For every thought Mickey thinks,
there is a counter-thought offered; for every action, a counter-action. For every
moment of outlandish, predatory, or destructive behaviour on Sabbath's part, there is
a moment of compassion, honesty, or insight. And meanwhile Mickey remains a
mystery, especially to himself. For example, before he attempts to bribe the young
woman at Roseanna's clinic with alcohol for sex, Mickey's thoughts paradoxically
reveal his respect for her as well as providing a generous insight into the nature of her
condition: 'Her laugh was very sly now, a delightful surprise. A delightful person,
suffused by a light soulfulness that wasn't at all juvenile, however juvenile she
happened to look. An adventurous mind with an intuitive treasure that her suffering
513
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hadn't shut down'.514 Comparing such insights with his audacious behaviour suggests
that Mickey is not wicked or good; instead he is simultaneously wicked and good.
Everything Sabbath says or does is both endorsed and undermined. He is a sexual and
moral terrorist, but also a version of Socrates; both a hopelessly cliched libertine and a
self-questioning thinker whose very existence forces others to confront their own
assumptions. The point of the novel, it gradually emerges, is not to arrive at the
'right' conclusion about it or its view of the world; the point is to submit yourself to
this rigorous course of self-testing that we see enacted before us in the character of
Mickey Sabbath. The rigorously bifurcated structure of the novel—in which
everything that Mickey stands for is refuted and everything that he ridicules is later
defended—is therefore crucial to Roth's embodiment and projection of Sabbath's own
divided and self-questioning nature.
The irony of this situation is that even as the novel's structure undermines any
transparently moralistic interpretations, its protagonist seems to demand the reader's
moral judgment. That is, Roth forcibly confronts us with certain elements that seem
to require either censure or approval. On the one hand, the reader is confronted with
Mickey's poetic nostalgia as well as his intense love for Drenka and his family. On
the other hand, one cannot help but feel adverse to Mickey's racism and cringe at
some of his more outrageous sexual antics. Indeed, the novel makes the reader want
to sympathize or judge; to either venerate Mickey or to stand above him in contempt.
The structure of the book, however, ironically undermines either of these two
affective stances. After all, the full spectrum of Mickey's outrageous actions and
opinions cannot be fully embraced. And yet, simply to judge him is to sanction a
moralizing attitude that renounces both empathy and forgiveness, a position that Roth
514
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depicts in characters such as Lucy Nelson as a formula for misery.515 What makes
Mickey's divided and divisive nature of interest to this thesis is his affinity for some
aspects of trauma theory, combined with those aspects of his character that seem to
disallow any identification of Sabbath as a victim. The divisive method that Roth
uses to portray Sabbath as well as Sabbath's relationship to trauma as a theory both
upholds as well as undermines the traditional definitions of trauma, but to what
purpose?
One of the main elements of trauma theory that Sabbath Theater calls into
question is the notion that mourning allows trauma to be 'worked through'. Jonathan
Boulter writes:
Trauma, as Freud indicates, is a complex, doubly-inflected condition: it is both
event/cause and reaction/effect. Trauma, in other words, must involve some
kind of reaction to the event. In my reading of trauma, this reaction/effect is
what I will here call the work ofmourning. In Freudian terms, this reaction is
the effort to work through the shock (usually by putting the event into
narrative form) in order to work back, to return, as it were nostalgically, to the
originary scene of trauma. Working through, as a process of mourning, is
predicated on collapsing the curious temporality of trauma—which places the
subject essentially in two 'times'—and reintegrating the subject.516
In Boulter's view, the subject splits at the moment of the traumatic events. Part of the
subject remains trapped in the moment of trauma, while another part of the subject
appears to move forward in time. The purpose of mourning, then, is to help the
subject retell his or her story in order to return the subject back to the originary
moment of traumatic schism. In other words, trauma transforms itself through
mourning because narrative extends the possibility of nostalgia and a retrospective
working through of the original traumatic experience. Thus, Boulter depicts
515
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mourning as the process through 'which loss is overcome.'517 Sabbath, in one sense,
can be interpreted as corresponding to Boulter's theory of mourning. As a subject he
is utterly split between two 'times' so that he cannot help but think of his mother even
whilst entertaining himself with Drenka's breasts. Sabbath also lives nostalgically.
He lives for his memories, re-narrating them over and over in his own head, and for
anyone else that will listen. And so, dancing with Drenka in the motel he repeats to
her Morty's words while they move to Morty's music. Yet this process of seemingly
perpetual mourning that Sabbath enacts every day has clearly brought him no closer
to 'reintegrating' himself as a subject. Sabbath's almost incessant mourning has not
brought him peace.
Instead, Sabbath's mourning, nostalgia, and repetitive narration of his losses
have become a type of traumatic onanism rather than a way to 'work through' the
damage done to him as a subject. Sabbath resists 'reintegration' as defined by Boulter
and, instead, reflects Dominic Rainsford's warning that 'for the testifier, his or her
trauma may constitute the world.'518 Indeed, Sabbath's Theater often seems to be
precisely this: the stage upon which Sabbath reconstitutes his trauma in compulsive
detail. Mickey Sabbath is obsessed not only with the traumatic facts of his life but
also with circulating the facts of that life by telling stories to anyone willing to listen
to them. In fact, he goes so far as to narrate events and memories that other people
would want to ignore or deny. One could argue that such repetitive narration is
Sabbath's attempt to 'work through' his trauma; that he wants to find the story that
will finally account for his losses. In this reading of the novel, Sabbath's attempts to
turn his life into a narrative and transform it through art and through story would
allow him to bring his world into emotional coherence. He responds to his trauma not
517 Boulter 336.
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just by attempting to lose himself in continual sexual activity but also by obsessively
telling his own story to himself and to others. And yet these narratives fail in that
they do not offer him the chance to understand the past nor gain a measure of control
over his relentless grief.
There exists a clear connection trauma and narrative in the novel, but not
simply in the therapeutic sense that Boulter suggests. Rather than a way of
overcoming his grief and loss, Mickey's desire to tell stories seems to spring as much
from an artistic impulse to create as from any kind of therapeutic urge. Storytelling is
an important trope within the novel, and even Sabbath, the great storyteller and
puppet master, is surprised at how other people envision their own lives. Thus when
Sabbath comes across Roseanna's letter to her father and the accompanying
therapeutic journal in which she is supposed to record her thoughts on the underlying
causes of her illness, Sabbath is surprised to find nothing at all about him. He thinks
to himself, 'He had his story; this was Roseanna's, the official in-the-beginning story,
when and where the betrayal that is life was launched.'519 In his narrative of their life
together, he is to blame for Roseanna's problems, as he informs her friends at the
clinic when he introduces himself: 'I am Mickey Sabbath. Everything you have heard
about me is true. Everything is destroyed and I destroyed it.'520 Imagine his surprise
when he realizes that, in Roseanna's narration of her life, everything began and ended
with the suicide of her overbearing father. In Sabbath's Theater, Roth implies that the
story a person chooses to represent his life is just that: one choice amongst many
possibilities. As Schifrin perceptively remarks, the novel, 'on top of everything, is
also a meditation on the irrelevancy of narrative. Sabbath believes, as much as he
519 Roth, Sabbath's Theater 263.
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believes in anything, that there is no one story to a human life.'521 1° my reading of
Sabbath, Schifrin's claim that 'there is no one story to a human life' suggests a
possible motivation for Sabbath's erratic behaviour. Sabbath is, after all, a puppet
master, famous for using his own once dexterous hands as his puppets.522 If Sabbath
can conceive of his own hands as puppets, what is to stop him from using his whole
body as a puppet and his own life as a stage in which he enacts various ways of
being? After all, Sabbath loves to treat the world as a set of props for his various
dramatic and philosophical performances. Even the contents of the breakfast prepared
for him by Norman, which includes eight jars of exotic preserves, inspires a riff on the
meaninglessness of bourgeois comforts.
The idea that Sabbath uses his own life to enact a perpetual performance is
supported by one of the climactic scenes of the novel in which a passer-by, assuming
Sabbath's dishevelled appearance means that he is a beggar, throws money into his
coffee cup. As a result, Sabbath is inspired to become an impromptu street performer,
reciting King Lear on the New York subway. But even this spontaneous act of
performance is imbricated with Sabbath's memories, and it is difficult to determine
whether the emotions invoked by King Lear inspire these memories or whether
Sabbath is using his own memories to inspire his performance of King Lear. First he
remembers everything about the affair with Kathy and all of the fallout from this
affair. During this lengthy portrayal of performance and memory, Sabbath acts out
Lear's rage even as he is filled with rage at Kathy and his former employers. When
his memories give way to the narration of his experiences whilst visiting Roseanna in
the hospital after her breakdown, he is simultaneously performing Lear's own turn to
madness. And when the novel depicts Sabbath reciting Lear's final scenes with
521 Shchifrin.
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Cordelia, the grief of this scene reflects Sabbath's enduring his own memories of
Nikki's disappearance, as well as the deaths of Drenka, his mother, and finally Morty.
This important scene depicts Mickey as performing the story of his own life through
his performance of King Lear. And yet whether or not his own life is an inspiration
for his performance or the play inspires his memories of his life is ambiguous. In fact,
Sabbath here appears to use his traumatic history as much to his own advantage as he
is influenced or determined by the affects of that trauma. The darker implications of
this are revealed when Mickey, while reading Roseanna's journal, thinks, 'What a
bother we are to one another—while actually nonexistent to one another'.524 This
statement reveals Mickey's surprise that Roseanna uses her father, and not Mickey, as
the centrepiece of the backstory for her performance of the character Roseanna. The
chilling subtext of this reading is that Mickey sees everyone—including his 'beloved'
family—as props in Sabbath's theatre.
Indeed, Sabbath's Theater seems, albeit inadvertently, to echo Ruth Leys's
misgivings about contemporary trauma theory. Sabbath had read in Roseanna's
journal hints that her father forced himself on her sexually, to which Madeline—the
girl he tries to bribe with vodka—responds, 'They all say that. The simplest story
about yourself that explains everything—it's the house speciality. These people read
more complicated stories in the newspaper every day, and then they're handed this
version of their lives. [. . .] The answer to every question is either Prozac or incest.'525
In other words, all that the hospital is interested in is 'curing' trauma either by
medicating the subject or giving them a false narrative of blame and forgiveness with
which to 'work through' their pain. But in Madeline's view, this false narrative is
entirely unnecessary: 'there's something about your wife that, in its own way, has a
524 Roth, Sabbath's Theater 263.
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certain heroism. The way she stood up to an excruciating detox. There's a kind of
deliberateness to her that I sure don't have: running around here collecting the shards
of her past, struggling with her father's letters [. . .] she did suffer a great blow and [. .
.] she earned her pain, that's all. She came by her pain honestly.'526 Madeline
suggests that the pain of trauma and the damage that trauma does should not be made
'easy', should not be simplified, by the kind of narratives or pharmaceuticals that the
clinic dispenses. Rather, it is the struggle that Roseanna embarks upon, the terrible
ordeal that is dealing with her father's letters and his terrible recriminations, that
makes her not only heroic but worthy of her pain.
For all of its complexity and interpretative richness, it is difficult to deny that
Sabbath's Theater is a novel hollowed out by trauma and continually preoccupied
with attempts to fashion a life out of the pain of traumatic experience. Sabbath's
confusion over his own existence is revealed when he passes out after being
confronted by Norman, who presents Sabbath not only with Debbie's underpants but
also with the cup Sabbath used to collect money from his street performance:
The fainting was a little like the begging, however, neither wholly rooted in
necessity nor entirely entertaining. At the thought of all that the cup had
destroyed, two broad black strokes did indeed crisscross his mind from one
edge of the canvas to the other—yet there was also in him the wish to faint.
There was craft in Sabbath's passing out. The tyranny of fainting did not
escape him. That was the last observation integrated into his cynicism before
he hit the floor.527
What any reading of Sabbath should disclose is that frequently even Sabbath does not
understand the reasons for his actions and attitudes. That he is the victim of traumatic
experience is undeniable, yet the precise effect that this experience has had upon him
remains unknown and unknowable. Trauma, in this novel, is depicted as resistant to
understanding or 'working through'. Even for Roseanna, who is eager to be given a
526
Roth, Sabbath's Theater 288.
527
Roth, Sabbath's Theater 349.
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single cohesive story that defines what happened to her and how it has affected her,
the real story of her life is both less complicated and more difficult than the one
fashioned for her by others.
While driving to Norman's, Sabbath talks to the ghost of his mother,
'recounting to her what had happened before this had happened.'528 He warns her
that, '[tjhat's all you could know, though if what you think happened happens to not
ever match up with what somebody else thinks happened, how could you say you
know even that? Everybody got everything wrong.'529 This theme of getting life
wrong will be played out to even greater effect in Roth's following novel, American
Pastoral, in which the narrator Zuckerman claims that 'The fact remains that getting
people right is not what living is all about anyway. It's getting them wrong that is
living'.530 Mickey Sabbath is someone whom the reader must 'get wrong': there is no
'right' way to read a character so complex and contradictory in his thoughts and
actions. In this sense, the existence of a character like Sabbath appears to contradict
Caruth's assertions that trauma could, and should, be appropriated by others. Leys
says of Caruth:
[. . .] I am unsympathetic to the way in which she tends to dilute and
generalize the notion of trauma: in her account the experience (or
nonexperience) of trauma is characterized as something that can be shared by
victims and nonvictims alike, and the unbearable sufferings of the survivor as
a pathos that can and must be appropriated by others.531
In Sabbath's Theater, the reader is confronted with a densely populated portrait of
Mickey's grief and suffering. The reader is constantly teased with images and
suggestions that imply that he or she is close to really understanding Mickey Sabbath.
And yet every time the reader is confronted with such an image or suggestion, Mickey
528 Roth, Sabbath's Theater 109.
529 Roth, Sabbath's Theater 109.
530 Roth, American Pastoral (London; Vintage, 1998) 35.
331 Leys 305.
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commits an outrage that eradicates any understanding or sympathy for him as a
traumatized victim. Like Leys, Roth suggests that no matter how much we want to
understand or empathise with victims of trauma, we cannot ever really appreciate, let
alone appropriate, their suffering. Even, however, if we know we are doomed
constantly to 'get people wrong', it may well be the case, as Nathan Zuckerman
believes, that 'It's getting them wrong that is living'532 Indeed, the novel suggests
that one ofMickey's great faults is that he is so determined to live a certain life that
he often cannot see other people's choices as anything but stupid or self-indulgent.
Indeed, the times that Mickey seems the most likeable, the most humane, are those
rare moments when he is as willing to listen as he is to talk: when he listens to
Madeline disagree with him about Roseanna or listens to Norman's opinions about
Mickey's life or listens to the voices of his dead. In the end, Sabbath's Theater
suggests that the only way we are to be less hopelessly wrong about ourselves and the
lives of others is simply to listen to other people. Their stories may not bring us truth
or happiness, but at least we might feel less alone.
Conclusion
In Sabbath's Theater and Time's Arrow, Roth and Amis explore the potential
as well as the problems of narrating testimony, trauma and history. Sabbath's Theater
problematizes any clear identification of Mickey as a traumatized subject by making
him as much a perpetrator of trauma as a victim. Similarly, Time's Arrow focuses on
a subject traumatized not because he is a victim of violence but because he was
involved in executing one of the greatest crimes in history. Both writers suggest that
trauma is far more complicated than its current popular usage would suggest, while at
the same time their obvious fascination with the subject suggests its importance. One
532 Roth, American Pastoral, 35.
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aspect of trauma theory with which they seem most intrigued is how traumatic
experience collides with the subject's formation of identity. Is the subject created by
trauma or does, as the case of Mickey Sabbath suggest, the traumatized subject enact
his or her trauma on his or her own terms? These questions are clearly related to my
final chapter's exploration of how themes and theories regarding masculinity and the
masculine subject dominate Roth's and Amis's artistic vision. Instead of reiterating
oft-used feminist critiques of Roth and Amis, I have decided to approach their work
using masculinity theory, as I will explain in more detail. My next, and last, chapter
will introduce some of the most important elements of masculinity theory, as well as
distinguish some of the problems or possible limitations of masculinity theory as
discussed by those critical of certain aspects of masculinity studies, especially in the
common discourse that masculinity is somehow 'in crisis.' I will then turn to two of
the most controversial novels by Amis and Roth, London Fields and Portnoy 's
Complaint, to examine how they treat the masculine subject as well as the subject of
masculinity. It is here, where Roth and Amis take on the gender that they are so often
accused of championing at the expense of femininity, that they prove to be anything
but misogynists. For their criticisms of masculinity, and especially of the formation
of the masculine subject, are far more aggressive, damning and cynical than anything
they have ever written about women.
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Chapter Four
Bless me with manhood! Make me brave! Make me strong! Make me whole]
-Philip Roth, Portnoy's Complaint (1967)
Men were so simple. But what did that do to the thoughts of women, to the
thoughts of women like Nicola Six?
-Martin Amis, London Fields (1989; 1991)
Masculinity [. . .] does not exist in isolation from femininity - it will always be
an expression of the current image that men have of themselves in relation to
women.
-Arthur Brittan, 'Masculinities and Masculinism' (2001)
Rather like trauma theory, the study ofmen and masculinity has become a
subject of increasing academic interest in recent years. One critic, playfully
acknowledging the growth of masculinity studies, has called the field 'Academic
Viagra'.533 Writing in 2001, another critic cites the fact that in the past decade alone
there have been 'over 500 books published, the introduction of two specialist journals,
and a proliferation of websites all providing a particular slant on the condition of men
at the turn of the millennium' as key evidence to support the claim that '[djuring the
last two decades research into men and masculinities has emerged as one of the
growth areas of sociological inquiry.'534 Although, as Stephen Whitehead and Frank
Barrett assert in their reader on masculinity, the study ofmasculinity is a key
constituent of modern sociological thought, its import is not restricted to the field of
sociology. A glance at some important recent titles in literary studies like Posting the
Male: Masculinities in Post-war and Contemporary British Literature (2003) and
Wounded Hearts: Masculinity, Law, and Literature in American Culture (2006)
suggests that the subject (and the problem) of masculinity has a genuinely
533 Bryce Traister, 'Academic Viagra: the Rise of American Masculinity Studies,' American
Quarterly 52.2 (2000): 274.
534 Stephen M. Whitehead and Frank J. Barrett, 'The Sociology of Masculinity,' The
Masculinities Reader, ed. Stephen M. Whitehead and Frank J. Barrett (2001; Cambridge: Polity Press,
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interdisciplinary status. In this chapter, I will present a brief summary of the history
of masculinity studies that highlights moments of important coincidence between this
emerging discipline and modem literary studies. This summary will also seek to
establish genealogical aspects of the "crisis in masculinity" that resonates within
contemporary cultural debate. It will then explore aspects of both this crisis and the
wider debate that it has engendered, in the fiction of Martin Amis and Philip Roth.
The choice of the work of Roth and Amis for this purpose might appear both
provocative and counter-intuitive given that both these writers have been accused of
adumbrating sexist and misogynistic attitudes throughout their literary careers. But as
a careful reading of continuingly controversial novels like Portnoy's Complaint and
London Fields will show, these texts contain subtle and rebarbative critiques of the
implicit violence of aspects of the normative constitution of masculine subjectivity, as
well as the unequal power relationship such subjectivity demands between modern
men and women.
Masculinity Studies: An Overview
The emergence ofmasculinity studies is inextricably bound up with the rise of
modem feminism and contemporary women's studies. As observed by critics, 'The
upheaval in sexual politics of the last twenty years has mainly been discussed as a
change in the social position of women. Yet change in one term of a relationship
signals change in the other.'535 By compelling women simultaneously to rethink their
relationships with men and the very idea of what it means to be a man or woman,
feminism confronted them with both a political and philosophical demand. Indeed, a
lateral effect of feminism's conflict with patriarchy was that women began to
scrutinize men and masculinity in much the same way they did their own roles in
535 Tim Carrigan, Bob Connell, and John Lee, 'Toward a New Sociology of Masculinity',
Theory and Society, Vol.14, No. 5. (Sept., 1985): 551.
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society. Thus, one of the direct consequences of feminist thinking and action has
been "to expose and highlight the power, position, and practices of men.'536 Yet
despite ostensible critical agreement that there exists a profound relationship between
feminism and masculinity studies, the relationship between these disciplines is neither
simple nor straightforward. In fact, the precise influence and political consequences
of feminism's influence upon masculinity studies remains a hotly debated topic. In
this section I will, therefore, undertake to review the history of masculinity studies,
outline some of its central topics of interest, and explore several points of concern
raised by those critical of some its main points of emphasis.
Although most overviews of the history of masculinity studies begin with the
second-wave feminist movement of the 1970s, some critics conferred a considerably
longer intellectual prehistory upon the subject.537 At the University of Chicago in the
1920s, sociologists began to use the term 'marginal man' to 'refer to the ways in
which groups such as Jewish and Black people experienced the conflict of living in
two cultures.'538 This term is striking in its use of the male pronoun to describe both
the men and women of a particular minority group. As their use of 'man' suggests,
these sociologists did not feel the need to differentiate between the experiences of
men and women of the same ethnicity or race. Scenarios like these illuminate one
critic's assertion that '[a]s the dominant sex in patriarchal culture, and historically the
dominant practitioners of history, men as a group have not proved especially curious
about men as a sex.'539 In other words, although men often wrote and thought about
themselves as the main protagonists of world history and culture, they rarely thought
536 whitehead and Barrett 3.
537 Carrigan, et al. 551.
538 Carrigan, et al. 554.
539 Judith A. Allen, 'Men Interminably in Crisis? Historians on Masculinity, Sexual
Boundaries, an<J Manhood,' Radical History Review 82 (2002): 191.
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self-consciously about themselves 'as men'.540 It was not until the latter half of the
century and the rise of 'the problem of women' that the idea - and the problem - of
differentiated sex roles became common parlance in American intellectual circles.541
But as Tim Carrigan and others argue, these new theories as yet contained 'little sense
of a power relation between men and women; and the argument embedded the issue
of sex and gender firmly in the context of the family.'542 Implicit in views like these
is the conviction that prior to the emergence of the second-wave feminism of the
1970s, sociologists took sex roles as 'a taken-for-granted fact.'543 Although sex role
theory was "nominally about both sexes," the conventional pattern had been "an
almost exclusive concentration on women's roles, ignoring their relation to men's
roles and to larger societal structures.'544 Whilst this 'version of the role framework'
went largely uncontested during the politically and socially conservative America of
the 1950s, with its 'lack of any direct political challenge from women', everything
changed with the rise of radical new types of feminism that demanded not only equal
rights, but also new ways of understanding and theorizing both women and
femininity.545
First-wave feminism challenged male dominance by demanding women's
equal access to social and political rights already enjoyed by men, but second-wave
feminism declared that 'ideas and representations were as significant to questions of
oppression as were the liberal demands for education, pay and property.' Second-
wave feminism demands that gender differences must also be taken into account,
540 Allen 192.
541 Carrigan et al. 553, 554.
542 Carrigan, et al. 554.
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which had a profound impact on feminism's political goals. Rather than
concentrating on those rights already accorded to men, second-wave feminists sought
new rights tailored to their sex's individual needs. These new rights included greater
political and legal control over their own reproductive, physical, and sexual
autonomy. And so, second-wave feminism strove to enact legislation that would
protect women from forms of oppression and victimization directly associated with
their own particular sex. The fact that such legislation often focused on the physical,
political and juridical coercion enacted on women by men underscored the insistence
of many second-wave feminists that 'masculinity as such had been constructed
through power and violence, and that femininity had been oppressed through a history
of uninterrupted patriarchal domination.'547 While this view cleared a path for a
second-wave feminist agenda designed to emancipate women from various abusive
practices and structures such as pornography, the nuclear family, and rape, it also
brought one version of patriarchal masculinity into sharp critical relief.548
Third-wave feminism rejected the philosophical platforms of both first and
second-wave feminism, arguing against both the Enlightenment principles of 'a
sexless reason or humanity' and the second-wave insistence on sexual difference.549
Instead, as Claire Colebrook explains, they raised the possibility 'of thinking beyond
identity, gender and distinct kinds.'550 Colebrook continues:
On this picture, feminism would no longer be the affirmation of women,
women's issues or women's identity, but would, in its criticism of
conventional maleness, identity and power, take the criticism of essentialism







The 'criticism of essentialism' alluded to here is of considerable significance for this
thesis. If for some feminists the primary purpose of such critique was to demonstrate
the historically determined and necessarily performative origins of all our
assumptions about gender, this speculation was also accompanied by a new focus on
552the ideological nature of masculinity As Bryce Traister points out, this
development has had significant repercussions for areas like literary criticism:
Since the appearance of [Elaine] Showalter's paradigm-establishing essay
['Towards a Feminist Poetics' (1985)], a two-pronged feminist literary
criticism has developed into a more generalist movement of 'gender studies,'
[and] [w]ith the rise of gender studies there has emerged a new focus on the
CO
construction ofmasculinity as a gender.
The arguments of third-wave feminist literary critics that gender is a construct and not
a biological determinant are an important aspect of contemporary feminist thought.
As Traister warns, however, there are some that fear that a generalized 'gender
studies' as well as the ever-advancing vanguard of masculinity studies threaten to
shoulder aside feminism and women's studies as topics of interest within both
academic and popular culture.
Despite the much discussed rise of masculinity studies in academia, a striking
element revealed by much of the available literature is just how much discord and
disagreement exists within the field. As Arthur Brittan reminds us, 'This assumption
- that we can know and describe men in terms of some discoverable dimension - is
problematic because it suggests that masculinity is timeless and universal.'554 In other
words, propounding a particular definition ofmasculinity inevitably requires basing it
upon a normative definition of masculinity. And yet, as critics argue, the type of man
552 See Colebrook, pp. 145-191, for an in-depth analysis of the contributions of theorists such
as Sigmund Freud, Julia Kristeva, Jacques Lacan, Ferdinand de Saussure, Claude Levi-Strauss, Jacques
Derrida, Elizabeth Grosz, Joan Copjec, Judith Butler, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari on this subject.
553Traister 274.
554 Arthur Brittan, 'Masculinities and Masculinism', The Masculinities Reader, ed. Stephen M.
Whitehead and Frank J. Barrett (2001; Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004) 51.
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to inspire much ofmasculinity theory is often discovered to be white, heterosexual,
and Western.555 Masculinity studies are, therefore often limited to discourse on a very
specific model ofmasculinity that cannot transcend its own self-imposed limits of
race, sexual-orientation, and culture. In turn, this points to what is a fundamental
problem at the heart ofmasculinity studies. The problem is a straightforward one of
definition: what exactly do critics mean by masculinity, let alone 'man'? But while
the problem may be straightforward, its solution certainly is not, and how critics
formulate their approach to a definition of masculinity reveals quite a few
complementary problems involving the relationship of masculinity studies to both
feminism and the politics of power.
Recent critical attempts to provide a normative definition of masculinity have
been riven by a number of tensions and disagreements. For Whitehead and Barrett,
the term 'masculinities' connotes 'those behaviours, languages and practices, existing
in specific cultural and organizational locations, which are commonly associated with
males and thus culturally defined as not feminine.'556 Arthur Brittan, however, offers
a more evasive and tentative definition of the term in his statement that '[m]asculinity
refers to those aspects of men's behaviour that fluctuates over time." Instead of
presenting a definition of masculinity per se, Brittan concentrates his efforts on
defining what he calls masculinism, arguing that '[t]hose people who speak of
masculinity as an essence, as an inborn characteristic, are confusing masculinity with
masculinism, the masculine ideology.'557 Ultimately, for Brittan, masculinism is that
ideology that "justifies and naturalizes male domination.'558 John Maclnnes,
however, makes no distinction between masculinity and masculinism, suggesting
555 See Allen for her views on this, 202-203.




instead that 'Masculinity can be seen as an ideology produced by men as a result of
the threat posed to the survival of the patriarchal sexual division of labour by the rise
of modernity.'559 Meanwhile, writers like Michael Kimmel and R.W. Connell present
a diffuse multiplicity of interpretations of the term. In Kimmel's words:
Our culture's definition ofmasculinity is thus several stories at once. It is
about the individual man's quest to accumulate those cultural symbols that
denote manhood, signs that he has in fact achieved it. It is about those
standards being used against women to prevent their inclusion in public life
and their consignment to a devalued private sphere. It is about the differential
access that different types of men have to those cultural resources that confer
manhood and about how each of these groups then develop their own
modifications to preserve and claim their manhood. It is about the power of
these definitions themselves to serve to maintain the real-life power that men
have over women and that some men have over other men.560
Writing in a similar vein, Connell suggests that '[rjather than attempting to define
masculinity as an object (a natural character type, a behavioural average, a norm), we
need to focus on the processes and relationships through which men and women
conduct gendered lives.'561 Although these authors would not claim that their
individual definitions are in any way comprehensive, the differences between these
definitions suggest some interesting implications for both masculinity studies and
feminism.
What these various definitions ofmasculinity reveal is, first of all, an
uncomfortable relationship to both women and feminism. There is an anxious
undercurrent to these definitions as to whethermasculinity can be defined only
through a dichotomized relationship with a feminine 'other.' Such a definition would
mean that masculinity has no essential essence, except in the sense that it must always
559 John Maclnnes, 'The Crisis of Masculinity and the Politics of Identity,' The Masculinities
Reader, ed. Stephen M. Whitehead and Frank J. Barrett (2001; Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004) 311.
560 Michael S. Kimmel, 'Masculinity as Homophobia: Fear, Shame, and Silence in the
Construction of Gender Identity', The Masculinities Reader, ed. Stephen M. Whitehead and Frank J.
Barrett (2001; Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004) 272.
561 R. W. Connell, 'The Social Organization of Masculinity,' The Masculinities Reader, ed.
Stephen M. Whitehead and Frank J. Barrett (2001; Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004) 33.
208
be in opposition to women and femininity. While this definition might seem to depict
masculinity as relative, it actually implies that masculinity is both stagnant and rigid
through its insistence on maintaining a reactive stance that denies creativity.
Secondly, these definitions reveal an uneasy relationship between masculinity and
power. When Brittan attempts to separate a definition of masculinity as what men do
from a definition of masculinism as what men in power do to those beneath them, he
reveals a widespread discomfort with a tendency in masculinity studies to focus on
what is sometimes defined as hegemonic masculinity. Critics define hegemonic
masculinity as, 'a question of how particular groups of men inhabit positions of power
and wealth, and how they legitimate and reproduce the social relationships that
generate their dominance.'562 While some theorists are careful to define hegemonic
masculinity as one specific type of masculinity, Mclnnes's definition suggests that
hegemonic masculinity serves for some theorists as a definition ofmasculinity in
general. To be specific, just as theorists of masculinity are uneasy with masculinity's
relationship to women and feminism, they are equally uncomfortable with the
apparent inescapability of defining masculinity through its relationship to power.
Their discomfort stems from the fact that critics are well aware that this 'culturally
exalted form of masculinity, the hegemonic model so to speak, may only correspond
to the actual characters of a small number of men.'563 In other words, just as
feminism has been accused of focusing on the plight of middle-class white women at
the expense of women of a different class, colour or sexual orientation, so has
masculinity studies been accused of focusing on white Western middle-class
heterosexuals. Finally, what should have become apparent in this discussion of
masculinity is that so much of this discourse contains a sense of anxiety or impending
562 Carrigan, et al. 592.
563 Carrigan, et al. 592.
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doom regarding masculinity and its viability. It is this nervousness that translates into
what many theorists interpret as masculinity studies' grand theme: 'The Crisis of
Masculinity.'
Warnings that masculinity is in crisis are now a recurrent theme in Western
cultural discourse. As Maclnnes reminds us, 'It has become something of a cliche to
argue that it is now "a bad time to be a man".'564 Whitehead and Barrett reaffirm this
view, writing that '[t]he male crisis, or "crisis of masculinity" thesis, has assumed, for
many, almost the status of a defining characteristic ofWestern societies at the turn of
the millennium.'565 Those who argue that masculinity is in crisis believe that in the
past fifty years, formerly appropriate 'displays of manhood' have become 'socially
stigmatized.'566 These critics contend that men can no longer rely on public displays
of aggression, dominance, and emotional repression in order to 'perform and validate
their masculinity'.567 Although there is no clear critical consensus about the primary
reasons for this revaluation ofmasculinity, three factors recur in discussions of the
area:
They assume that men are being reduced to this confused, dysfunctional and
insecure state through a combination of, firstly, rampant, soulless
consumerism; secondly, women's (feminism's) successful assault on male
bastions of privilege; and thirdly, more widespread social and cultural
disapproval of traditional displays of masculinity.568
As Whitehead and Barrett discuss, these social markers all suggest that culpability for
the 'crisis of masculinity' lies with feminism and the women's rights movements in
that these markers try to explain—or, some would argue, excuse—'many men's
apparent inability to accommodate women's new found confidence.'569 Whitehead
564 jvlaclnnes 313.
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and Barrett, along with other critics, suggest that the attention masculinity studies has
brought to both men and masculinity is not necessarily a positive development, albeit
for different reasons. Indeed, some of the most prominent discourses within
masculinity studies, especially that masculinity is in 'crisis', can reiterate a set of
beliefs that cater to anti-feminist, even misogynistic, beliefs.
Connell writes that 'to say masculinity has become "problematic" is not
necessarily to say gender relations are changing for the better. It is, rather, to say that
cultural turbulence around themes of masculinity has grown.'570 In other words,
Connell reminds us that theories about men and masculinity do not necessarily
contain an explicitly progressive or feminist agenda, suggesting that the ways that
people interpret or appropriate the idea that masculinity is in crisis can differ greatly.
As Rachel Adams explains, there are those who see masculinity studies as conducive
to the improvement of gender relations as well as an incentive for both interest in and
development of feminist academic inquiry:
The scholarship on masculinity has expanded the terrain of gender and
sexuality, bringing fresh insights to familiar texts and revealing the category of
straight white manhood to be something like the Wizard of Oz, a tenuous,
vulnerable figure hiding behind a screen of smoke and mirrors. Men across the
disciplines have been interrogating their own masculinities; interpreting their
relationships with their fathers, brothers, and male friends; confessing their
feelings of alienation and weakness; and sometimes productively translating
those personal revelations into renewed commitments to the analysis of gender
and sexuality. At its best, this work brings new vitality to feminist questions
and suggests crucial points of contact between feminism and queer theory.571
There is also evidence, however, of considerable scholarly unease about the nature
and trajectory of this new discipline. Some of this unease surfaces in the second half
of Adams's argument:
570 R. W. Connell, 'The Big Picture: Masculinities in Recent World History', Theory and
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Yet the sheer amount of ink spilled over this topic might give us reason to
wonder why men—admittedly, now appropriately situated and theorized—
have once again become the focus of analytic attention. Too often the study of
masculinity seems to come at the expense of the study of women, with the
unfortunate implication that questions about women have become
uninteresting or are so familiar that they no longer need to be asked.
Moreover, when focused on the burdens of gender and the fragility of bonds
between men, this scholarship tends to ignore the persistent links among
572
masculinity, patriarchal power, and privilege.
A number of points of interest arise in Adams's conclusion. Some critics see the
rapid growth of masculinity studies as a type of patriarchal backlash against
feminism. Connell, one of the founders of contemporary masculinity studies,
dramatically restates this position in an interview on the subject. The interview is
notable for his claim that 'because [masculinity studies'] niche was created by
women's studies,' some feminist or women's studies scholars feel that critics like him
have an attitude of '"Thanks for bringing this to our attention, ladies, but we'll take it
over now.'"573 In this view of masculinity studies, men and male academics have
used the 'turn to gender' to reinscribe the priority of masculinity at the heart of
modern intellectual culture.
Furthermore, Adams suggests that many critics fear that promoting the idea
that 'masculinity is in crisis' belies the fact that men are still often in positions of
power and privilege and that they often abuse that power and privilege. Anthony
McMahon warns that '[i]nstead of wondering whether they should change their
behaviour, men "wrestle with the meaning ofmasculinity.'"574 In other words, both
masculinity studies and the so-called 'crisis of masculinity' can be taken to imply that
572 Adams 467-468.
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'[djomination is an aspect of masculinity, rather than something men simply do.'
This over-simplification suggests that men misbehave because their masculinity made
them do it. McMahon implies that displays of violent or aggressive masculinity may
genuinely be expressions of masculinity in crisis, but this does not excuse such
behaviour nor does it explain the long history of male violence and aggression. As
Whitehead and Barrett dryly conclude:
Of course, behind the hard veneer of the male 'Nazi', paramilitary, or
militiaman, there usually lies a fragile identity and an equally fragile
confidence, but nevertheless, the actual performance of such radical masculine
expression results in damage to all who come into contact with it. In this
respect, while such men may be in some form of emotional or existential
crisis, there is little new about this.576
In other words, Whitehead and Barrett warn that those who argue that aggressive or
violent behaviour in men is the fault of some new crisis ofmasculinity will have to
ignore the fact that such behaviour has always existed. This means that either men
have always been in crisis or, as McMahon argues, men need to keep as critical an eye
on their own behaviour as they do theories about masculinity.
Adams's summary of the current stalemate between masculinity studies and
feminism also raises some important issues for feminism itself. Judith Kegan
Gardiner addresses these questions directly in her review of six texts of masculinity
and gender subtitled 'Consensus and Concerns for Feminist Classrooms'.577 As her
title suggests, Gardiner is principally interested in 'how these texts advance or modify
feminist interdisciplinary scholarship and agendas for social change.'578 Her first
impression is that there exists a 'considerable consistency' in all of the texts reviewed,
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'which demonstrates a new consensus in gender studies based on feminist thought.'579
All of the texts agree 'that gender is a hierarchical relationship that involves male
dominance and female subordination.'580 They also concur that 'gender is a process,
project, or set of relationships rather than a thing in itself.'581 But despite this apparent
critical consensus, Gardiner warns that significant differences still remain between the
Women's Studies, masculinity, and gender texts. In her own words:
Masculinity is seen as compensatory, defensive, and needing explanation and
modification, while femininity is virtually uninterrogated, apparently assumed
to result uneventfully from daughters identifications with their mothers and
women's adaptations to male dominance. There also seems to be an
assumption that feminists have been describing the problems of women for
thirty years; now is the time to focus more on men and masculinity and on
global economic and political forces.582
Yet despite having faithfully recounted recurrent feminist concern that masculinity
studies has begun to supplant feminism as a topic of critical interest and debate,
Gardiner suggests that this state of affairs might be as much the fault of contemporary
feminism as it is the responsibility ofmasculinity studies:
I have noted here the very different investments that men, including
masculinity scholars, appear to have in preserving masculinity as some
intelligible and coherent grounding of identity in comparison to the scepticism
and distance shown by feminists toward femininity. Thus, a paradoxical
finding from looking at the masculinity-focused texts is that it may be time for
feminists to return to theorizing femininity.583
While men have actively embraced theorizing masculinity, according to Gardiner,
women have been quick to dismiss any theorizing about femininity under the
assumption that 'femininity' is always a negative construct and should be abandoned.
In her view the 'very absence of a "crisis of femininity" in contemporary U.S. culture,







"masculinity," may in fact indicate some of the limits of "gender" as a general
category for feminist theory, scholarship, and political mobilization.'584 What is
required, she argues, are new ways of reinvigorating contemporary feminism and
women's studies. One way to begin this task might be to cultivate a renewed interest
in femininity by means of a new field of 'femininity studies.'
In this section, I have sought to define contemporary masculinity studies as
well as to delineate some of the problems inherent to the discipline. But now I will
turn to the fiction of Martin Amis and Philip Roth in order to explore how these two
writers have engaged with and challenged many prominent theories regarding
masculinity. While I argue that London Fields and Portnoy's Complaint engage
critically with images of hegemonic masculinity, both novels are also often used as
'evidence' of their authors' prejudices against women, as illustrated in Chapter One of
this thesis. London Fields (1989) focuses upon Nicola, a woman determined to
organize her own murder and the three men whom she manipulates to kill her.
Nicola's self-murdering character made the London Fields one of Amis's most
controversial books, and many critics were happy to use the novel and its protagonist,
Nicola Six, as proof of Amis's misogyny. I argue, however, that rather than
lasciviously recirculating lifeless stereotypes of self-destructive women, Amis
actually defines a series of conflicts and problems regarding men and masculinity.
Written much earlier, Roth's novel Portnoy's Complaint (1967) can be read as a
precursor to contemporary masculinity studies. This audacious novel takes for its
eponymous subject a young man named Alexander Portnoy, whose quest to define
himself as an independent, self-made man clashes with his inability to define himself
except through his deviant and exploitative sexual relationships with women.
584 Gardiner 156.
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Corrupted Material: Nicola Six and London Fields
Set at the turn of the millennium, Martin Amis's London Fields tells the story
of a woman, Nicola Six, who foresees and organizes her own murder. In order to
fulfil her objective, she courts the attention of three men, one of whom she knows will
become her murderer. There is working-class Londoner Keith Talent, upper-class
Englishman Guy Clinch, and the Jewish-American intellectual Samson Young who
presents himself to the reader as the ideal of a 'reliable' narrator.585 All three men are
in the same pub when Nicola enters, and all three are instantly drawn to her, albeit for
different reasons. Keith sees a possible sexual conquest, Guy perceives a beautiful
and fragile woman in need of protection, and Samson recognizes in Nicola the
possibility of a good protagonist for the novel he so desperately wants to write. In
fact, London Fields is Samson's 'novel': his version of the events as he either
witnessed them or as told to him by Nicola. While Samson, however, initially
believes that he is firmly in control as the narrator of events, it is soon revealed that
throughout the novel Nicola is really the one in 'the driver's seat,' and that Samson
has been as much of a pawn in her deadly game as Keith or Guy.586 The figure of a
self-murdering female character has proved consistently controversial for Amis's
critics. As one reviewer writes, 'Nicola is a problem [. . .] she makes us yield to a
sneaking suspicion that a misogynist lingers here somewhere [. . .] She seems to be
another of Mr. Amis's plastic women.'587 The debate about Amis's portrayal of
Nicola Six has become symptomatic of his perceived "woman problem." This issue
came to a head during the judging of the 1989 Booker prize, when two female judges,
585 Throughout London Fields Samson asserts that this is a 'true story' (1, 240), that 'this is
actually happening' (10) and that he is incapable of writing anything else because he 'just can't make
anything up' (25). Because of this inability to create fiction, Samson assures us that he is 'a reliable
narrator' (78)-
586 I here make reference to Muriel Spark's, The Driver's Seat, a novel that is also about a
self-murdering woman. Reading this novel helped me focus my understanding of London Fields.
587 Bette Pesetsky, "Lust Among the Ruins," rev. of London Fields, by Martin Amis, 4 March
1990 late ed- F'na' Section 7: pg 1, col 1; Book Review Desk.
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Maggie Gee and Helen McNeil, refused to shortlist London Fields and accused Amis
ofmisogyny in quite public terms.588 Dispiriting and overly familiar as this type of
media controversy might be, it does grant insight into what people are prepared to
read and to tolerate. And when confronted with the pornographically hackneyed
aspects of Nicola coupled with her genuinely disturbing objective to be beaten to
death, it seems obvious that readers would be offended by this particular
characterization of corrupt and self-destroying femininity.
The issues surrounding the critical reception of London Fields are of signal
importance to this thesis. Although their significance will emerge in various ways
during what follows, I should state at the outset my conviction that the views of Gee
and McNeil represent a profound misreading of Amis's work. I do agree that London
Fields is fraught with problematic images of self-destroying women, and that the
novel gleefully depicts the pleasure that those images seem to generate. However, I
believe that far from indulging or blandly circulating these negative images of
femininity, Amis's fiction seeks to reproduce the way that a certain masculine self-
image constitutes itself through its relationship with a necessarily corrupted
femininity. Indeed, I will argue that London Fields uses the lifeless body of a
pornographic cliche - the character of Nicola Six - to rebuke the male propensity to
give imaginative life to the dead and second-hand material of which pornography is
composed. More disturbingly, London Fields contains a warning that perhaps this
masculine obsession with reanimating the dead women of pornographic cliche is
continuous with real-life violence against living women. Read in these terms, Amis's
circulation of a series of pornographic cliches do not constitute a failure of novelistic
imagination; instead, they are crucial to both his aesthetic and ethical project. In fact,
588 Martin Goff, "Playing Silly Bookers," The New Statesman 23 Oct. 1998, June 10, 2007
<http://www.martinamisweb.com/pre_2006/lfbooker.htm>.
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Amis suggests that men often indulge themselves in an artificial 'discourse' with the
lifeless images of women that pornography circulates, making genuine
communication with living women threatening to a masculine self-image based on a
largely fantasized and malleable female foil.
Any reading of London Fields needs to begin by considering why Nicola Six
remains such a disturbing and controversial character. Preliminary reasons why
Amis's reader might find herself recoiling from this initially glamorous but
increasingly sinister 'murderee' are not difficult to deduce. It is revealed that, as a
child, Nicola 'propels a playmate over a cliff to her death.589 This cruelty carries on
into adulthood. Her beauty equips her with 'the power of inspiring love,' but
something in her very nature makes her 'receive this love and send it back in opposite
form, not just cancelled but murdered.'590 The idea of cancelled and murdered love
resonates throughout Nicola's entire life; it recurs whenever one looks at "the human
wreckage she left in her slipstream, the nervous collapses, the shattered careers, the
suicide bids, the blighted marriages (and rottener divorces)'.591 Nicola's philosophies,
such as they are, are as decadent and disturbing as her prevailing mode of social
relation; her conversation and thought appear to be dominated by pornographic
conceits involving 'tight bright white underwear' and a predilection for anal sex.592
Despite the veneer of intellectual sophistication provided by her books on astronomy
and popular physics, these subjects actually symbolize her penchant for sodomy,
593
which she considers the great 'twentieth century theme.' Nicola's taste for sodomy
embodies her anti-fertility; she imagines herself as a black hole, marked only by 'the






scar tissue of her seven abortions.'594 Finally, Nicola's favourite fantasy involves not
only public sex with the Devil, but also 'the act of doubledarkness' with God himself.
595 Even Nicola's mother recognizes her child's mouth as a whore s mouth ... like
the mouth of the clowngirl in pornography.'596 Sexually predatory, murderous,
blasphemous, and with a face even her mother cannot love, it is obvious that Nicola
Six represents an extremely problematic and offensive female protagonist
However, the perception that the character of Nicola Six is a genuinely
disturbing and decadent figure does not begin to answer the question of how we
should read her. Indeed, contemporary critics have been far too eager to pass over the
disturbing and genuinely problematic depths of the novel in order to indulge
themselves in simplistic moral condemnation of what they presume to be a
reactionary masculine fantasy: the pornographically degraded, abused and self-
abusing figure of Nicola Six. Such responses have proved wholly inadequate to grasp
the aesthetic and ethical problem the novel actually poses: why is this degraded figure
simultaneously presented as alluring and seductive? At the same time, the moral
fervour of the critical denunciation of Amis and his female creation seems curiously
excessive if all she represents is a degraded masculine fantasy. After all, no one
seems to feel it necessary to argue that Mein Kampfis anti-Semitic; if the character of
Nicola is so easily reducible to a misogynist masculine fantasy, why has it proved
necessary to condemn her over and over again? The persistence of this critical
controversy - a controversy that helps to shape the reception of Amis's fiction to this
day - suggests that his portrayal of Nicola Six retains an uncanny force that has the
capacity to provoke unpalatable and perplexing questions about the relationship





Such questions cannot be exhausted by the weary moral realism that inflects most
readings of Amis's work. These readings, even when couched in forms of literary
sympathy, generally assume an all too familiar form. Thus they begin from the
observation that London Fields must be a version of the 'State of the Nation' novel
keen to present a satirical overview of life in modern Britain. Reading the novel in
such a way makes Nicola a source of critical anxiety and dissatisfaction. For
example, one critic claims that Amis makes various 'attempts to establish [Nicola] as
a real person,' but that she 'remains an automaton.'597 The implication of this
statement is that Amis fails with Nicola Six, and that, in this instance, he is a 'bad'
writer. On another level, some critics warn that perhaps Nicola Six is less the product
of a 'bad' writer as she is the product of a 'bad' man's imagination. Warming to this
theme, Graham Fuller sees in Nicola evidence that 'Amis himself is unable to resist
Nicola's pornographic promise or the lascivious lexicon of sexism—which alone
should offend many women readers'598 Such criticism takes for granted the idea that
Nicola is supposed to be realistic, and never stops to consider that Amis may have
intended Nicola to be the cliche they fear she is. Nor does such criticism stop to
ponder what such a fascination with cliche might mean in the broader scope of the
novel.
The crucial, and crucially still unacknowledged, aspect of these predominantly
moralistic readings of the novel is that Amis's own fiction continually pre-empts the
terms of this critical debate. Thus the recurrent claim that the novel is flawed because
Amis cannot create a vital and emotionally plausible female character is ironically
undermined by the character of Samson, who can be read as Amis's own parody of
his popular critical caricature. An industrious but merely mediocre journalist and
597 Christina Konig, "Death By Request," The Guardian 21 Sept. 1989.
598 Graham Fuller, quoted in James Diedrick, Understanding Martin Amis, 2nd ed. (Columbia,
SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2004) 156.
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memoirist, Samson has never been able to create anything vibrant, original, or lasting;
all he can so is reiterate other people's judgments and opinions. And so he can mimic
the yob culture of characters such as Keith but he is incapable of engaging with it
critically or of creating it outright. What is interesting about this portrayal of Samson
is that some critics imply that Amis suffers from a similar inability to create. For
example, James Wood complains of Amis that 'The language wants to be
sophisticated and it is certainly knowing; but Amis is not transforming anything here.
These people exist in the catalogue, already indexed and adjectivally tagged.'599
Wood's complaint is thus that Amis is only capable of manipulating a series of
already established stereotypes, appropriating them uncritically and unquestioningly
for his own use while he adds nothing to their literary suggestiveness or potency.
Through Samson, our 'reliable' narrator incapable of invention, Amis satirizes one of
his own caricatured media portrayals.
Another scene in which Amis appears to pre-empt his critics is that in which
Samson addresses Nicola, saying 'I'm worried they're going to say you're a male
fantasy figure.' 600 Nicola's response to his concern takes two forms. The first has her
respond 'I am a male fantasy figure. I've been one for fifteen years. It really takes it
out of a girl.'601 This is exactly the sort of satirical but also dehumanized response
that we come to expect from Nicola. The second part of her response, however, in
which she articulates exactly which type of male fantasy figure she is, reveals another
possibility available to readers of Nicola Six, one usually overlooked in favour of
condemning her. Nicola rejects such titles as Sack Artist, Mata Hari, and Femme





Fatale in favour of Murderee.602 Nicola explicitly identifies herself as a murdered
body. As such, the central question of the novel cannot be why does Nicola have to
die, but why does anyone insist she was ever alive? This question takes me to the
heart ofmy argument: that Nicola may be a pornographic stereotype but the type of
pornography she represents is not that of mere sexual intercourse. Her irreality is not
accidental nor is it the fault of Amis's 'woman problem.' Indeed, this thesis
recognizes that Nicola is not supposed to be 'real' nor 'alive' but that she is a corpse
upon which sexual desire in the form of violence is enacted. Through such a reading,
perhaps we can account for the banality of much of the criticism levelled at Nicola.
Such criticism appears unable to deal with the unsettling force of Amis's novel which
suggests that a certain murderous and life-denying version of masculinity in fact
depends upon reducing the "feminine" to a series of lifeless and self-abnegating
images. In order fully to examine these questions, we need to confront the fact that
London Fields does not merely present us with degraded images of women to be
consumed and enjoyed; instead, it offers us a vision of the ways in which a pernicious
and reactionary vision of femininity is constructed from certain forms of masculine
desire. In this sense, the principal theme of the novel is not the pornographic relay of
degraded images of a lifeless and self-destructive femininity; it asks us, rather, to
consider the ways the three male protagonists fashion their own subjectivity by
remaking Nicola Six in their own degraded image.
These broad observations may be supported and developed by means of an
analysis of Keith Talent, through whom Amis presents a vision of a masculine subject
whose self-image is composed almost entirely through his investment in
pornographically degraded images of the feminine. London Fields is replete with
602 Amis 260.
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examples of Keith's violent renunciation or reconstruction of the image of the
feminine - almost his every waking moment is consumed by his preparation or
perpetration of an appalling misogynist act. The violence of his pornographic
imaginary emerges forcefully from the way he watches television:
Every evening he taped six hours of TV and then screened them on his return
from the Black Cross, the Golgotha, Trish Shirt's or whatever. [. . .] What he
was after were images of sex, violence, and sometimes money. Keith watched
his six hours' worth at high speed. Often it was all over in twenty minutes.
Had to keep your wits about you. He could spot a pinup on a garage wall in
Superfastforward. Then Rewind, SloMo, Freeze Frame. A young dancer
slowly disrobing before a mirror; an old cop getting it in the chest with both
barrels; an American house. Best were the scenes that combined all three
motifs. An oil baron roughing up a callgirl in a prestige hotel, for instance, or
the repeated coshing of a pretty bank teller. [. . .] The female body got
chopped up by Keith twenty times a night: what astronomies of breast and
belly, of shank and haunch . . . Now the great thumb moved from Fast
Forward to Rewind to Play, and Keith sat back to savour the pre-credit
sequence of a serial-murder movie. Bird running through park at night.
Psycho hot on her heels.603
These violent images, strung together like comic strips randomly cut up and
reassembled, powerfully illustrate how Keith's obsession with images of violence
translates itself into the affect of social authority. Power is everywhere in this
passage: Keith's power over his remote control, the serial killer's power over his
victims, the power of the oil barons over the earth's resources. Furthermore, power is
connected in this passage with violence against women. Indeed, Keith's favourite
television viewing constantly reaffirms the message that men in control demonstrate
their power through violence against women and that weak men can achieve some
form of power through violence against women.
Meanwhile, Keith's actions prove that his sexual sadism is not relegated to his




The peculiar difficulty with girls experienced by God, Shakespeare, and Keith
was this difficulty: they raped them. Or they used to. They had all been on
the same rehab courses and buddy programmes; they had mastered some
jargon and tinkertoy psychology; and they didn't do it any longer. They could
control their aggression. But the main reason they didn't do it any longer was
that rape, injudicial terms (and in Keith's words), was no fucking joke: you
just couldn't ever come out a winner, not with this DNA nonsense. The great
days were gone. Shakespeare and God had both spent a long time in prison
for it, and Keith nearly had. Of his two court appearances on rape charges, the
first had been more or less okay ("Why, Jacqui, why?" Keith had hollered
woundedly from the dock). But the second case was very frightening. In the
end the girl dropped the charges, thank heaven, after Keith sold his motor and
gave three and a half thousand quid to her dad. Of course, Keith's rapes were
to be viewed quite distinctly from those numerous occasions when, in his
youth, he had been obliged to slap into line various cockteasers and icebergs
(and lesbians and godbotherers). Rape was different. Rape was much more
like all the other occasions (not so numerous, if you kept Kath out of it) when
he had candidly used main force to achieve intercourse and the woman, for
one reason or another, hadn't reported him.604
From this passage we learn that Keith has a violent history of rape. His own personal
definition of 'rape,' however, namely main force, carefully excludes what is also
legally considered a form of sexual assault, namely coercive force, which Keith
dismisses as simply 'slap[ping] into line' women who resist his advances. In other
words, Keith's 'difficulty' with women translates into what is actually a
predisposition to violent sexual assault. In the world of London Fields there is a
direct connection between Keith's voyeuristic enjoyment of violent images and his
enactment of violence upon women in real life. This barrage of exploitative imagery
seems to augment Keith's failure to imagine women as anything other than erotic
fodder for his own fantasies. Throughout the novel, Keith's ability to recognize the
humanity of various female characters is constantly undermined. He pays a mother
for sex with her very under-age daughter, while still insisting he treats the teen-aged
Debbee 'special'; he beats his wife, knowing her frustration results in her 'takeing it
604 Amis 168.
out on the Baby [sic]'; he declares his willingness to murder Nicola for wrecking a
darts tournament.605
Amis not only suggests that Keith is emboldened and encouraged by an
exploitative masculine culture that feasts on disembodied images of violence against
women but also questions the sort of therapeutic methods used to try to stem Keith's
violence in the real world. Amis's use of terms such as 'jargon and tinkertoy
psychology' for Keith's 'therapy,' for example, both complicates the relationship
between Keith's acts of rape and his perception of the judgment and punishment of
rape as a crime. In the same way, the idea that Keith has 'mastered' rehabilitation's
buzzwords of 'Regard, Respect, Restraint' is very important to the novel.606 In those
scenes in which Keith and his pub cronies whisper to themselves of their 'regard,
respect, restraint,' Amis illustrates how a sentiment or judgment expected to be
external to the character and delivered as a pronouncement of his punishment has now
actually been internalized by that very character as a way of constituting his own
sense of himself. Indeed, Keith and his friends use these words as a way of actually
discussing how sexually attractive they find various women, and how virile was their
response to this sexual attraction. What Amis implies is that the judgment that Keith,
as a rapist, lacks qualities such as regard for women's feelings, respect for women's
bodies and the ability to restrain his own violent desires has ceased to function as the
condemnation it should be. This judgment has become, instead, a meaningless mantra
used as a form of pub braggadocio amongst Keith and his fellow rapists. In
consequence, the only real threat to Keith's enjoyment of his 'peculiar difficulty' is
the fact that DNA evidence has made rape 'no fucking joke.'607
605 For Keith and Debbee, see London Fields p. 51. For Keith's journal confession, see p. 370.
Finally, for Keith's proclamation of his intention to kill Nicola, see p. 462.
606 Martin Amis 169.
607 Martin Amis 168.
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At the same time, the idea that Keith's 'peculiar difficulty with girls' is
indicative of a much wider social problem involving reactionary and unexamined
attitudes towards sexual violence against women is reinforced by the aforementioned
connection between this phrase from London Fields and the title of one of Kingsley
Amis's novels, Difficulties With Girls. Indeed, in key sections of his novel, Martin
Amis appears to be directly engaging with the gender politics of his father and his
father's generation. Thus Martin Amis not only connects Kingsley's euphemism
'difficulties with girls' to rape but also suggests that, for much of society, little has
changed since his father's generation. Laws may make rape illegal but not until
scientific advances such as DNA did the accusation of rape really become substantive.
Indeed, Amis suggests that all the workshops about 'Respect, Regard, Restraint'
forced upon Keith and his ilk actually make matters worse because they give them the
tools to impersonate feeling human beings. What this really means is that Keith's
'rehabilitation' has enabled him to internalize a feminist critique of violent masculine
subjectivity that is supposed to mark him out as problematic. Disturbingly, this
means that it is useless to apply the language of moral criticism to a character like
Keith because Keith has already internalized such criticism in order to act badly.
There can be no distancing effect of moral judgment because the Keiths of this world
have already consumed a daily dose of Jerry Springer and Trisha, and are able to
parrot the morally concerned rhetoric of this television patois. In fact, one of the few
connective tissues remaining in this otherwise violently fragmented society is a shared
vocabulary gleaned from the moral instruction of television talk shows and
therapeutic group meetings. Keith, however, has no actual connection with this
material: he does not think about it, he merely regurgitates it. This is the reason that
despite his 'rehabilitation', Keith, far from understanding why rape is wrong, mourns
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the loss of 'the good old days' when acts of rape were more difficult to prove. Amis
creates in Keith Talent a disturbing vision of a masculine subject who actually uses
his knowledge of a feminist-inspired discourse regarding women's rights as well as a
popular rhetoric of morality to facilitate and excuse his violently chauvinistic
behaviour.
Although Keith offers the most lurid example of a misogynistic masculinity, it
is certainly not the case that he is the only male character under indictment in this
novel. Nicola's socially diverse choices for her three possible murderers are telling, as
are her different approaches to each man. Indeed, one of the fascinating aspects of the
novel is the way Amis's satirical vision embraces a number of different social classes
and cultural types. Besides Keith, both Guy, the titled upper-class Englishman, and
Samson, the Jewish-American intellectual, are enthralled by the pornographic cliche
they know as Nicola Six, and both prove alarmingly well disposed toward her violent
demise. Despite his wealth, education, and social class, Guy proves to be the most
gullible of the three. For lowest-class Keith, Nicola makes home-made pornographic
movies and promises both money and darts fame. But for Guy's benefit, Nicola
switches tactics, presenting herself as intellectual, yet naive; damaged, yet virginal to
the point of never having been kissed. She claims both gypsy and Jewish blood,
tapping into the stock fantasy that Philip Roth calls 'The Gentile dream of the melon-
breasted Jewess.'608 Nicola also tells Guy a tale of being raised in an orphanage
where she befriended a Cambodian girl, whose fate had her 'farmed out to a pitiless
Iraqi'.609 There was sexual abuse, a child, and she 'was then repatriated, never to
return.'610 Nicola calls the mother and child Enola Gay, and Little Boy.611 These





names ring no alarm bells for Oxford educated Guy, who apparently never studied
current history. However, neither does Guy notice anything wrong with a letter he
finds written by Nicola to Professors Barnes and Noble.612 All Guy does see in
Nicola is an 'anachronism;' to him she is 'a museum piece, time orphaned.'613
Meanwhile, his wife, Hope, is certainly not an anachronism; she is 'intelligent,
efficient [and] brightly American.'614 Despite its chivalric facade, Guy's perception
of Nicola is as dead as that of Keith's; she is a museum exhibit: a mummy, a stuffed
bird. Guy, furthermore, imagines Nicola as representing a woman in need while
wealthy, efficient Hope needs no one. Guy's desire for Nicola might be based on an
old-fashioned, 'gentleman's' fantasy, but when her deception is revealed, it is the
hitherto foppish Guy who drives Keith 'into the ground like a tentpeg' in order to be
the one to murder Nicola.615 Guy's fantasies of Nicola may appear more palatable
than Keith's, but, in reality, they are based on images equally lifeless and self-denying
and inspire an equally violent response.
Ultimately, however, Guy does not claim his right to kill Nicola. Samson,
dying of what he calls a radiogenic synergism, convinces Guy to trade his act of
revenge for the chance to return to his family.616 Earlier in the novel it is revealed
that, because of his swiftly progressing degenerative disease, Samson's suicide, like
Nicola's murder, is inevitable.617 To 'save' Guy, Samson takes his place in what
becomes a sort of ritual act of expiation, purging the world of Nicola's presence.
Belatedly, Samson realizes that it was he, not Keith, whom Nicola recognizes at the








class background, would be able to dominate Keith but that Samson would take Guy's
place, because he 'wasn't quite unregenerate.'618 It might seem strange that
murdering a woman would be depicted as an act of regeneration, but it might make
more sense given the other imagery associated with Samson's choice and act.
Samson, indeed, recognizes his victim as 'Necropolitan Nicola.'619 She is a zombie: a
corpse reanimated but certainly not living. She also 'made it easier' for Samson to
murder her by repeating 'I'm so cold' over and over. Even before her death, Nicola
bears a cadaver's chill. This is the point of the novel: that Nicola does not die, she
was never alive. What makes Samson's and Nicola's relationship so eerie, however,
is, on the one hand, his apparent ability to see her as dead and, on the other hand, the
fact that regardless of this knowledge he wants to kiss her, see her naked, and finally,
he sodomizes her.620 All of this despite Samson telling Nicola, early in the game,
'I'm immune [. . .] The bedroom voodoo, the Free Spirit nihilistic heroine bit, the sex-
actress bit - it just doesn't get to me.'621 Indeed, Samson has resisted the charms of
other women in the book, such as the beautiful and voluptuous Lizzyboo, because he
claims that his sickness has made him impotent. And yet such is Nicola's power over
him that despite his terrible illness and alleged impotence he is able to perform
sexually for her. Samson claims to be able to recognize and withstand the degraded
pornographic images that Nicola presents to the world. However, he finds himself
incapable of actually resisting these images while also being the most aware, of all the
male characters, that her sexually stereotyped image is projected upon the lifeless




620 Amis 185, 284, 391.
621 Amis 119.
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It is in these areas that Amis's writing begins to develop a genuinely
subversive and uncanny power. It does so because he is able to establish a connection
between the pornographic male imaginary and a form of necrophiliacal desire: the
need to turn live women into dead images while reanimating dead women into living
images. This recognition is of crucial significance because it enables us to see that
when critics seize upon Amis's creation of Nicola Six as simultaneously unrealistic
and misogynistic they fail to see that this is the very point ofAmis's writing.622 Seen
in these terms, Nicola is less a "character," realistic or otherwise, than an ossified
representation of certain aspects of the pornographic male imaginary - she is, in fact,
an always already posthumous and endlessly circulating and reanimated version of
dead human material: a material that encodes a frozen and paralyzed form of modern
social relations. London Fields is not, then, a novel "about" a self-murdering woman.
Instead, it takes for its subject the obsession with stereotypes of corrupt or degenerate
femininity by which modem masculinity constitutes its own moral self-image. The
character of Nicola Six is constructed entirely from stereotypes; her life, such as it is,
reflects the male need to reanimate or give imaginative expression to this corrupt
material. What is truly pornographic about London Fields as a novel is not, then,
Nicola Six's propensity for sodomy or her debased view of the world; rather, it is the
fact that Samson, Guy, and Keith all insist upon giving imaginative life to the cliche
she represents.
What really interests Amis, and what should interest critics, is not how
debased and cliched a character is Nicola Six but the criticism of contemporary
masculinity that Amis introduces through her. Despite many critics' perception of
622 1 would like to thank Judy Bunch for pointing out that the idea that Nicola is not a real
person but just another stereotype is supported by her last name, Six. She is just another version of an
already-existing model, as in the science-fiction television show Battlestar Gallactica. In this show,
the human-shaped Cylons (robots) are all known by their model numbers and the sex-bot Cylon model
is known as number Six.
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him as a misogynist, Amis's disagreements with his father's chauvinistic prejudices
towards women are well documented, and he has actually gone so far as to label
himself a feminist.623 In many ways, London Fields can be read as an illustration of
how and why hegemonic masculinity is such a dangerous and debilitating factor in
Western society. Amis reiterates critics' assertion that, '[i]t would hardly be
exaggeration to say that hegemonic masculinity is hegemonic so far as it embodies a
successful strategy in relation to women.'624 By focusing on the three male characters
through Nicola, Amis implies that these three men need women like Nicola in order
to exist. They need a feminine 'other' not only to attempt to dominate or control but
actually to define themselves against. Hence Nicola's chameleon-like qualities: she is
a virgin for Guy, a succubus for Keith, and an aloof intellectual for Samson. Indeed,
considering that all we know of Nicola is through Samson, for whom Nicola has
provided her 'diaries', we must be cynical as to whether or not he can actually have
revealed anything about her 'true' character at all. The fact that we know nothing
about Nicola except through a male cipher emphasizes the idea that Nicola cannot
really exist: throughout the novel she is only the projected image of the various male
protagonists' needs and desires.
In this sense, Amis does far more than just reiterate received ideas about a
masculinity that is supposedly 'in crisis.' Instead, he offers elements of a radical
critique of the development and reproduction of some of the foundational assumptions
of normative heterosexuality in modern liberal Western society. In his scathing
critique of many aspects of contemporary masculinity theory, Anthony McMahon
explains what he calls 'the "negative" nature of male identity':
623 See Keulks 179.
624 Carrigan, et al. 592.
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[. ..] whereby boys, in the absence of concrete male models, are supposed to
construct their identities through a rejection of everything feminine. This kind
of analysis leads some to argue that 'masculinity is the weaker of the gender
constructs' and that as a result men encounter 'unique problems' of identity,
and suffer from 'emotional shallowness.' Such accounts, implicitly or
explicitly, construct a female 'other' who is not emotionally damaged: her
relational potential is intact, her emotional needs are acknowledged.625
McMahon proposes that there is a subtext within contemporary masculinity studies
that encourages the masculine subject to create a feminine other against which to
define himself as a man. Amis suggests a critical affinity with this theory in his
creation of Nicola Six. Nicola represents a female 'other' against which the male
characters define themselves, butfirst they create her in order to do so. Guy already
has an energetic and confident wife against which he could define himself, but he
rejects Hope in favour of the weak and victimized virgin that he is so absurdly eager
to see in Nicola. Keith is married to a wife he dominates and abuses, but he too seeks
out Nicola's representation of his 'ideal' woman: a pornographic doll who comports
herself like a moll in a gangster film. Even Samson, the writer, pushes away the
'real' women in his life but falls prey to the perfect narrative device, the Murderee,
that will give him the novel he so desperately desires. That all of these types of
women are models of victimization is not an accident, for what Amis alludes to is
Whitehead's and Barrett's chilling conclusion that 'anti-femininity lies at the heart of
masculinity.'626 And so Amis's overarching theme in London Fields is not one of
misogyny or chauvinism. Rather, he warns that masculinity is not automatically
defined by a pre-existing and coherent feminine 'other,' but that men actively pursue
their own desired self-image through largely imaginary images of femininity that
enable them to indulge their own fantasies of power and control at the expense of
women and femininity. It is, in this context, a considerable irony that so much
625 McMahon 688.
626 Whitehead and Barrett 23.
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contemporary liberal and feminist literary criticism takes for its subject a text like
London's Fields whose critique of modem social relations chimes so profoundly with
its own underlying principles.
Masculinity in Confession: Portnoy's Complaint
Lying on his psychoanalyst's couch, Alexander Portnoy begins to tell of the
triumvirate that dominated his childhood: his overbearing Jewish mother, his
constipated Jewish father, and the goyische world that they held before him as
representative of all that was wicked, polluted, and free. In a continuous and slightly
hysterical monologue, he confesses to his mother-obsessed childhood, his
masturbation-obsessed adolescence, and to the sins of his adult life. At 33 years of
age, he is in public a defender of the poor and the voiceless, while privately he lives a
shame-filled, lascivious existence shtupping as many shikses as he can lay his hands
on.627 Roth claims that he wrote Portnoy partly out of revenge, that he was tired of
being accused of making both his Jewish and female readers nervous with his
representations of his co-religionists and women. And so he created Portnoy, with his
'apertures spurting' torrents of obscene language and sexual content.628 When asked
whether Jews would be offended by his characterization of Portnoy, Roth wryly
replied, 'I think there will even be Gentiles who will be offended by this book.'627 As
suggested, Roth knew how controversial Portnoy's Complaint would be, and yet even
he admits to being surprised at its notoriety and how much its publication affected his
private life. In an interview he makes reference to how, seemingly overnight, he
627 Different sources spell the word shikse differently. In Roth, it is spelled as it is here, but in
much of the commentary it appears as shiksa.
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Press of Mississippi, 1992) 196.
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became a celebrity and as such a 'brand name,' as in, 'Ivory is the soap that floats;
Rice Krispies the breakfast cereal that goes snap-crackle-pop; Philip Roth the Jew
who masturbates with a piece of liver.'630 Portnoy's Complaint became a succes de
scandale, bringing Roth attention not only from the synagogues and academic circles
that Roth expected but from the world of popular culture as well.
One reason for the novel's infamy is its use of vulgar language as well as
explicit sexual content. As a critic explains:
Although its treatment of sexuality and use of obscenity might seem
unexceptional and unexceptionable to a twenty-first century readership
accustomed to erotic imagery in advertising, on television, and in the cinema
(as well as in fiction and fine art), its candid, detailed discussion of onanism
was revolutionary in the late sixties, and its language was sufficiently explicit
to ensure that it was banned from many public libraries in the United States.631
Certainly David Brauner is right to remind us just how shocking Portnoy 's Complaint
would have been at the time of its publication, yet even today there is very little in the
novel that could be considered 'unexceptionable.' Take the case of Portnoy's
language, which is far more than merely 'explicit.' Portnoy uses language to disarm
those around him, and his wit and intellect lend his verbal attacks brutal force. Even
without obscenities his language can be vicious, as is exemplified by this scene in
which he addresses his hospitalized mother's respect for their rabbi who took the time
to visit her before surgery:
Mother, Rabbi Warshaw is a fat, pompous, impatient fraud, with an absolutely
grotesque superiority complex, a character out of Dickens is what he is,
someone who if you stood next to him on the bus and didn't know he was so
revered, you would say, 'That man stinks to high heaven of cigarettes,' and
that is all you would say.632
630 Philip Roth, in an interview with Alan Finkielkraut, 'The Ghosts of Roth', Conversations
with Philip Roth, ed. George J. Seales, Literary Conversations Series (1981; Jackson, MS: University
Press of Mississippi, 1992) 120.
631 David Brauner, '"Getting in Your Retaliation First": Narrative Strategies in Portnoy's
Complaint', Philip Roth: New Perspectives on an American Author, ed. Derek Parker Royal (Westport,
CT: Praeger Publishers, 2005) 44-45.
32 Philip Roth, Portnoy's Complaint (1967; London: Vintage, 1999) 73.
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Secondly, Roth's description of onanism is more than just candid or precise. It is also
wildly, exceptionably inventive, even by today's standards. Roth's aforementioned
comment about being 'the Jew who masturbates with liver' refers to a scene from the
novel in which Portnoy masturbates with a liver bought by his mother. He confesses,
'I had [the liver] in the privacy of my own home, rolled round my cock in the
bathroom at three-thirty—and then had [it] again on the end of a fork, at five-thirty,
along with the other members of that poor innocent family of mine.'633 Even the most
jaded of contemporary readers will balk at a character who admits that 'I fucked my
own family's dinner.'634 Finally, there is the broader question of sex and sexual
relationships. It is not just what Portnoy does, although he certainly intends to shock
with his confessed activities, but it is why he says he does it. The most controversial
and much-discussed example of Portnoy's ability to offend not only the prurient but
also women and fellow Jews is his explanation for why he has such varied sex with so
many shikses. Thinking aloud for his psychoanalyst, he ponders his relationship with
a girl he calls 'The Pilgrim', an upper-class Protestant girl of New England extraction
whose upbringing of boarding schools, equestrian sports, and debutante society all
represent the east coast establishment. He finally comes to the conclusion that 'I
don't seem to stick my dick up these girls, as much as I stick it up their
backgrounds—as though through fucking I will discover America. Conquer
America—maybe that's more like it.'635 By declaring that he uses gentile women to
'conquer' whatever aspect of American culture that they represent—in this case,
WASP culture—Portnoy marks himself as a problem for most readers, and especially
for both Jewish and female readers.
633 Roth, Portnoy's Complaint 134.
634 Roth, Portnoy's Complaint 134.
635 Roth, Portnoy's Complaint 235.
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It is in these scenes in which Portnoy explains his need to define himself
against the identity of a feminine 'other' that the real power and controversy of the
book comes into focus. For rather than merely introducing a series of shocking
images and opinions, Roth is identifying a fundamental problem with masculine
identify-formation, at the same time that he anticipates and challenges the notion that
masculinity is in crisis. While many critics believe the novel to be proof of Roth's
hatred of women and evidence of his own misogynistic imagination, I argue that
Portnoy's Complaint warns against the dangers of the masculine subject defining
itself through a necessarily dehumanized feminine 'other.' Furthermore, rather than
indulging in any so-called Jewish anti-Semitism, Roth slyly uses his own experience
as an ethnic minority self-defined by its otherness to suggest that American men in
general are encouraged to define themselves through a dichotomized relationship with
the rest of the world. And it is the very fact that Portnoy cannot see any other reality
than his own that is Roth's final damnation of Portnoy's deluded and narcissistic
masculinity.
To begin with, the idea of what 'type' of author Philip Roth is must be
examined. Is he a Jewish writer, a Jewish-American writer, or an American writer?
Although this question may appear at first glance to be either explanatory or beside
the point, it actually dominates much of the extant criticism concerning Philip Roth
and his work. As can be seen from Roth's battles with Commentary, Irving Howe,
and Norman Podhoretz, many of Roth's fiercest critics have been fellow Jews who
not only assume Roth's identity to be that of a Jewish writer but base their criticism
on their belief that, as a Jew, he should be more sympathetic towards his Jewish
subjects. Even in academia, as Debra Shostak describes, much of the existing work
on Roth takes as its position the idea that '[ajlthough "the Jew" is only one of his
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concerns—as a subject that recurs in a variety of positions—it is a fundamental
feature of his take on the world.'636 While the influence of Judaism and Jewish
culture on Roth's writing as well as his worldview is important and undeniable, Roth
is also a deeply American writer. In fact, Roth self-consciously explores that version
of American identity that is 'the Ethnic Minority,' and theorizes how being part of an
ethnic minority in America is actually in itself a. fundamentally American experience.
In other words, whilst Roth is certainly, in many ways, a Jewish writer, he
understands that his ethnic and religious minority status actually makes him more,
rather then less, American. He develops this position in an interview:
My point is that my America in no way resembles the France or the England I
would have grown up in as a Jewish child. It was not a matter of a few of us
and all of them. What I saw was a few of everyone. Rather than growing up
intimidated by the monolithic majority—or in defiance or in awe of it—I grew
up feeling a part of the majority composed of the competing minorities, no one
of which impressed me as being in a more enviable social or cultural position
than our own.637
In his own words, Roth acknowledges his Jewish upbringing as one that was actually
very American, and, as one critic points out, a Roth hero can never 'forget that he is
both Jewish and American' [emphasis mine].638 This is not to say that Roth is
unaware of anti-Semitism or the experiences of other Jews in other countries. In the
same interview, he remarks that he is very much aware of the 'tragic dimension of
Jewish life in Europe,' explaining that it was in the discrepancies between his own
experience of life in America versus what he knows about life for Jews elsewhere that
he 'found the terrain' for Portnoy 's Complaint.
636 Debra Shostak, Philip Roth: Countertexts, Counterlives (Columbia, SC: University of
South Carolina, 2004) 11.
637 Roth, in an interview with Finkielkraut, 127.
638 Frederic Cople Jaher, 'The Quest for the Ultimate Shiska', American Quarterly, Vol. 35,
No. 5 (Winter, 1983): 528.
639 Roth, in an interview with Finkielkraut, 127.
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The idea of finding discrepancies between different people's lived experiences
is of utmost importance to Portnoy's Complaint, and it introduces a second and more
significant reason than the fact of its vulgarity to explain why the novel so thoroughly
captured the public imagination. In focusing on a male protagonist who does,
genuinely, want to be a good man—both in the sense of being moral and in the sense
of being a thoroughly masculine subject—but whose desire to be good clashes with
both his sexual desires and his overt attempts to define himself through a sexualized
and debased feminine 'other,' Roth anticipated those anxieties that would later be
diagnosed as a 'crisis of masculinity.' Consequently, in 1967, Roth presciently
created a figure who embodied aspects of masculine anxiety and turmoil years before
they would coalesce into the "'men's movement' of the 1970s'.640 Portnoy's own
tumultuous masculinity is evident in his divided life. On the one hand, Portnoy's
adult life, at least as it is lived in public, appears to be successful and disciplined.
Having made a promising start as a civil rights lawyer by winning high profile cases
while still in his twenties, Portnoy has been made the Assistant Commissioner of
Human Opportunity for the City of New York.641 Previously he had worked as
counsel in a House Sub-Committee of the United States Congress, and he is a regular
fixture at parties at Gracie Mansion, home to the Mayor of New York City.642
Upwardly mobile in career terms, he is also portrayed as a figure of august moral
rectitude - at least in public. Thus, he is currently 'conducting an investigation of
unlawful discriminatory practices in the building trades of New York' that involves
him in the fight against 'racial discrimination',(M And if his career success was not
enough, he is accompanied at openings, parties and to restaurants by a bevy of
640 Carrigan, et al. 578.
641 Roth, Portnoy's Complaint 110.
642 Roth, Portnoy's Complaint 110, 213.
643 Roth, Portnoy's Complaint 110.
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beautiful women. On the social surface, at the very least, Alexander Portnoy appears
to have it all.
But hidden underneath his successful exterior, Portnoy's life conceals a dark
secret. First, he feels anything but successful, a fact he blames on his parents. Early
in the novel a hysterical Portnoy exclaims, 'Good Christ, a Jewish man with parents
alive is a fifteen-year-old-boy, and will remain a fifteen-year old boy till they die\,M4
He feels he is trapped in the role of 'the smothered son in the Jewish joke' similar to
the joke that he often repeats in which the Jewish mother runs down the beach crying
for help, shouting 'my son the doctor is drowning! [emphasis mine]'.645 Although
both of his parents are central to the book, it is this stereotyped character of the Jewish
mother who really draws the ire of both academic critics as well as Portnoy himself.
For it is his mother who really dominates: she dominates his childhood, she dominates
his father, and she dominates her household. So tyrannical is his mother's presence
that Portnoy feels he lives in a Panopticon of his mother's design, having, as a child,
internalized the paranoid delusion that she can see his every move and hear his every
thought whatever his wishes. Meanwhile, she keeps her children under surveillance
in order to ensure that she has succeeded in passing on what she believes are good
Jewish values such as cleanliness, family affiliation, and a good appetite—but only
for the sort of wholesome, kosher food cooked by a Jewish wife and mother. The
punishment for challenging these values is to be locked out of the house or, in
extreme cases such as the refusal to eat, his mother will 'pull a knife on her own
son'.646 Standing above him with a bread knife while he fearfully gulps down his
dinner, she asks him the questions that will haunt him for the rest of his life. She
demands to know how he wants to be perceived as an adult: as 'weak or strong, a
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success or a failure, a man or a mouse?'647 But having reached adulthood, Portnoy
cannot reconcile the image of the boy with a knife-wielding mother hovering above
him with the image of a strong and successful man.
Against this domestic background, Portnoy blames his family, and especially
his mother, for unsettling his ideas of what manhood should be and making it difficult
for him to become an integrated masculine subject. He also blames them for forcing
upon him an entirely schismatic view of the world. For one of the definitive lessons
his mother teaches him is the allegedly essential differences between Jews and
Gentiles. Typically, even this lesson is connected to food:
Self-control, sobriety, sanctions—this is the key to a human life, saith all those
endless dietary laws. Let the goyim sink their teeth into whatever lowly
creature crawls and grunts across the face of the dirty earth, we will not
contaminate our humanity thus. Let them (if you know who I mean) gorge
themselves upon anything and everything that moves, no matter how odious
and abject the animal, not matter how grotesque or shmutzig or dumb the
creature in question happens to be. Let them eat eels and frogs and pigs and
crabs and lobsters; let them eat vulture, let them eat ape-meat and skunk if
they like—a diet of abominable creatures well befits a breed of man-kind so
hopelessly shallow and empty-headed as to drink, to divorce, and to fight with
their fists.648
According to Portnoy's vexed recollection, his childish worldview was subjected to
an artificial distinction between us and them: the clean, good, and deserving Jews
versus the filthy, brutish, and absolutely undeserving gentiles. He claims bitterly that
'the very first distinction' he learned from his parents 'was not night and day, or hot
and cold, but goyische and Jewish!'649 On the one hand, as critics point out, this
division is to a certain extent an inevitable outgrowth of Judaism's complex set of
dietary laws:
The Jewish world is defined and controlled by dietary laws which stipulate
what can be eaten and what cannot be eaten and to some extent how food is to
be eaten. Consumption of the wrong food threatens ill-health. [. . .] Contrasted
647 Roth, Portnoy's Complaint 16.
648 Roth, Portnoy's Complaint 81.
649 Roth, Portnoy's Complaint 75.
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to Jewish cleanliness and order, forbidden and therefore polluting food and
disorder are chazerai; they partake of the realm of the Goyim. In other words,
there is a direct symbolic association amongst non-Jewish customs, forbidden
food, disorder, filth, pollution and ill-health.650
Breaking bread with strange gentiles is depicted as not only physically hazardous but
also unsafe in the sense that contact with outsiders threatens to divide and pollute the
community. On the other hand, maintaining the separate society that this division
requires means that the next generation can have no experience of the world outside
of the community, producing 'a trained incompetence towards it, comprised of a
physical, emotional and social incapacity.'651 Besides making children ignorant of the
outside world, maintaining this division has another effect, and that is the
mythologizing of the goyische universe. In fact many of Portnoy's neurotic
obsessions can be traced back to his ignorance regarding the ordinary lives of gentile
Americans. As one critic advises, had the Portnoys stayed in the integrated Jersey
City, and not moved to the almost exclusively Jewish Weequahic, then 'the mystery
and allure of the gentile/American world might have been early dispelled and
Portnoy's attraction to it, based as it is on myth and fantasy, might have been
modified by reality.'652 Because she tried to instil a division between her son and the
world of the goyim, Portnoy believes that his mother is actually responsible for his
most unhealthy and shameful secret: his childhood obsession with gentiles that has
transformed into his compulsive desire for sex with shikses.
Portnoy's obsession with sex begins as an adolescent during a period of his
life that he subtitles 'Whacking Off.'653 While his early childhood is defined by his
desire to please his parents, he soon desires only to please himself. He admits to
650 Alan Segal, 'Portnoy's Complaint and the Sociology of Literature,' The British Journal of
Sociology, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Sep. 1971); 263.
651 Segal 264.
652 Barry Gross, 'Seduction of the Innocent: Portnoy's Complaint and Popular Culture,'
MELUS, Vol. 8, No. 4, The Ethnic American Dream (Winter 1981): 81.
653 Roth, Portnoy's Complaint 17.
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spending 'halfmy waking life [. . .] locked behind the bathroom door, firing my wad'
not only into the toilet bowl or the laundry hamper, but even into his own mouth, 'to
take that sticky sauce of buttermilk and Clorox on my own tongue and teeth'.654
Portnoy shamefully admits to being so out of control that he could not 'cut down to
one hand-job a day'; soon he finds himselfmasturbating 'before,' 'after,' even
Ydjuring meals'655 Claiming at one point to have been 'stricken with diarrhea', he
rushes from the dinner table, locks himself in the bathroom, slips over his head 'a pair
of underpants [. . .] stolen from [his] sister's dresser', and attempts to prove his
position as 'the Raskalnikov of jerking off—the sticky evidence is everywhere!'656
Portnoy blames his excessive onanism on the association of his mother's well-laden
dinner table with his understanding of her as a tyrant threatening him with castration
by bread knife if he dare not eat her food. He underscores the justice of this
interpretation by depicting her hovering outside the bathroom door and demanding 'I
want to see what you've done in there.'657 His obsession with masturbating coupled
with his family's strict adherence to purity and hygiene means that he lives in the
shadow of perpetual shame, and he is stricken with irrational fears as a boy. Finding a
hitherto unnoticed freckle on his penis, he is convinced he has developed cancer as a
punishment for his relentless onanism.658 Portnoy fears that his shame over his sexual
desires coupled with his deep-rooted longing to be both good and pure by his
mother's standards means that he can never be a 'real' man. In an oft-quoted tirade
he angrily denounces his family and their beliefs:
It's a family joke that when I was a tiny child I turned from the window out of
which I was watching a snowstorm, and hopefully asked, 'Momma, do we
believe in winter?' Do you get what I'm saying? I was raised by Hottentots
654 Roth, Portnoy's Complaint 18.
655 Roth, Portnoy's Complaint 19.
656 Roth, Portnoy's Complaint 19-20.
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and Zulus! I couldn't even contemplate drinking a glass of milk with my
salami sandwich without giving serious offense to God Almighty. Imagine
then what my conscience gave me for all that jerking off! The guilt, the
fears—the terror bred into my bones! What in their world was not charged
with danger, dripping with germs, fraught with peril? Oh, where was the
gusto, where was the boldness and courage? Who filled these parents of mine
with such a fearful sense of life?659
Portnoy fears that his parents' vision of life, with what he perceives as its lack of
appreciation for pleasure or courage or masculine vitality, has feminized him. One of
Portnoy's major complaints is his belief that his disaffection from traditional
masculine values as a boy means that as a man he must somehow be found wanting,
and it is following this angry repudiation of his parents' attitudes and values that
Portnoy asks his analysis to 'bless me with manhood', and to 'make me whole.'660
Through the process of psychoanalysis, Portnoy hopes to shed the fixations on caution
and cleanliness that he believes his parents bred in him and embrace a more active
and aggressive set of masculine traits.
Portnoy's infamous obsession with sex and shikses is partly a response to this
desperate desire to prove his masculine worth. His obsession with gentile women
begins early in life, and he contrasts his intense interest for shikses with his irritation
for just about everyone else.661 Usually he glowers at the manifold 'idiocy' of both
the Jews and the goyim, yet amongst the 'kerchiefs and caps' of ice-skating gentile
girls he is unaccountably 'ecstatic.'662 It is not just 'the way they look, they way they
move and laugh and speak' that arrests his attention; he becomes fascinated with 'the
lives they must lead behind those goyische curtains.'663 Curtains in this novel bear a
heavy symbolic weight: the frills and flounces that adorn gentile windows are
contrasted with the cold practicality of his mother's coveted and much-loved
659 Roth, Portnoy's Complaint 34-35.
660 Roth, Portnoy's Complaint 35.
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'aluminum "Venetians".'664 For Sophie Portnoy frilly curtains symbolise the gentile
obsession with mere decoration rather than the substantive values embodied in
familial fidelity and religious devotion. Yet for her son these luxurious adornments
gesture towards a world of goyische hedonism in which gentiles have seemingly
unlimited access to the types of pleasure from which Jewish tribal loyalty and purity
laws have excluded him. The slats of his mother's Venetian blinds appear to him as
horizontal prison bars through which he peers at a fantastic world of inaccessible
sensual delight. Everything changes, however, in the moment when his future
brother-in-law, Morty, orders him a lobster in a New York City restaurant.665 Where
once he felt like a prisoner, now he feels free, and "maybe the lobster," he reflects, "is
what did it' 666 Portnoy theorizes that Morty proved the taboo against eating lobster
to be 'so easily and simply broken,' thus teaching him the lesson 'that to break the
law, all you have to do is—just go ahead and break it!'667 And that night, to celebrate
his newly wrought independence and to cement its connection to pleasure, breaking
taboos, and gentile women, he masturbates on the train next to a sleeping gentile girl
'in the seat beside me, whose tartan skirt folds I had begun to press up against with
the corduroy of my trouser legs'.668 For Portnoy, as this passage attests, both
independence and pleasure are inextricably linked to a cultural fantasy: the image of
the beautiful shikse within whose affections he can finally enter the mythological
realm of a goyische Utopia free of restrictions.
Besides his mother, the reader is specifically introduced to four other women
who dominate Alexander's imagination: the first three are, ostensibly, real, while the
last is openly a fantasy. The first of the figures is the Pumpkin, Kay Campbell,
664 Roth, Portnoy's Complaint 148.
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Portnoy's girlfriend at his decidedly goyische college of Antioch.669 The Pumpkin
stands out in Portnoy's catalogue of gentile ladies simply because she seems to be the
most solidly realized of the four. A sturdy girl from the mid-west, Portnoy calls her
the Pumpkin not only because of her 'pigmentation' and 'the size of her can' but also
because she was 'hard as a gourd on matters of moral principle'.670 Alone amidst his
bevy of beauties, Kay Campbell is distinguishable because she is the only woman he
admits to envying, in her case for her moral stubbornness.571 To say this is not to say
that the Pumpkin does not also accrue her share of ridicule; Portnoy's recollections of
his visit to her house—his first to an entirely gentile domain—begin in admiration and
end in his poking fun at the banal breakfast patter of her family.672 But his real
vituperation is saved for the other two examples of Portnoy's real-life lovers: the
Pilgrim and the Monkey. The "Pilgrim" is in actuality Sarah Abbott Maulsby of
'New Canaan, Foxcroft, and Vassar'.673 Whereas Kay Campbell was middle-class
and mid-western, the Pilgrim is precisely what her aristocratic soubriquet suggests: a
young woman who can probably trace her lineage back to the Mayflower. She is a
member of the invisible but powerful American aristocracy, and she bears all of the
accompanying traits and gifts of that privileged caste. In his relationship with Sarah
Abbott Maulsby, or the Pilgrim, Portnoy seems to have reacted to her aristocratic
lineage by attempting to use her as a portal through which to enter high society. But
Portnoy takes his claim that he uses the Pilgrim to 'stick it up their |WASP American]
backgrounds,' a step further by also associating her with his father's employer, Mr.
Lindabury-674 This association is important to Portnoy and crucial to the novel. His
669 Rolh, Portnoy's Complaint 215.
670 Rolh, Portnoy's Complaint 216.
671 Roth, Portnoy's Complaint 216.
677 Roth, Portnoy's Complaint 219-226.
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245
father works for an insurance company who will not promote a Jew to manager and
he, therefore, spends his life scraping by, beset by perpetual bouts of constipation that
represent his stifled existence. And so Portnoy divulges that 'Sally Maulsby was just
something nice a son once did for his dad. A little vengeance on Mr. Lindabury for
all those nights and Sundays Jack Portnoy spent collecting down in the colored
district. A little bonus from Boston and Northeastern, for all those years of service,
and exploitation.'675 In his convoluted verbal testimony Portnoy confesses to self¬
consciously using Sally Maulsby not only to 'stick [his] dick' up her background, but
also to exploit her in the way that he feels his father was exploited by the social class
she represents. In these regards, the Pilgrim appears to have no real existence for
Portnoy besides his fantasized image of her as representative of a certain American
class.
On the opposite side of the social divide from the Pilgrim is the Monkey, so-
named for a sexual exploit she performed with a banana.676 While the Pilgrim hails
from the highest American social class, the Monkey comes from the lowest stratum of
the working classes. She is practically illiterate, culturally crass, and
pornographically sexualized throughout the novel. In one episode she cries out to
Portnoy, 'Oh, sweetheart, darling [. . .] pick a hole, any hole, I'm yours!'677 While
Portnoy professes delight in his new girlfriend's lack of inhibitions, his thoughts on
the matter reveal a dark undercurrent:
What strength she has stored in that slender frame—the glorious acrobatics
she can perform while dangling from the end of my dork! You'd think she'd
snap a vertebra, hanging half her torso backward over the side of the bed—in
ecstasy! Yi! Thank God for that gym class she goes to! What screwing I am
getting! What a deal! And yet it turns out that she is also a human being—
yes, she gives every indication that this may be so! A human being! Who can
be loved!
675 Roth, Portnoy's Complaint 240-241.
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But by me?678
The sad fact that Portnoy doubts he can love this girl who so desperately wants to
marry him is overshadowed by the horrifying fact that he seems to be surprised at her
very humanity. He exhibits neither compassion nor respect for the Monkey. And yet
this lack of respect should not be unexpected, considering what we know of his
feelings for the Pilgrim. After all, Portnoy uses Sally Maulsby to humiliate and
dominate the upper-class establishment that discriminates against Jews by barring
them access to opportunity. But whereas Mr. Lindabury and his ilk may hide their
anti-Semitism behind a corporate structure, the Monkey represents exactly the kind of
coarse, uneducated, drunk and violent goyishe world that Portnoy's mother warned
him about and that scarred her ancestors' lives in Eastern Europe. By sexually
humiliating the Monkey and the Pilgrim, Portnoy attempts to strip two of his
childhood nemeses of their power: the spectre of the privileged gentile who represents
the powers that be as well as the openly and violently anti-Semitic underclass. These
women are the two most obvious examples in the novel of Portnoy's utilization of
female figures to dominate aspects of the larger world that he both fears and hates.
There is, however, a final feminine figure who recurs throughout Portnoy's
Complaint but unlike the Pilgrim and the Monkey she receives very little critical
attention. This figure is Thereal McCoy, Portnoy's wholly imaginary feminine alter-
ego. When Portnoy was young, he imagined Thereal as the paragon of his ice-skating
companions:
In her blue parka and her red earmuffs and her big white mittens—Miss
America, on blades! With her mistletoe and her plum pudding (whatever that
may be), and her one-family house with a banister and a staircase, and parents
who are tranquil and patient and dignified, and also a brother Billy who knows
67lt Roth, Portnoy's Complaint 194.
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how to take motors apart and says 'Much obliged,' and isn't afraid of anything
physical [.. ,].679
Thereal originally represents the sort of wholesome, mild-mannered American
existence that Portnoy feels is this opposite of his own insular, argumentative and
ritual-obsessed home-life. But with the onset of puberty, she evolves into Portnoy's
ultimate shik.se sex-goddess:
She pushes Drake's Daredevil Cupcakes (chocolate with a white creamy
center) down over my cock and then eats them off of me, flake by flake. She
pours maple syrup out of the Log Cabin can and then licks it from my tender
balls until they're clean again as a little baby boy's. Her favourite line of
English prose is a masterpiece: 'Fuck my pussy, Fuckface, till I faint.' When I
fart in the bathtub, she kneels naked on the tile floor, leans all the way over,
and kisses the bubbles. She sits on my cock while I take a shit, plunging into
my mouth a nipple the size of a tollhouse cookie, and all the while whispering
every filthy word she knows viciously into my ear.680
Thereal functions for Portnoy as the representation of a number of his obsessional
fantasies. Most obviously, this catalogue of food and defecation related sexual
depravity continues Portnoy's connection of chazerai and gentile America with
pleasure and sexual gratification but also dirt and corruption. Moreover, while
Thereal may be Portnoy's fantasy figure of smut personified—filthy, corrupt, and
corrupting—she is also, like Portnoy's girlfriends, inextricably tied to a version of
America. This identification is underscored by her litany of brand-named sexual
props: Tollhouse cookies, Log Cabin Syrup, and Drake's Daredevil Cupcakes. Just
like the Pilgrim, the Pumpkin, and the Monkey, Thereal McCoy symbolizes an aspect
of American life, in this case that of conspicuous consumption and materialism. Her
caricatured sexuality also makes her an excellent example of Portnoy's misogynistic
imagination. But what is most interesting about this figure is that Thereal is explicitly
679 Roth, Portnoy's Complaint 151.
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a fantasy, and yet she seems to play as important a role in Portnoy's understanding of
his emotional and psychological development as the real women in his life.
Along with Thereal McCoy, Portnoy's other great fantasy counterpart,
Seymour Schmuck, deserves critical attention. Portnoy introduces Seymour as a
caricatured amalgamation of all the 'perfect' Jewish sons that his mother is constantly
telling him about, presumably as proof of his own filial failings:
[. . .] Seymour is now the biggest brain surgeon in the entire Western
Hemisphere. He owns six different split-level ranch-type houses made all of
fieldstone in Livingston, and belongs to the boards of eleven synagogues, all
brand new and designed by Marc Kugel, and last year with his wife and his
two little daughters, who are so beautiful that they are already under contract
to Metro, and so brilliant that they should be in college—he took them all to
Europe for an eighty-million-dollar tour of seven-thousand countries, some of
them you never even heard of, that they made them just to honor Seymour,
and on top of that, he's so important, Seymour, that in every single city in
Europe that they visited he was asked by the mayor himself to stop and do an
impossible operation on a brain in hospitals that they also built for him right
on the spot, and—listen to this—where they pumped into the operating room
during the operation the theme song from Exodus so everybody should know
what religion he is—and that's how big your friend Seymour is today! And
how happy he makes his parents !681
To Portnoy, Seymour represents the sort of man that he feels has been made into a
mouse by the expectations of family and religious community. He may be wealthy
and successful, but he has lived his life only to make others happy. He lacks the
vitality and wilfulness that Portnoy associates with the non-Jewish man, and, instead,
exemplifies only the obedience and passivity of the infantile Jewish son. Seymour
Schmuck is further evidence of Portnoy's belief that to be a Jewish son means to be a
boy for the majority of one's life. Just as Thereal McCoy represents Portnoy's most
chauvinistic fantasies, many readers perceive Seymour Schmuck as evidence of
Portnoy's latent anti-Semitism. In a similar vein, Portnoy's indulgences with gentile
women are often depicted as proof that he is a self-hating Jew. An all-too-familiar
681
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reading of the book represents Portnoy's 'shiksa fantasies' as his 'insurrections
against his parents and Judaism' as well as 'his own divided personality'.682
According to Frederic Cople Jaher, this reading focuses on Portnoy's belief that '[t]he
well-behaved achiever', such as Seymour Schmuck, 'should be rewarded with the
girl-next-door in an upper-class WASP neighbourhood, but the shameful prisoner of
lust,' such as Alexander Portnoy, 'deserves (and craves) the shiksa whore.'68' In this
reading, Portnoy's exploitation of his gentile women represents a fantasy of revenge
against his Jewish family and their Jewish traditions. While this reading of Alexander
Portnoy is certainly accurate, it also indicates the common perception that it is not
Alexander Portnoy, but Philip Roth, who sought to use this novel as his revenge
against the Judaism he resents. It is my contention, however, that Portnoy's
Complaint is not about being Jewish but about being a man. While Portnoy blames
his inability to be a man specifically on his Jewish upbringing, Roth undermines an
entirely 'Jewish' reading of the book through the curiously American characterization
of Seymour Schmuck.
That Seymour Schmuck is more than just a jibe against Jewish masculinity can
be discerned from his description. Excepting the theme song from Exodus, Seymour
Schmuck is as much a fantasy version of the American Dream as he is the self-
regarding pseudo-lament of a Jewish mother.684 Schmuck is a man who has 'made it'
not in the sense of spiritual enlightenment or religious observance but in the sense of
physical prosperity and material success. Whilst he is obviously well educated, a
good father, and involved in the community, all representative of so-called 'good
Jewish values', these aspects of his life are actually used to prove his success, rather
682 Jaher 540.
683 Jaher 540.
684 And although the subject of Exodus is explicitly Jewish, it was also a big-budget,
successful Hollywood film that did well at the Oscars. As such, it too is as much a symbol of worldly
success as it is 'Jewish'.
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than his integrity. After all, his education is evidenced by his success in the very
lucrative career of surgeon, a career that allows him to travel Europe exhibiting his
skill. His strengths as a father are substantiated by the beauty and brains of his
daughters, whom his money clothes and educates to the highest degree. Even his
participation in religion and community, as represented by his work in various
synagogues, is overshadowed by both the number of synagogues involved as well the
fact that they are 'all brand new and all designed by Marc Kugel'. Indeed, the words
that dominate Seymour's descriptions are various adjectives for 'new' as well as the
figures for the amounts ofmoney he is either paid or spends. Seymour Schmuck is a
success because of his new-world material success, rather than old-world spiritual
enlightenment. There is also an evident banality evinced by the imagination that
would invent Seymour Schmuck: he does not own mansions or estates, but 'split-level
ranch-type houses'. While this could be Portnoy's jibe at what he imagines is his
parent's own lack of imagination, the figure of Seymour Schmuck actually echoes
Portnoy's admiring description of the Pumpkin's modest but ail-American success of
a father, who is a 'real estate broker and an alderman of the Davenport town
council'.685 For 'All-American Success' is exactly what Seymour Schmuck is: he is
economically well-off, has standing in his community, and, above all, is someone
whom others looks up to as a man. Indeed, in many ways, Seymour Schmuck is
really just a grossly exaggerated caricature of those very-same values that Portnoy
holds up to his parents as proof of his own maturity and achievement. He attempts to
force his parents to treat him as an adult by reminding them of his success as a lawyer,
his friendship with important figures such as the mayor of New York City, and his
ethical credentials: he works for congress and he fights racism. He wants them to see
685 Roth, Portnoy's Complaint 221.
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him as an important man who holds a deserved position of respect in his society. And
yet these same traits are those of Seymour Schmuck, whom he associates not with
manliness, but with being 'good'. They are the opposite of those values he yearns for
when he cries out to his father, asking him where is his 'gusto', 'boldness' and 'sense
of life'.686
Rather than locating Portnoy's complaint in the 'real' relationships he has with
the 'real' characters in the book, I locate the heart of his conflict in his fantasy realm
where it inheres between his two creations of Seymour Schmuck and Thereal McCoy.
These two characters represent the rifts in Portnoy's philosophies, as well as the
illogical nature of his desires. Indeed, far from identifying with or justifying Portnoy
and his various obsessions, Roth carefully and relentlessly undermines his
protagonist's assumptions through Portnoy's relationship to the two opposing
fantasies represented by Seymour and Thereal. Although Alexander certainly cannot
see it, Roth elliptically suggests that Sophie Portnoy's definition of a 'good' son and
man is, for the most part, a very American definition of masculinity based upon
'respectable' virtues such as material success, familial devotion, and community
standing. In this sense Seymour Schmuck could easily exchange places with the
Pumpkin's utterly Midwestern father, that humble example of virtue, affection and
material achievement. But what of Thereal McCoy? Reflecting upon the role of
popular culture in Portnoy's Complaint, Barry Gross argues that Portnoy's connection
to popular culture, especially through radio and cinema, not only defines his
unrealistic vision of gentiles and America, but also explicitly connects the gentile
world with America: 'all American is "Coy!".'687 While I disagree with this last
aspect of Gross's reading, his argument that Portnoy is heavily influenced by the radio
686 Roth, Portnoy's Complaint 35.
687 Gross 83.
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and cinema of his childhood lends an interesting interpretation to the end of the
novel.688 In this last, hyperbolic display, Portnoy acts out a favourite cinematic
stereotype. He plays the part of a criminal on the lam involved in a shoot out with the
police, during which he cries out 'But at least while I lived, I lived big!' before letting
out a barbaric yawp and engaging with the police in a suicidal gun battle.689 Opposed
to the Seymour Schmuck version of respectable masculinity there is the version of
masculinity represented by the sort of man who 'lives big'; the sort of man who sports
women like Thereal McCoy draped over his arm. This man is no one's son, father, or
husband; he is entirely his own, answering only to himself. When Portnoy fantasizes
about being the outsider—the gangster who yells 'Up society's ass, Copper!'—he
fantasizes about being that alternative version of masculinity that exhibits 'gusto,'
'boldness,' and 'courage' rather than restraint and obedience.690
In these and other ways Portnoy's Jewish-American upbringing and the
conflicts that Portnoy believes it engenders actually disclose a very American crisis of
masculinity. As Peter Schwenger warns, '[t]he very stability of the social context,
which seems so opposed to the male destructive element, ensures its continuation: for
it is in social expectations that the male mythology has its origins.'691 In the novel,
society's competing but equally prevalent definitions of masculinity are, on the one
hand, that of the Seymour Schmuck, with his excessive material success, upward
mobility, and social respectability. But on the other hand, there lurks that destructive
but bold figure of domination, vitality and aggression who pursues his pleasure with
688 Indeed, the example given from the novel of a film character—the gangster, or mafia
figure—is anything but 'all American' and, in fact, better suits Roth's definition of American as one of
'competing minorities'.
689 Roth, Portnoy's Complaint 21A.
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gusto and lets women know that 'I am the man around here, and I call the shots!'.692
There is the doctor-son, who gives his mother something to brag about even as he
drowns, and there is the 'Mad Dog' mobster with his 'guns blazing' who may die
young but courageously 'lived big.'693 The fact that these oft-recycled characters
present neither imaginative nor plausible images of vital and productive life does not
occur to Portnoy. Incredibly, for a man who claims to have been raised with binary
oppositions such as Jew versus Gentile, he fails to understand these two 'choices' of
doctor or Mad Dog are, in reality, the negative images of one another. They represent
two extremes of the masculine American imaginary: Johnny Appleseed opposed to A1
Capone, moll in tow. In this sense, what his mother really wanted, albeit in her own
Jewish terms, was, like most American mothers, to have a son that took part in the
American dream of material success and upward social mobility. But for every story
told or movie made about wholesome Americans benefiting from manners and
morals, there exists an alternative vision of sex, violence and independence.
That Portnoy cannot decide between a version of masculinity as Seymour
Schmuck or the version with Thereal McCoy draped over his arm is not the fault of
his Jewishness or his Jewish parents. Rather, it implicates a divided and materialistic
American society that is on the verge of a major 'crisis ofmasculinity,' increasingly
stricken by changing sex roles challenged by economical and social upheaval. A
further implication, however, is that this upheaval may not be a bad thing. As
Schwenger admonishes, '[ljike war, masculinity may be nourished by society until it
has grown to a point where it turns to destroy that which brought it into being.'694
Portnoy's Complaint does illustrate a man right on that threshold of self-destruction,
the victim of a society guilty of cultivating a set of dangerously unrealistic and
692 Roth, Portnoy's Complaint 88.
693 Roth, Portnoy's Complaint 274.
694 Schwenger 633.
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extreme masculine stereotypes. And yet, that Portnoy has sought out Dr. Spielvogel
for help with his condition is heartening, for it proves that he knows something is
wrong and acknowledges that it is something wrong with him. Dr. Spielvogel's
response is also encouraging. After patiently enduring Portnoy's 274 page tirade
without comment, the novel closes with what Portnoy understands to be the punch
line of his life story: 'So [said the doctor]. Now vee may perhaps to begin. Yes?'695
This last comment is obviously a humorous dig at Portnoy, who thinks that, with the
conclusion of his rant, the doctor will cure him and send him on his way, not
announce that they can only now commence with his treatment. But this is also
Roth's concluding indictment of Portnoy's obviously biased "confession"—his final
reminder that Portnoy is a patient, in need of care, and not to be trusted—as well as an
indication that there is yet hope for Portnoy's recovery. The very nature of Portnoy's
narrative—the confessions of a hysteric on the couch of his psychoanalyst—as well as
the response of his doctor—who indicates that Portnoy's own self-diagnoses are
flawed and that his 'confession' is only the beginning of his treatment—undercuts
assertions that Roth wants us to applaud or empathize with Portnoy. For Portnoy
may, indeed, be a victim, but Roth is careful to expose Portnoy as someone who needs
to rethink his conception of masculinity, as well as to expose the real culprit. Rather
than his Jewish heritage, or the machinations of women, Portnoy is the victim of the
unworkable demands of an American culture that mythologizes unrealistic and
imprudent models of masculinity.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have defended my assertion that critics are wrong when they
represent Roth or Amis as having an unhealthy or obsessive fixation on dead and
695
Roth, Portnoy's Complaint 274.
deadly images of women, and suggested that their real interest is with men and
masculinity. Both Roth and Amis, if they are 'obsessed' with anything, are fascinated
by how the masculine subject is formed. Both seem concerned by a masculine
propensity to imagine itself through a necessarily dehumanized feminine 'other,' and
both, to a certain extent, appear to agree with an academic and popular discourse that
positions masculinity as 'in crisis.' Their fiction, however, clearly illustrates limits on
'the crisis ofmasculinity'. Male characters such as Keith Talent and Alexander
Portnoy may genuinely be 'in crisis', but both Roth and Amis depict the ultimate
victims of this 'crisis' to be the women in their characters' lives. In other words,
these novels are not apologies for men nor are they excuses for violence against
women. They are, as critics are often happy to point out, about misogynists; but not
in the way such criticism suggest. Rather, as my thesis argues, Roth and Amis are




This thesis concludes where it began, with the questions posed by Julia Keller
in her article about Philip Roth. Keller titles her article 'Philip Roth Hates Women',
an absolutely unequivocal statement accusing Roth ofmisogyny. And yet her subtitle
to the article is, 'Is this true and does it matter?'.696 Keller answers the first question
with a resounding 'Yes.' She has no doubt that Roth does hate women and that this
hatred is writ large across the pages of his novels. But her second question, in which
she asks 'does it matter' if Roth is a misogynist, represents the typical approach to
Roth and Amis found in both academic criticism and popular journalism. While this
question might appear provocatively and rhetorically to accuse a man of hating
women and then glibly to ask whether or not hating women 'matters,' she complicates
any straightforward answer by immediately referring to Roth as a 'genius.' By raising
the issues of 'genius' and prejudice in the same characterization of an artist, Keller
calls attention to a complicated set of problems haunting literary criticism. Can a
writer be a racist, or an anti-Semite, or a misogynist and still be a 'genius'? Should
not being a 'genius' preclude any adherence to such obviously illogical prejudices as
hating someone based on their gender, ethnicity, religion, or colour? And yet, within
academia, we canonize writers such as Ezra Pound despite his infamously racist and
anti-Semitic attitudes.
As my thesis has argued, it is impossible to answer these questions without
first addressing the specific criticisms levelled against Roth and Amis and examining
the forms of fiction Roth and Amis are writing. While countless pages have been
filled with accusations against and defences of both writers, it is the fundamental
696 Julia Keller, 'Philip Roth Hate's Women' Chicago Tribune June 1, 2006, section five, page
1.
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premise of this thesis that all of these critiques and justifications are beside the point.
For it is my contention that those who read Roth or Amis 'as' misogynists do so out
of profound misreadings of both writers' novels. Such misreadings are often based on
a fantasized interaction on the part of the critic between him or herself and the
caricatured media ghoul that represents Roth or Amis in popular journalism. Who
would not want to publicly divorce themselves from the much-publicized lecherous
lunatic that is Roth qua Portnoy or the nepotistic aspiring yob that is Amis qua Keith
Talent? And yet these caricatures are just that, crassly drawn portraits of Roth and
Amis that have little to do with the fiction they actually write.
The reason that I assert that this thesis is not a 'defence' of Roth and Amis is
that I believe they do not need it. It is not that they are 'easy' or 'nice' writers, their
books are challenging and they do present the reader with repugnant images and
philosophies. But these images and beliefs are not presented to serve some
misogynistic agenda on Roth's or Amis's part but because they are representative of
the sorts of belief systems in which Amis and Roth are actually interested. Both
writers want to understand why people, and especially men, do what they do and
believe what they do. In other words, they are not just happy with diagnosing social
ills; they do not merely reproduce 'problems'. A good example of this is Amis's
Keith Talent. Keith is a rapist and wife-beater and yet these horrifying realities are
presented elliptically, almost as footnotes to his character. Amis is not interested in
parading before the reader another example of a wife-beating sexual brute. Rather,
Amis is interested in assessing the limits of cultural norms and questioning forms of
social acceptability. The difference between these two ideas is that the former, in
which Keith is merely paraded before the reader as an example of how not to behave,
would depict Keith as a model of a 'bad' masculine subject which must be labelled
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and shamed. Such a depiction would suggest that Keith is at fault for his behaviour
and is, therefore, in control of his character and that he is capable of change. But the
latter idea is far more unnerving in that Amis suggests, through Keith, a whole range
of influences upon men and the masculine subject that preclude change or even self-
understanding. In other words, Amis and Roth are interested less in what men do than
in why they do it.
Critics of both authors, however, will attempt to undermine this sort of
assertion by claiming that any thematic exploration of 'why men do what they do' is
undercut by both writers' focus on corrupt and corrupting images of women, of
violence against women, and the depiction of the pleasure that the degradation of
women brings to certain of their male characters. In other words, some would argue
that even if Roth and Amis are genuinely interested in formulating a critique of
violent masculine subjectivity, it does not matter if, in doing so, they give imaginative
life to exactly the sort of violent masculine fantasies they claim to be criticizing. I
would argue, however, that such an assertion assumes that the particular nature of
fantasies or philosophies is inconsequential, and that it is only the effect of images or
philosophies that matter. Roth and Amis understand that it is not only what people do
but also the particularities of a character's self-representation as well as their internal
life that matters. Support of this lies in their discussion of trauma, World War Two,
and the Holocaust. No one would argue with the fact that Nazis were anti-Semitic
and yet 'knowing' this is not enough. The real fascination, as Time's Arrow
reiterates, lies in why men like Odilo Unverdorben came to believe what they did and
how otherwise average people were able to commit such horrendous atrocities.
Time's Arrow also recalls the reader's attention to the fact that violence has, quite
simply, already been done. There is no act of brutality, sadism, or savagery that has
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not already been enacted to its fullest extent in the twentieth and twenty-first
centuries. And so, when Philip Roth depicts Mickey Sabbath attempting to bribe a
drunk with vodka for sexual favours Roth is not falsifying human nature in order to
fulfil some personal fantasy of perversion. Set, as Mickey's childhood is, against the
backdrop ofWorld War Two, his personal history suggests that while he may act
monstrously, any wicked act that he commits is insignificant compared to the
barbarity of the world in which he was raised.
In other words, those critics who would ask Amis and Roth to tone down their
criticisms for fear that their detailed depictions of violent ideologies might inspire
violence are deceiving themselves; such violence is already omnipresent. Roth and
Amis, furthermore, do not merely recreate the mindlessly repetitive violence of a
video game or horror film; they actually depict less of what characters such as
Portnoy, Sabbath, Keith Talent, or Odilo Unverdorben do as what they think. The
reader knows that Portnoy sodomizes his girlfriends, that Keith Talent beats his wife,
that Sabbath urinates on his lovers, and that Odilo commits genocide, but these details
as images or fantasies are peripheral to what these details mean in the greater context
of the individual character's ideological approach to life and of the character's wider
social Zeitgeist. And this brings me to the final claim ofmy thesis: that Amis's and
Roth's fiction explores some of the most pressing issues relevant to contemporary
society. Both writers seek to articulate how the masculine subject is formed, and this
focus on masculinity encompasses an interest in how masculinity imagines itself
through a necessarily dichotomized feminine 'other'. Roth and Amis also share an
interest in history, trauma, and narrative, subjects that the war in Iraq and the effects
of terrorism have made as current and crucial as they ever have been. Finally, their
interest in ideology, especially in a world rife with religious fundamentalism and
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radical political ideologies, means that their fiction will continue to be prescient and
most certainly controversial. It is my hope that this thesis will encourage readers of
Philip Roth and Martin Amis to move away from reading them 'as' misogynists, and
to focus on the real issues at stake in their fiction. To do otherwise would be to waste
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